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Money, Morals, and Human Rights: Commercial Influences in the Marketing, Branding, and Fundraising of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Arts

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MONEY, MORALS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMERCIAL INFLUENCES IN THE MARKETING, BRANDING, AND FUNDRAISING OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

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Graduate Program in Media Studies

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

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THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
Abstract

This thesis explores the marketing, branding, and fundraising activities of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and critically examines promotional texts used to communicate with the public. This thesis is multidisciplinary, combining scholarly work on the topics of history, humanitarianism, marketing, branding, commercialization, representation, and consumer culture. By adopting market logic and corporate strategies from the private sector, both organizations have increased revenue and created a strong identifiable brand. Each organization attempts to balance between the moral foundation or grassroots origins of the organization and the need to raise immediate revenue to sustain operations. This money-morals dilemma is also at play within the promotional material of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as each promotional text inadvertently seeks donations while also addressing the organizations’ desire to mobilize shame to aid sufferers.

Humanitarian action has been dramatically redefined by both organizations to include the act of consumption and speech-acts. It is concluded that some forms of corporate-inspired marketing and fundraising efforts have changed the nature of donor involvement with the cause. Virtuous action has been made easy and thoughtless, disconnecting donors from the potential benefactors of their actions and divorcing action from duty and sacrifice (Eikenberry, 2009). This notion is propagated in the promotional material of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as the technologization of action has enabled on-the-spot interventions that have simplified the spectator’s mode of engagement with the cause (Chouliaraki, 2010). The promotional material of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also engage spectators in playful acts of consumerism, emphasizing the brand values of each organization (Chouliaraki, 2010).

Keywords
marketing, branding, fundraising, nonprofit, NGO, consumer culture, donor, human rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, mobilizing shame, promotion, commercialization, humanitarianism, post-humanitarian communication
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Introduction

Purpose
Charitable organizations realize that their donor base is “overwhelmed with requests to support causes” and that some causes “appear more vital, more immediate, more critical, and more important” than others (Jordan and Quynn, 2009, p. 393), making it difficult for them to attract and maintain donor income in a highly competitive nonprofit environment. The combination of a highly saturated nonprofit market and limited donor resources has made donor income an unpredictable financial resource for many nonprofit organizations. Due to the volatile nature of donor revenue, organizations are relying less on this to sustain their activities, leaving NGOs searching for new ways to generate funds. For these reasons, among others, charitable organizations have adopted certain corporate strategies to generate income. Such “marketization” has resulted in humanitarian nonprofit organizations “coming to operate increasingly on market terms” and being “increasingly influenced by a logic of supply and demand” (Vestergaard, 2011, p.14).

Academics have taken note of the “commercialization,” “corporatization,” and “marketization” of the nonprofit sector, focusing their research on a myriad of nonprofit organizations such as museums, zoos and aquariums, hospitals, and social service providers like the American Cancer Society (Sloan, 1998; Young, 1998; Cain and Merritt, 1998; Anheier and Toepler, 1998). This thesis examines how human rights organizations have been influenced by this “marketization,” with a focus on commercial strategies used to raise revenues. Human rights organizations generate the majority of their income from donations and are not commercialized to the same extent as some of the organizations listed above. However, human rights NGOs have been undeniably influenced by private sector logic, adopting commercial practices that have inadvertently changed the mode of interaction and engagement with their donors.
The use of corporate strategies and working with for-profit firms enables nonprofits to improve efficiencies and augment revenues (Brinkerhoff, 2007). However, the embrace of corporate thinking does present interesting challenges and complications. Some, like Bush (1992), argue that nonprofits can easily lose sight of the need for cooperation across nonprofits when commercial strategies are employed. Moreover, Eikenberry and Drapal (2004) note that the use of for-profit strategies may run counter to fostering a strong civil society. Marketing and branding are arguably the most prevalent commercial tactics employed by NGOs. Marketing and branding have benefited organizations in building a globally identifiable brand, which can lead to increased donations. Yet, their use is a source of contention amongst donors due to costs associated with building and sustaining the brand, a cost that some believe should be put towards the organization’s services and programs (Hudson, 2007; Ritchie, Swami, & Weinberg, 1998). Moreover, marketing and branding initiatives have complicated the relationship between the donor and the organization. Donors have become consumers, not just supporters, of human rights, purchasing concert/film festival tickets and consumer goods, as well as engaging in numerous cause-marketing initiatives. In fact, the commercial element of human rights fundraising has resulted in the commodification of human rights. This thesis explores these points of contention, seeking to determine what motivates human rights nonprofits to engage in commercial practices and what these initiatives are teaching the public.

This thesis examines Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), with a focus on their adoption of commercial practices and business logic. This study traces the historical development of human rights organizations and the gradual implementation of private market logic, with an emphasis on social, political, and economic factors influencing the adoption of these practices. It discusses advantages and disadvantages associated with commercial practices, while assessing their impact on humanitarian values. This study also examines recent promotional materials produced by AI and HRW in order to illustrate how causes are represented to donor publics. These ad campaigns and promotional videos inhabit the intersection between humanitarian values (e.g. ethics and morality), the origins of these organizations, and commercial logic. A critical discursive analysis of this material reveals how these organizations have
redefined and technologized humanitarian action. These campaigns break with the “registers of pity” traditionally found in prior humanitarian communication, instead promoting an identifiable organizational brand (Chouliaraki, 2010). This thesis is guided by the following research questions: What corporate strategies have human rights organizations adopted from for-profit firms and what external and internal factors led to their adoption? What marketing strategies and promotional materials are used by human rights NGOs and how have these materials changed over time? What messages do these strategies reveal to the donor public? And lastly, what does human rights promotional material reveal about these organizations and their cause(s)?

**Methodology**

**Definitions**

For the purposes of this study, the phrases “human rights organizations” and “human rights NGOs” refer to those organizations that primarily focus their efforts on civil and political human rights, as outlined in the first 21 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These rights include, but are not limited to, the following: the right to life, right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the right to freedom of speech, religion, and association, and the right to not be held in slavery.

The term “commercialization” in this study refers to the “sustained activity, related, but not customary to the [nonprofit] organization, designed to earn money” (Skloot, 1987, p. 381). Commercialization also refers to business-like “organizational practice, planning, and behaviour” adapted by nonprofit organizations and embodies the “application of business thinking” and “business tools” to the “analysis and management of both nonprofit programs and other programs intended to generate revenue or profit” (Dart, 2004, p. 293-294). This descriptor incorporates not only programs/initiatives introduced to generate more income, but also business-like tools and thinking used by nonprofit firms to initiate, manage, and analyze these activities.

It is important to consider the complex relationship between humanitarianism and human rights. Humanitarianism can be understood as “a concern for human welfare” (Coyne, 2013, p.18) and Vestergaard (2011) notes that it is “a moral sensibility
demanding action on the part of the safe and secure, towards the suffering and endangered” (p.10). Humanitarianism also promotes the welfare of others based on the condition that all human beings deserve respect and dignity and should be treated with these principles in mind (Vestergaard, 2011). Humanitarianism is rooted in compassion with historical roots dating to the 18th century when compassion entered public life and inspired social reforms to alleviate suffering (Vestergaard, 2011). Since humanitarianism is compassion based, it supposes that “any instance of suffering is in equal demand of action, regardless of what brought the suffering on or what the consequences of assisting might be” (Vestergaard, 2011, p. 11). This gives rise to the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence, which “create[s] a humanitarian space which is insulated from politics” (Vestergaard, 2011, p. 11).

Human rights organizations have a complicated relationship to politics. These organizations find it almost impossible to appear neutral and must often “get their hands dirty with politics” (Barnett, 2009, p. 40). They seek to alter negative behaviour through denunciation and exposure and make human rights violations public in order to mobilize those powerful enough to end perpetrator abuse (Barnett, 2009; Keenan, 2004; Vestergaard 2011). Thus, human rights organizations concern themselves with causes and justice (Vestergaard, 2011). Moreover, human rights organizations emphasize “the importance of putting on public record evidence of abuses regardless of the outcome of this, making a forensic concern with witnessing, providing testimony, documenting and collecting evidence…” (Vestergaard, 2011, p.12). Lastly, human rights organizations are not based upon the moral claim of compassion alone, but are based upon the notion that all human beings are entitled to rights and freedoms simply because they are human (Vestergaard, 2011). Thus, humans can make demands in order to ensure that these rights are being met (Vestergaard, 2011). In general, human rights exist as shared norms or as legal rights existing nationally or internationally (Vestergaard, 2011).

Coyne (2013) defines humanitarian action as “the manifestation of humanitarianism” and includes “any coercive or noncoercive action intended to alleviate potential or existing human suffering and to improve the human condition” (p.18). Coyne (2013) states that noncoercive actions “include relief operations in response to immediate
human suffering and may also consist of various types of assistance—financial, physical capital, technical advice, and so on—to end poverty and foster growth and development to make people’s lives better” (p.18). Therefore, donor actions that are encouraged by NGOs (and to some degree, made possible by them)—including letter writing, petition signing, etc—are exemplary of forms of noncoercive action. However, humanitarian action is complicated when NGOs mediate between private citizens and humanitarian action, as action no longer simply serves sufferers, but also serves the organization offering ways in which to act (Davis, 2002).

Selection of Organizations

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were selected for analysis because the majority of their research efforts focus on civil and political human rights abuse. Amnesty International, established in 1961, was selected because it is representative of a member-based organization. Founded in 1978, Human Rights Watch is, in contrast, a non-member based organization. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are two of the largest international human rights organizations in the world. AI has more than three million supporters, members, and activists in over 150 countries (Amnesty International, 2011b). Both organizations have international reach with respect to researching and publicizing human rights abuse throughout the world. Both organizations have comparatively large operating budgets. In 2011, AI USA section had an operating budget of nearly $40 million. HRW’s budget that year topped $150 million. Both organizations have also undertaken numerous marketing and brand management initiatives in the past half-decade.

Collection of Promotional Material

This study examines print and video advertisements and other promotional materials, which allow for the study of the representation of human rights issues and messages pertaining to each organization’s brand. Promotional materials were collected from online advertising archives, organization websites, social media sites such as YouTube, news articles in the mainstream media (e.g. CBC news), and advertising/marketing blog sites.
Semi-Structured Interviews and Additional Research Materials

This thesis also relies on four semi-structured interviews conducted with financial, marketing, and nonprofit fundraising experts. Semi-structured interviews were selected as a means to gather information because they provide a level of flexibility and control to the researcher and the participant (Bryman, 2012). Semi-structured interviews consider the interviewee’s point of view and experiences in order to answer research questions (Bryman, 2012). An interview guide was used to ensure that major topics were discussed, however, based upon interviewee responses and their areas of expertise, follow-up questions not included in this guide were asked to gather additional applicable information to answer research questions (Bryman, 2012).

Interviews were conducted by telephone, email, or in person, depending on the location of the participant and individual preference. Participants were interviewed for approximately one hour and interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. The responses of participants that complemented secondary research findings were incorporated throughout the text to provide further insight and explanation into the adoption of commercial practices and marketing strategies of human rights organizations. These interviews are used as the foundation for Chapter Two, which tracks the implementation of various marketing and fundraising practices over the past few decades. In addition to these interviews, newspaper articles, blog entries, commercial websites, and academic texts are used to provide further insight into the marketing and fundraising practices of these organizations.

Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1: The Historical Development of International Nongovernmental Organizations

Beginning with a detailed account of the rise of civil societies emerging in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, this chapter traces the development of international nongovernmental groups concerned with human rights related issues. These groups concerned themselves with issues like slavery, women and labour rights, and peace and security. These organizations developed various advocacy strategies that served as historical precedent for later groups like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch. The successful protection of human rights, I argue, required the extensive involvement of the general public and nongovernmental organizations, as international bodies like the League of Nations, largely failed to ensure collective security. This chapter identifies new advocacy tools and strategies developed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in their infancy, which later enabled the human rights movement to flourish in the 1970s (Moyn, 2010).

Chapter 2: Fundraising, Marketing, and Branding Human Rights: Two Case Studies

Chapter Two historically traces the marketing, branding, and fundraising initiatives undertaken by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, most of which were rooted in commercial practices. This chapter outlines corporate partnerships, cause-marketing initiatives, corporate donations, and investment strategies used by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to increase exposure and raise revenue. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such revenue-generating tools and marketing strategies and their implications for donor relationships and the public’s perception of the organization.

Chapter 3: “Mobilizing Shame” and “Post Humanitarian” Communication

This chapter argues that the promotional texts of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch illustrate each organization’s dependence on the axiom of mobilizing shame. The axiom of mobilizing shame suggests that political injustices can be remedied through public exposure and the force of public opinion, which in turn inspires positive action and reform (Keenan, 2004). The promotional campaigns of AI and HRW also redefine humanitarian action, inviting the spectator to engage in speech-acts and technological tools in order to act and show support. Moreover, Chapter Three illustrates that the campaigns developed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch break with traditional “registers of pity” discourse and embody forms of “post-humanitarian” communication (Chouliaraki, 2010). This chapter highlights tensions in contemporary humanitarian communications related to communicating the organization’s brand values while also encouraging public action.
Chapter 1: The Historical Development of International Nongovernmental Organizations

Introduction

The nineteenth century is often characterized as a period of political nationalism; however, nations embracing nationalism could not prohibit the development and growth of international intergovernmental organizations and philanthropic societies (Seary, 1996). The nineteenth century saw the establishment of a transnational civil society, with private citizens tackling issues including women’s rights, peace and security, labour rights, and minority rights. These individuals used the press to garner widespread support and promote global change. At the close of the Great War and in response to the millions who had suffered at its expense, global powers convened to form the League of Nations to promote peace and ensure collective security. Regardless of its noble intentions, heightened international tensions resulted in nations withdrawing from the intergovernmental organization and ignoring its mandates, dwindling the organization’s potential success. Again, after the Second World War, global powers collaborated to form the United Nations, an organization that would succeed the League of Nations in promoting peace and security worldwide. Yet once again, nations were merely encouraged to promote human rights, but never ordered to do so (Ignatieff, 2003). In fact, some nations initially rejected proposals to incorporate human rights into the mandates of the United Nations, despite the atrocities committed against minorities during the Second World War. Potential members of the UN seemed more concerned about preventing another Hitler-like instance of aggression and intervention that was experienced just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was nongovernmental organizations and non-state actors that demanded that human rights be included in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Michael Ignatieff (2003) concisely states: “What broke the log-jam and turned human rights into a powerful critique of state sovereignty was not the advocacy of states, but the pressure of NGOs and non-state actors” (p. 54). It was clear early on that human rights “masked other agendas” (Moyn, 2010, p. 46) and state sovereignty took precedence over the protection of universalistic moral principles.
Human rights have remained subordinate to state sovereignty over the course of history (Ignatieff, 2003). It was the development of organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that enabled the more effective monitoring and enforcement of human rights on the international stage. Inspired by early nineteenth century advocacy group methods (though on an entirely larger scale), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch utilized the mass media to publicize human rights violations. These organizations created a direct connection to suffering, which allowed the public to connect with distant sufferers through letter writing and published newspaper articles that reached a global audience (Moyn, 2010). A direct connection to suffering proved useful in the nineteenth century, as sufferers often spoke about their experiences publicly and worked with organizations to promote change. This method enabled organizations to reach a large number of citizens who could rally together to support an organization’s work and demand that human rights abuse be brought to an end.

This chapter traces the development of international nongovernmental organizations dealing with human rights related issues. It also highlights the importance of international non-state groups and actors in the development and protection of human rights. The social, economic, and political influences that sparked the development of international nongovernmental organizations and enabled their successes or failures are also highlighted throughout the text. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates that the reliance on the public and nongovernmental organizations over governments is more successful in the protection of human rights. It was the revival of nineteenth century advocacy and media usage, along with the development of new advocacy tools/strategies by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that enabled the human rights movement to flourish in the 1970s and beyond.

1 The foundations of the concept of human rights are subject to consistent academic debate (Vestergaard, 2011). Ishay (2009) argues that the intellectual foundations of human rights can be traced as far back as Classical Greece. Ignatieff (2003) argues that the modern conception of human rights was born after the Second World War, while Moyn (2010) argues that the modern conception of human rights emerged much more recently, as late as the 1970s.
Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Origins

The nineteenth century is often noted for the rise and spread of nationalism. The term ‘nation’ became politicized in the late eighteenth century, as Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers redefined the concept (Herb & Badescu, 2008). Enlightenment thinkers argued that political power should rest in the hands of the people (termed a “nation”), as they shared a common interest and identity (Herb & Badescu, 2008). Rather than stressing the freedom of the individual as Enlightenment philosophers did, proponents of Romanticism defined the nation as a community sharing the same ethnic culture and soil—those who shared the same language and customs (Herb & Badescu, 2008). In response to the re-conceptualization of the ‘nation,’ the idea of nationalism spread across the globe over the course of a hundred years through revolutions that redrawed political boundaries in both the Americas and Europe (Herb & Badescu, 2008). The American Revolution led to other European colonies becoming independent states in the Americas (Herb & Badescu, 2008). Moreover, new nation-states, including Germany, Italy, and Belgium, emerged across Europe (Herb & Badescu, 2008). Nationalism, however, did not occur at the expense of international economic and political relationships (Seary, 1996). In fact, many of the factors that enabled the spread of nationalism—including advances in communication and social restructurings brought about by industrial and commercial revolutions—made international coordination and cooperation, both through governments and private philanthropic societies, possible (Herb & Badescu, 2008).

The development of humanitarian groups was partially made possible by the increased wealth of merchants. The Industrial Revolution facilitated the expansion of domestic and overseas trading (Herb & Badescu, 2008) and increased international interaction through trade and investment opportunities (Caron, 2000). Increased trading resulted in the increased wealth of merchants, which contributed to the rise of the bourgeoisie (Herb & Badescu, 2008). The development of a worldwide network of goods, capital, and labor resulted in a thriving world economy, with corporations and middle class individuals having more funds to invest in private philanthropic organizations (Iriye, 2002). The growing middle class meant that a greater number of
individuals had the time, education, and now the financial resources necessary to foster social change through the participation in humanitarian societies and organizations with international reach (Seary, 1996).

The first half of the nineteenth century also saw technological developments and advances in communication that helped to facilitate the development of international non-state groups. The development of the locomotive, the steamship, and the telegraph, as well as the growth in rail systems, condensed time and space and allowed for more frequent communication and human contact (Iriye, 2002; Seary, 1996). The dissemination of information was made possible by large-scale printing of newspapers and other literature that could then be transported through postal services in Europe and the Americas (Herb & Badescu, 2008). It was against this landscape that international non-state societies emerged and flourished in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Moreover, international cooperation at conferences/congresses and the development of international governmental organizations also inspired non-state groups to proceed internationally.

In addition, the development of humanitarian societies was largely inspired by Enlightenment thinking and the late eighteenth century awakening of religious revivalism, a movement that “emphasized salvation and the moral regeneration of society” (Cortright, 2008, p. 26). By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, citizens had become concerned about social conditions and believed that the formation of societies committed to action would help to address their concerns and materialize social change (Seary, 1996). The public felt a strong need to morally reform society, which inspired private individuals to organize campaigns on numerous social issues (Cortright, 2008).

Slavery

The slave trade was the first humanitarian cause undertaken by international non-state organizations (Charnovitz, 1997). Anti slavery organizations were “among the first institutions created to fight violations of human dignity” (Oberleitner, 2007, p. 24) and the campaigns organized by these groups “were the first to garner widespread support for
a single, bounded issue based on universal moral principles” (DeMars, 2005, p. 66). The anti-slavery movement was the first cause in which “transnational moral entrepreneur[s]” played a significant role (Andreas & Nadelman, 2008, p. 30). Small, national organizations, such as The Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade and the Société des Amis Noirs, both formed in the late eighteenth century, preceded international organizations formed in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. These groups achieved tremendous success in their emancipation efforts when British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act in 1807 and the United States passed the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves in the same year (Lauren, 2007). These groups achieved even further success with the passing of the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833. National anti-slavery groups organized committees, signed petitions, and issued pamphlets dedicated to ending slavery. For example, The American Anti Slavery Society (1833) produced newspaper articles, pamphlets, and books, and published The Emancipator and the National Anti-Slavery Standard (Kamrath, 2007). The Society also relied on former slaves, such as Frederick Douglass, to speak publicly to expose the wrongs of slavery (Kamrath, 2007). The group circulated tracts and periodicals, utilized the press, and encouraged the organization of anti-slavery groups (Kamrath, 2007). The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society (BFASS) (1833) conducted national women’s conventions, organized a multistate petition campaign, organized fundraisers for male antislavery organizations, and sponsored lectures (Caddel-Liles, 2007). The BFASS also organized fairs at which handmade items and donated goods were sold (Caddel-Liles, 2007). In addition, the BFASS published The Liberty Bell, an annual gift book that included poetry, reflective essays, biographical sketches, and short stories (Caddel-Liles, 2007; Chambers-Schiller, 1994). The Liberty Bell was sold at anti-slavery fairs to visitors and was also distributed to fair workers. The gift book acted as a memento of the fair and an acknowledgment of one’s contribution to the anti-slavery cause (Chambers-Schiller, 1994).

International anti-slavery organizations first emerged in 1839 with the founding of the British Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. In its effort to abolish slavery worldwide (it was believed that by the 1840s there were millions of slaves living in Brazil, the US, Spain, France, and Holland), the Society employed a paid executive (the “Secretary”) and published a journal entitled The Anti-Slavery Reporter (Miers, 2003).
Anti Slavery Society sent articles and letters to the press, produced books and pamphlets, organized lectures and meetings, and corresponded with the government to offer criticism and advice (Miers, 2003). The Society put pressure on the British government by rallying public opinion (which, in the nineteenth century, was expressed by the public through the press and at the polls) (Miers, 2003). The organization also planned international antislavery conventions, which were attended by all leading British abolitionists, international representatives, provincial antislavery societies, church groups, other benevolent societies, and numerous spectators (Miers, 2003). To prepare for its conventions, the organization launched worldwide slavery investigations and employed the use of questionnaires to gather information/research (Miers, 2003).

Peace Organizations

Societies devoted to the promotion of peace emerged in the early nineteenth century, in large part due to the religious-inspired social reform movement, public outrage at the horrors of the Napoleonic Wars, and opposition to the War of 1812 in the United States (Cortright, 2008). The first peace organization, The New York Peace Society, appeared in the United States in 1815 (Cortright, 2008). Inspired by a member’s novel, entitled War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ, the New York Peace Society “believed that war was contrary to the spirit and example of Christ and that it inevitably led to intemperance and barbarism” (Cortright, 2008, p. 27). Peace societies also sprouted up in London. In Britain, pacifism was largely influenced by the Quakers’ denunciation of war (Cortright, 2008). In 1816, Quakers established the British Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace (also known as the London Peace Society) (Cortright, 2008). Participation in this organization was open to all and the group attracted many Christian members, including Anglicans and other non-Quakers (Brock, 1972). As was typical of most social reform organizations, the London Peace Society (LPS) distributed leaflets, pamphlets, and tracts to educate the public and raise awareness. The LPS printed 32,000 copies of its tracts and distributed them in its first year and beginning in 1819, the organization published a monthly journal called the Herald of Peace (Brock, 1972).
Peace movements eventually spread to other areas in Europe beginning in 1821, when the *Société de la Morale Chretienne* emerged in Paris, followed by the *Société de la Paix de Genève* in 1830. These European organizations, while anchored by religious beliefs, were also inspired by “ideas of democracy and liberty” (Cortright, 2008, p. 28).

As the mid-nineteenth century approached, American and European peace activists worked together to hold a series of peace conferences in Europe (Campbell, MacKinnon, & Stevens, 2010). The London Peace Society joined with other pacifists, holding conferences in London in 1842 and 1843 (Campbell et al, 2010). The Peace of Nations Society (1847) worked with the London Peace Society and arranged conferences in Brussels in 1848, Paris in 1848, Frankfurt in 1850, and London in 1851, with the goal of encouraging nations to peacefully solve disputes (Campbell et al, 2010). However, these conferences had borne few fruits, as the delegates that supported peace “had little political means to influence policy” (Cortright, 2008, p. 35).

Meanwhile, intergovernmental groups formed to promote the cause of peace across Europe. Internationalism was not an entirely new concept to nation-states (Iriye, 2002). Nations often cooperated with one another through treaties designed to ensure national security and protect national interests (Iriye, 2002). In the nineteenth century, the nature of these cooperative intergovernmental efforts changed. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), attended by European state ambassadors to discuss and ensure peace and the balance of power in Europe, developed an international approach to European ethical and economic concerns (Seary, 1996). The Treaty of Paris (1814) “established the first intergovernmental political structure in the sense of regular meetings with broad objectives and an open agenda” (Seary, 1996, p.18). The Treaty of Paris outlined that signatories would hold meetings devoted to their common interest in ensuring prosperity and peace in Europe (Seary, 1996). Subsequent congresses were held in 1818, 1820, 1821, and 1822 (Seary, 1996). International cooperation is further evidenced with the establishment of the first intergovernmental organization, which emerged out of the Congress of Vienna in 1815: the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (Iriye, 2002). The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine was limited to participation by central European nation-states (Iriye, 2002). However, with the development of new international governmental organizations, inclusivity became the
trend (Iriye, 2002). Organizations started including members from nations across the globe in addition to European representatives (Iriye, 2002). The Superior Council of Health (1838), for example, included both European and Ottoman delegates (Iriye, 2002).

In the early nineteenth century, nations started to organize international conferences that discussed preventative measures for war, the codification of international law, and the establishment of international courts of arbitration (Iriye, 2002). It became clear early on that pan-European issues were to be addressed in pan-European ways (Seary, 1996). National representatives worked hand in hand to tackle international problems, proving that “nations existed not simply to provide for the security and interests of their citizens, but also to promote the well-being of all of them collectively, and that in the modern world more could be gained through international cooperation than through unilateral action” (Iriye, 2002, p. 11). This notion inspired activist groups to model themselves after the collaborative efforts of international government representatives (Iriye, 2002).

The peace movement strengthened as it moved into the second half of the nineteenth century with the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC’s roots date back to the late 1850s (Forsythe, 2005), when Henry Dunant witnessed the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino (1859), a battle between Austria and France and Piedmont (Solis, 2010). As was quite common in the nineteenth century, wounded soldiers, without assistance and unable to keep up with remaining troops, were left to perish on the battlefield (Solis, 2010). Dunant, witnessing the horrific sight of the wounded, immediately helped to “police the battlefield of wounded soldiers of both sides” and assisted in their care (Solis, 2010, p. 47). Three years later, in 1862, he wrote *A Memory of Solferino*, a novel detailing his experience (Forsythe, 2005). The end of Dunant’s publication “contain[ed] the seed of an idea for the formation of neutral relief committees in times of peace,” where trained volunteers would treat wounded soldiers under the protection of international treaties ensuring their safety and security (Solis, 2010, p. 48). In 1863, government experts and private individuals implemented Dunant’s suggestions, marking the start of the Red Cross movement (Solis, 2010). Dunant’s
extraordinary work eventually led to the signing of the first Geneva Convention in 1864, a document that protects the rights of victims of war (Forsythe, 2005).

The Red Cross wasn’t alone. International peace organizations continued to spread across Europe as well, with the establishment in 1867 of the Paris based *Ligue Internationale et Permanente de la Paix* and the Geneva based *Ligue Internationale de la Paix et de la Liberte* (Cortright, 2008). The Society for the Promotion of Danish Neutrality emerged in 1882 and the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society was established in 1883 (Cortright, 2008). These organizations sought to achieve and maintain peace as international tensions heightened at the close of the nineteenth century.

*Labour Rights*

Labor rights groups also blossomed in the nineteenth century in response to workplace changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The workers’ movement was “organized to counter the power of private capital by means of counter-institutions, like the cooperative and the trade union, which backed new public policies” and covered such issues as the abolition of child labour and night work by women, the reduction of working time, and improved working conditions (Keane, 2003, p. 49). Workers often called on governments to develop social policies, like unemployment insurance, and to host work related conferences (Keane, 2003). The first forms of labour unions were formed in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century with the purpose of protecting members against illness and workplace accidents (Schmidt, 2010). For example, Robert Owen’s Grand National Consolidated Trades Union (GNCTU) was established in 1834. The GNCTU “proposed to rationalize the existing structure of trade unions and to provide assistance for all workers on strike” (Jackson, 1982, p. 39). In Germany, The Brotherhood of German Workers emerged in 1848 and had roughly 18,000 members (Schmidt, 2010). This organization “understood its purpose not only as an organization of working class interests but also as a precursor for civil, political, and human rights of the working people” (Schmidt, 2010, p. 921). Moreover, in Britain, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Machinists, Smiths, Millwrights and Pattern Makers was founded in 1851 (Jackson, 1982).
The labour movement reached its peak in the late nineteenth century with the development of large-scale national and international groups. Some organizations looked to the strength and stability of earlier unions and organizations for inspiration, relying on their methods of operation as the foundation for the establishment of new unions, like the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (England, 1860) (Keane, 2003). Other organizations preferred to tackle labour issues on the international stage. In 1864, the first international labour organization emerged with the establishment of the International Working Men’s Association (IWMA) (Keane, 2003). The IWMA was concerned with issues that affected working individuals and promoted research into working conditions (Forman, 1998). The organization supported striking workers, acted as a forum for debates on the effects of industrialization, and called for the equality of rights and participation for women and teenagers in the workforce (Forman, 1998). The movement also saw the development of the International Federation of Tobacco Workers and the International Federation for the Observation of Sunday (1876), both of which focused on international labour issues (Forman, 1998).

Into the 1880s, the labour movement “developed into mass organizations with multifunctional purposes” (Schmidt, 2010, p. 921). For example, the American based Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labour was formed in 1869 out of the disintegrated Garment Cutters Association (established in 1862) (Foner, 1947). The Knights sought to achieve better working conditions through trade assemblies and the replacement of capitalist systems by the cooperative system (Foner, 1947). The group also wanted to achieve “the complete emancipation of the wealth producers from the thralldom and loss of wage slavery” (Foner 1947, p. 436). The organization’s membership reached 700,000 by 1886 (Wheeler, 2002). Moreover, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was established in 1886, marking it as one of the first federations of labour unions in the United States (Greene, 1998). The AFL represented an array of unions, such as tailors, bakers, iron molders, bricklayers, printers, miners, and carpenters (Greene, 1998).

New intergovernmental organizations also emerged throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. These organizations dealt with numerous issues, ranging from
weight measurements to health measures (Roberts, 1998). Organizations like the
International Telegraph Bureau (1868) and the Universal Postal Union (1874), along with
other organizations, led to the standardization of weights and measurements, the adoption
of uniform postal and telegraphic rates, and international measures to cope with the
danger of communicable diseases, all of which further increased international
cooperation (Iriye, 2002).

Women's Rights

By the mid-nineteenth century, groups dedicated to women’s political rights
flourished worldwide (Ishay, 2009). The aspirations of the women’s rights movement
were closely linked to those of the abolitionist movement and were “inspired by the same
equal rights literature” (Stokes, 2005, p. 49). Women, who fought diligently for the
abolition of the slave trade, became politicized about their position of inequality in
society when they were excluded from the World Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840 solely
because of their gender (Stokes, 2005). Furthermore, changing gender relations
throughout the nineteenth century inspired the growth of the women’s movement
(Berkovitch, 1999). The perceived role of women in society was being challenged
throughout the nineteenth century, as middle class women had rising educational
aspirations, were playing an increasingly important role in philanthropic and social work,
and were moving into the labour market as a direct result of industrialization (Berkovitch,
1999). Middle and upper class women called for equality between the sexes at the 1848
Seneca Falls Convention in New York, demanding the right to own property, to have
custody of their children in case of divorce, to keep their own earnings, to sign contracts,
to serve on juries, and to equal education, as well as voting rights (Ishay, 2009).

The women’s rights movement led to the establishment of national organizations
concerned with education, employment, and suffrage. These organizations include: The
Female Political Association in 1851 (Britain), the Society for Promoting the
Employment of Women in 1859 (Britain), General German Women’s Association in
1865 (Germany), the American Equal Rights Association in 1866 (United States), and the
American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) in 1869 (Burstyn, 1990; Clark, 2008).
Female members of women’s rights organizations published pamphlets, journals, and books to help educate and publicize the concerns of women. Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, one of the founders of the Society for Promoting the Employment of Women (SPEW), published pamphlets on the *Most Important Laws Concerning Women* (1854) and *Women at Work* (1857) (Clark, 2008). SPEW published the *Englishwomen’s Journal*, while the leader of the American Woman Suffrage Association financed (and founded) a weekly newspaper entitled *The Woman’s Journal* (Burstyn, 1990).

The women’s movement proceeded internationally by the late nineteenth century. The first international women’s rights organization, the International Association of Women, was established in 1870 (Kuhlman, 2002). Earlier national organizations saw the benefits of international cooperation and in 1882, two leaders of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) agreed that it was time to unite forces to organize an international society for the political rights of women, called the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (Berkovitch, 1999). At the NAWSA meeting in 1887, the idea of an International Woman Suffrage Congress was put on the society’s agenda, and in 1888, marking the fortieth anniversary of the Seneca Falls Conference that ignited the women’s movement in the United States, an international congress was held in Washington, DC (Berkovitch, 1999). Representatives from organizations across the globe attended the congress, including those from Canada, Denmark, England, Finland, France, India, Norway, and Scotland. The International Council of Women was officially created and would act as an umbrella organization for all women’s associations, clubs, and organizations (Berkovitch, 1999).

International tensions in the 1890s put once peaceful cooperation in jeopardy. Between 1892 and 1894, Germany was concerned with the progressive consolidation of the Franco-Russian alliance (Barcroft, 1989). Moreover, the Kruger telegram disrupted the once peaceful relationship between Britain and Germany in 1896 (Barcroft, 1989). In 1898, the United States was at war with Spain and the US emerged as a new key power in the international arena (Barcroft, 1989). In that same year, Britain and France threatened war against one another over the conquest of Africa (Barcroft, 1989). International disputes were becoming the norm, as was the practice of resorting to war to solve them.
Germany continued to expand its army and other nations, in fear, began to follow suit (Barcroft, 1989). An arms race had begun, as nations had started to increase their level of armaments for national protection and the application of industrial technology during the Industrial Revolution made the mass manufacture of armaments possible.

Inspired by rising international tensions and the growing arms race, as well as the international peace movement and evidence of international cooperation witnessed throughout the nineteenth century, Tzar Nicholas II of Russia invited world powers to convene at the 1899 Hague Conference (Barcroft, 1989). The Hague Conference was held to “address issues of war and peace” and the main topics on the conference agenda were disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration (Caron, 2000, p. 14). Rather than promoting peace, the conference merely updated the laws of war (Best, 1999). Signatory nations banned the use of some war machinery, such as balloons, and agreed that nations should abstain from the use of projectiles utilizing gases, in the hopes of preventing chemical and biological warfare (Best, 1999). In addition, nations agreed not to use bullets that “expand or flatten easily in the human body” (Barcroft, 1989, p. 65) and agreed on restraint principles in land and sea bombardment in the interests of protecting civilians, a group that was slowly becoming more involved in war (Best, 1999). Although the Hague Conference sought to protect civilian rights during wartime through international agreements (Normand & Zaidi, 2008), the conference seemed to focus more so on outlining acceptable war weaponry and combat behaviour, which limited its effectiveness (Best, 1999).

Despite noble efforts, the Hague Conference failed to protect civilians and limit military technology. By the turn of the century, the world was facing the rising power of Germany, which threatened the balance between European imperialist powers (Normand & Zaidi, 2008). Nation-states were more concerned about protecting their own interests, rather than adhering to and practicing universalistic principles (Iriye, 2009). International efforts that once attempted to protect humanitarian principles in war were “swept away” by the horrific violence of World War I (Normand & Zaidi, 2008, p. 43).
The nineteenth century reflects the tension between international cooperation and the rise of nationalism (Iriye, 2009). Throughout the nineteenth century, nation states pursued their own interests by “building up their military power and establishing colonies overseas” (Iriye, 2009, p. 39). However, this period is also characterized by the formation of numerous non-state advocacy groups and societies by private citizens that concerned themselves with philanthropic and humanitarian pursuits (Iriye, 2009). Private citizens developed an effective advocacy formula to foster social change and their efforts led to the formation of a transnational civil society that demanded the protection of universalistic moral principles. These groups, through the public sphere, used the media to garner public support and rallied together to encourage change that would protect the rights of individuals and groups. As Geoffrey Best (1999) accurately notes, in the nineteenth century the “word ‘globalization’ was unknown and the expression ‘human rights’ was not yet in use, but both concepts were (so to speak) in the air…” (p. 620).

**World War One and the Interwar Years**

The Great War saw the advent of total war and advances in military technology that caused immense human suffering. The war “blurred the distinction between civilians and combatants” (Marshall, 1964, p. viii). Civilians were targeted to weaken the morale of soldiers and weaken the military’s economic backbone (Chickering & Forster, 2000). Technological advances made the Great War tremendously lethal (Marshall, 1964). Modern factories were able to produce ammunition in large quantities and modern technology resulted in the development of tanks, dreadnoughts, submarines, and artillery that could lob explosives up to seventy-five miles (Marshall, 1964). Regardless of the agreement made at the Hague Conference, nations used poisonous gases and weapons, like the machine gun, that caused tremendous suffering (Marshall, 1964).

The result of the use of such weaponry was shocking. At the close of the War on the Western front in November 1918, approximately fourteen million people had died, most of whom were soldiers (Hunt, 2008). In addition, two million Russians were lost during the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution (Hunt, 2008), when the Bolshevik party emerged and overthrew the Western-style Provisional Government (Rabinowitch, 2009). The astonishing death toll of WWI had the victorious allies in search of a mechanism to
ensure global peace (Hunt, 2008). Upon the close of WWI, the right to self-determination, labour, and minority rights became an international concern (Normand & Zaidi, 2008). US President Woodrow Wilson hoped that these rights would be realized through the League of Nations, an intergovernmental organization that “would establish borders for homogenous ethnic groups, thereby presumably removing a major cause of war” (Ishay, 2009, p. 188). The League of Nations, formed in 1919, operated with the intent of “promot[ing] international cooperation and achiev[ing] international peace and security,” as well as “compel[ling] member states ‘not to resort to war’ and to abide by international law and treaty obligations” (Ishay, 2009, p. 207). The League of Nations was to “maintain peace, oversee disarmament, arbitrate disputes between nations, and guarantee rights for national minorities, women, and children” (Hunt, 2008, p. 200). The League emerged as an intergovernmental organization concerned with many of the rights that small advocacy groups defended throughout the nineteenth century.

The League of Nations developed Minorities Treaties and made admission to the League contingent on the protection of minority rights (Lauren, 2011). The League instruments to protect minority rights guaranteed minorities the right to not be discriminated against, ensured equal protection under the law, the freedom of religion, and equal access to public employment and commerce (Lauren, 2011). Moreover, the League guaranteed the right to use minority language and for minorities to maintain their own educational institutions (Kamminga, 1992). The League of Nations also prohibited slavery and any remnants of the slave trade in areas under its control (Lauren, 2011). To help secure these rights, the League “encouraged states to sign bilateral agreements protecting minority rights” and created “special mechanisms and procedures” which allowed “minority groups to bring complaints against states that violated their rights before the international community” (Lauren, 2011, p. 117).

The League of Nations also specifically addressed the rights of women and children and worked with a number of organizations on this front, including: the International Council of Women (1888), the International Alliance of Women (1904), the International Federation of Business and Professional Women (1930), the International Federation of University Women (1919), the World Young Women’s Christian
Association (1855), and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (1915) (Pietila, 2002). Additionally, The International Council of Women (ICW) called upon the League for the suppression of women and child trafficking and the right of women to vote (D’Itri, 1999, 143). To further indicate its support of female equality, the League of Nations also welcomed the participation of women and addressed women’s issues such as prostitution, consent in marriage, the exploitation of women, human trafficking, and the welfare of families (Lauren, 2011). Many women’s organizations lobbied to the League of Nations during the 1920s and 1930s to ensure that women’s rights were not ignored on an international level (Pietila, 2002).

The International Labour Organization (ILO), an agency of the League of Nations, emerged in 1919 due to pressure from the workers’ trade union organizations (Lauren, 2011). The ILO was responsible for investigating working conditions, handling labour complaints, coordinating contact between labour unions, and drafting treaties (Lauren, 2011). The ILO also promoted economic and social justice, created the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions (a treaty monitoring board), and published the International Labour Review (Lauren, 2011).

To directly address the catastrophes realized during the Great War, the League of Nations developed a system to solve international disputes through the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in 1924 (Lauren, 2011). The protocol extended the jurisdiction of the Court of International Justice and stated that disputes falling outside this jurisdiction would be settled through arbitration (Lauren, 2011). The protocol also bound signatory nations to participate in the application of sanctions (Craig & Gilbert, 1994). Furthermore, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous gases, and of bacteriological agents in war (Schindler & Toman, 1988), a direct response to their use during WWI. Moreover, in 1929, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War protected soldiers detained during wartime and “guaranteed the captured and wounded shall be humanely treated and protected with the right to receive medical attention and the right to be free from torture” (Lauren, 2011, p. 121).
Meanwhile, new nongovernmental organizations emerged and others reformulated their causes to deal with the protection of rights after the war. Minority rights groups sprouted up in Japan and China with the development of the League for the Abolition of Race Discrimination (1920) and the Pan-Asian Society (1921), respectively (Lauren, 2011). In 1925, representatives from across Asia joined together to form the Coloured International, which called for the abolition of racial discrimination in immigration policies (Lauren, 2011). The *Ligue Universele pour la Defense de la Race Noire* (1924) was formed to protect those victimized because of skin colour (Lauren, 2011). The *Academie Diplomatique Internationale* (ADI) was developed in 1926 and suggested that “all inhabitants of all states should have the right to receive full and complete protection of life and liberty, equality before the law” and that these individuals should enjoy “civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language, or religion” (Lauren, 2011, p. 114). Members of the *L’Institut de Droit International* adopted the Declaration of the International Rights of Man in 1929, urging that the rights of man be internationally recognized (Lauren, 2011). Members insisted on the protection of the right to life, liberty, and property regardless of one’s sex, race, language, or religion (Lauren, 2011). The Declaration of the International Rights of Man was comprised of six articles, the first three of which “defined a state’s duty to recognize the equal rights of each person within its territory to life, liberty, property, and religious freedom” (Weissbrodt, 2007, p. 20). The remaining three articles “outlined the states’ duties toward their citizens” (Weissbrodt, 2007, p. 20). These notions challenged national sovereignty and marked “a significant point of departure for a new era of international human rights” (Lauren, 2011, p. 114).

NGOs that focused on the rights of children also emerged in the aftermath of WWI. These organizations included the Save the Children Fund (1919) and the *Union Internationale de Secours aux Enfants* (1920) (Lauren, 2011). The League of Nations responded to the lobbying of these organizations and created the Advisory Committee for Child Welfare to address life and health in early infancy and childhood (Lauren, 2011). In 1923, the League adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which was drafted by the founder of Save the Children (Lauren, 2011; Ensalaco, 2005). The Declaration “covered a full array of concerns, including food, health care, delinquency, shelter,
emergency relief, work, exploitation, and the ‘child’s service to mankind’” (Ensalaco, 2005, p. 10). Not only is this indicative of the League’s desire to protect the welfare and rights of children, but it illustrates the productive and cooperative working relationship between NGOs and the League of Nations.

The League of Nations made limited references to INGOs through its Covenant, but at “an informal level, the presence of NGOs was an established fact” (Seary, 1996, p. 22). The League Secretariat often sent representatives to NGO conferences and international NGOs were sometimes invited to meetings held by the League of Nations (Charnovitz, 1997; Seary, 1996). In 1925, the League assigned one staff member the responsibility of overseeing the League’s relationship with NGOs (Charnovitz, 1997). NGOs also played an important role in the League’s work on minority rights, disarmament, children and women, and refugees and relief work (Charnovitz, 1997). For example, the League would accept minority rights petitions from NGOs and allowed feminist groups to present reports and initiate discussions (Charnovitz, 1997). Nevertheless, NGO involvement in the League of Nations was inconsistent. After 1932, collaboration between the League and NGOs was limited (Charnovitz, 1997). NGOs began contributing to the policy work of the League during its infancy, but the League of Nations was less interested in this in later years, only providing information for or about the work of NGOs through publications like the Quarterly Bulletin of Information on the Work of International Organizations and the Handbook of International Organizations (Charnovitz, 1997; Seary, 1996). Bertram Pickard speculates that there are numerous possible reasons for this inconsistency, noting that “heightened world tensions, the growing number of NGOs, the growing bureaucratization of the League’s Secretariat, and the greater technical competence of NGO representatives” may be to blame (as cited in Charnovitz, 1997, p. 247).

The League of Nations appeared to combine a “number of single-issue struggles into a broader vision of interdependent and indivisible human rights” (Lauren, 2011, p. 123). Yet, in the 1920s and 1930s, the world was engulfed in turmoil, with the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, the withdrawal of nations from the League or their unwillingness to participate (United States), and the struggles brought about by the
The Fascist Party emerged in Italy under the leadership of Mussolini in 1922, by the late 1920s Stalin had established a dictatorship in the Soviet Union, Nazism flourished under Hitler’s reign beginning in the 1930s, and militarism reached new heights in Japan (Lauren, 2011). These regimes did not care for internationalism or universal laws of humanity, and did not want to concern themselves with the protection of individual gender or minority rights that the League of Nations sought to protect (Lauren, 2011). Instead, these regimes glorified the nation-state and the concept of sovereignty and were determined to gain territory by exerting power over others (Lauren, 2011). Unhappy with the League of Nation’s condemnation, Japan severed ties with the organization in 1931 (Lauren, 2011). Hitler also cut ties from the League in 1933 and made anti-Semitism state policy. His actions inspired nations like Poland, Hungary, and Romania to declare that they, too, did not need to protect minority rights (Lauren, 2011). In the meantime, Stalin initiated the Great Terror in the mid 1930s, executing those who opposed his leadership, and Mussolini launched a war against Ethiopia in 1935, destroying hospitals and attacking women and children (Lauren, 2011).

The Great Depression of the 1930s made circumstances even more difficult. The Depression caused “serious unemployment, poverty, starvation, homelessness, and economic and social collapse that severely stressed democratic institutions and international efforts by the League” (Lauren, 2011, p. 134). Despite the fact that INGOs had much to fight for during this period, the Great Depression reduced INGO revenues and many organizations were forced to limit the number of conferences attended, publications, and other advocacy initiatives (Davies, 2008).

The League of Nations proved ineffective in “enforcing the ‘collective security’ by means of an international organization based on sovereign states” (Ishay, 2009, p. 178). The League of Nations, like the Hague Conference before it, reflected the contradictions between national self-interests and the protection of individual rights (Normand & Zaidi, 2008). The League failed to stop the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, both of which led to the outbreak of World War II (Hunt, 2008). However initially promising the League of Nations appeared to be, it failed to work consistently with NGOs, and government leaders could not protect individual and
minority rights on an international level while trying to pursue their own self-interests. Trying times brought about by regimes hungry for power, coupled with the Great Depression, weakened civil society and crippled the effectiveness of INGOs and the League of Nations.

**World War Two and the Development of the United Nations**

The global tensions that mounted in the 1930s resulted in the outbreak of World War II. It proved more barbaric than WWI, with the death toll reaching sixty million, most of whom were civilians (Hunt, 2008). In WWII, civilian populations were bombed in the hopes that breaking down civilian morale would lead to victory (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2010). German air raids in Britain, the British bombing of Cologne and Dresden, and the United States’ atomic bombing of Japan caused tremendous civilian loss (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2010). Further technological improvements since WWI increased civilian deaths. Guns were heavier and fired more rapidly and improvements were made to military tanks and aircrafts (Weinberg, 2005). In addition, prisoner of labour camps produced more war victims, and some nations employed slave labourers to increase the production of military weaponry (Weinberg, 2005).

The Holocaust marked one of the most devastating human rights violations of the century (Ishay, 2009). Although some opposed Hitler’s plan, many participated in it (Berenbaum, 2005). Churches and the ministry provided the birth records that indicated Jewish members of the public, post offices delivered deportation orders, the finance ministry seized Jewish property, Jewish employees were fired from German places of employment, Jewish students were refused from universities, pharmaceutical companies tested drugs on prisoners at concentration camps, and companies provided ovens and chemical gases for exterminations (Berenbaum, 2005). More than six million Jewish men, women, and children were killed in concentration camps in Dachau, Auschwitz, Belzec, Majdanek, and Treblinka (Ishay, 2009). The Nazis also targeted Gypsies, the handicapped, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and social democrats (Ishay, 2009). These captives were “enslaved, exhausted by agonizing labour, tortured, starved, and ultimately consumed in crematoria or open fires” (Ishay, 2009, p. 215-17). These
violations inspired the founding of new governmental and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the protection of human rights.

The United States-based International League for the Rights of Man (ILRM), founded in 1942, was the first organization that approached the concept of human rights as a whole (as opposed to the rights of one particular group or one particular right) (Clark, 2008). The organization was formed by French refugees in New York, the majority of whom were once associated with the *Ligue Francaise pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen* (French League for the Defense of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) (Clark, 2008; Neier, 2012). These individuals wanted to continue the activities of the French League, despite Nazi occupation of France, and invited Roger Baldwin Nash to be on the Board of Directors of the new organization formed during the war (Neier, 2012).

As World War II wound down, the Allies were determined to develop an institution stronger than the League of Nations, one that would ensure collective security and world peace (Hunt, 2008; Ishay, 2009). In 1944, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, world superpowers including China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom began to prepare proposals for the United Nations (Ishay, 2009). These nations “agreed that all peace-loving states would be eligible for membership” (Ishay, 2009, p. 212). Together, they began to discuss the structure and functions of the UN (Ishay, 2009). The main global powers and prospective members of the UN convened at a subsequent conference held in San Francisco in April of 1945 to further develop the structure of this new intergovernmental organization (Ishay, 2009).

Small and medium sized nations and NGOs criticized the new international governmental organization, as it did not explicitly address human rights, despite the atrocities committed against minority groups during WWII (Hunt, 2008; Ishay, 2009; Korey, 2001). NGO leaders were even more upset to learn that in 1944, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had rejected proposals to incorporate human rights into the UN Charter (Korey, 2001). However, nations including Australia, New Zealand, India, the Philippines, Chile, Cuba, and Panama, as well as Latin American states, demanded a
strong human rights commitment (Ishay, 2009). Likewise, NGOs such as the American Jewish Committee, the World Trade Union Congress, the Provisional World Council of Dominated Nations, the West Indies National Council, the Sino-Korean People’s League, and the Council of Christians supported the efforts of small and medium sized states and felt that the UN ignored human rights (Ishay, 2009). Together, these NGOs and nations asserted pressure, urging the main global powers and prospective members of the UN to incorporate human rights into the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Ishay, 2009). The American Jewish Committee (AJC) played an important role in the lobbying efforts. The AJC called for an international Bill of Rights, which 1,300 Americans of all faiths and races signed (Korey, 2001).

NGO members like Frederick Nolde of the Council of Churches and Judge Joseph Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Committee, made emotional presentations to the major powers during the San Francisco Conference, urging prospective members to include human rights into the provisions (Ishay, 2009). Philip Murray, President of the Congress of International Organizations, spoke out in support of Joseph Proskauer, while Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, spoke on the significance of ensuring that colonies and other dependent people are included within the concept of human rights (Glendon, 2001). Other organizations, like the International League for the Rights of Man, also lobbied world powers, encouraging them to incorporate human rights into their agenda (Neier, 2012). Clarke Eichelberger of the American Association for the United Nations required that a commission on human rights be set up (Glendon, 2001). Nations including Cuba, Chile, and Panama, submitted a draft for a bill of human rights to the 1945 San Francisco Conference and “their efforts were greatly amplified by the forty-six civil and religious groups invited to San Francisco to help in the founding” (Morsink, 2000, p. 2). The pressure from NGOs and small to medium sized nations was strong enough to force the major powers to amend the UN Charter and make human rights a primary concern of the United Nations (Ishay, 2009). Three days after the presentations, the United States, Britain, France, and the USSR supported and agreed to the proposals of NGO leaders (Ishay, 2009). In 1946, the United Nations set up a Human Rights Commission that drafted a bill of human rights under the lead of Eleanor Roosevelt, who directed the bill through a lengthy and complex approval
process (Ishay, 2009). The International Bill of Rights was comprised of two documents: a declaration constituting human rights principles to be followed by all states in the UN and a binding covenant with measures of implementation (Korey, 2001). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights took a year to draft and 81 sessions and numerous meetings were held to examine each of the Declaration’s articles and 168 amendments (Korey, 2001).

After substantial research, collaboration, drafting, and review, the members of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10th, 1948 (Ishay, 2009). The UDHR asserts that “human rights are universal, belonging to all members of the human family” (Glendon, 2001, p. 176). The UDHR distinguished between two categories of human rights: civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights (Korey, 2001). Civil and political rights include the right to life, liberty, and security of person, privacy rights, and the right to private property (Korey, 2001). This category of rights emphasizes nondiscrimination rights and stresses political and electoral rights. This category also prohibits slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as inhumane treatment (Korey, 2001). Economic, social, and cultural rights protect rights to social security, work and equal pay, to leisure and rest, adequate standard of living, security in the event of illness and unemployment, and the right to an education (Korey, 2001).

Human rights NGOs operating after the Second World War, like the AJC and the ILRM, were granted consultative status to the United Nations based on the UN Charter’s Article 71 (Moyn, 2010). Article 71 states: “the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations that are concerned with matters within its competence” (United Nations, n.d.). By including Article 71 in the Charter, the UN “had formalized the arrangements that had been used by the League of Nations,” and affirmed that a working relationship with NGOs was a valuable tool (Charnovitz, 1997, p. 252). In 1948, 41 NGOs held consultative positions with the United Nations (Ishay, 2009), and the majority of human rights organizations granted consultative status were organized around such group identities as religion, ethnicity, or gender (Moyn, 2010).
Human rights NGOs established in the pre-WWII era underwent significant changes after the establishment of the United Nations, as they “reformulated the earlier terms of their causes…around the emerging UN bureaucracies and language” (Moyn, 2010, p. 123). Group-identity human rights organizations found that pursuing the rights of a specific group was best achieved when pursued through the larger cause of human rights at the UN (Moyn, 2010). Regardless, human rights organizations “universalized their rhetoric without shifting the basis of their membership” (Moyn, 2010, p. 124). Group-identity organizations remained primarily focused on issues that were of concern to their clientele/members and the advocacy model of group-identity organizations “made the UN the privileged, indeed exclusive, location of interest, action, and reform” (Moyn, 2010, p. 123-5).

NGOs were very active within the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s and played an important role. NGOs were responsible for the “adoption and domestic ratification of major human rights treaties” and acted as “human rights promoters, standard setters, and fact finders in the early days of the United Nations” (Ishay, 2009, p. 224). Thirty NGOs participated in a conference that drafted the Convention on Refugees in 1956. NGOs participated in a UN conference that drafted the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery in 1956 (Charnovitz, 1997). NGOs were also important influences in the drafting of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966 (Ishay, 2009). Likewise, NGOs had a hand in the development of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1967) (Ishay, 2009). Despite these achievements, the Cold War stalemate limited the work of NGOs at the United Nations (Ishay, 2009).

Although the US and the Soviet Union were allies during World War II, they had different ideas of how to achieve peace and manage the post-war world (Gaddis, 1972). The Soviet Union was convinced that security could be achieved through territorial acquisitions and spheres of influence, while the United States believed self-determination and democracy would lead to international peace (Gaddis, 1972). The ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union caused increased tensions, as
each side distrusted the other (Gaddis, 1972; Paxton & Hessler, 2011). The Soviets believed that the “capitalist powers, led by the United States, were encircling them,” while the Americans believed that the “Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, was trying to subvert and overthrow every free-enterprise regime in the world” (Paxton & Hessler, 2011, p. 414). Thus, every action from either side was deemed suspicious (Paxton & Hessler, 2011). These tensions interfered with international relationships and pitted nations against one another, making human rights progress at the international level extremely difficult.

The Cold War stalemate affected the United Nation’s pursuit of human rights, as members that once seemed determined to develop an institution to protect human rights and mediate conflict became distracted with their own self-interests (Ishay, 2009). The UN had become a “battleground between superpowers’ economic and geopolitical interests…” and “…human rights principles became a subterfuge for advancing the realpolitik interests of East and West” (Ishay, 2009, p. 226). The world was merely veiled in “human rights rhetoric,” as aggressive nation-states proceeded to protect their own interests over those of humanity (Ishay, 2009, p. 228). This was clearly evident when nuclear weaponry was financed and produced by global superpowers (Ishay, 2009). As Cold War tensions escalated in the 1950s, the “initial enthusiasm for international [human rights] legislation was replaced by long-lasting ignorance and inertia” (van Dijk, Gray, & Savranskaya, 2008, p. 443).

Again, human rights took a back seat to the national self-interests of sovereign states. The partnership between NGOs and the United Nations proved to be a successful practice with the establishment of an array of documents designed to protect human rights. However, relying on governments to police, enforce, and monitor the protection of these rights was not. As soon as tensions began to heighten, the topic of human rights was easily forgotten or ignored, halting all progress made on the human rights front in favour of real politik interests. The Cold War stalemate and the resulting abandonment of human rights rhetoric indicated that alternative measures and governing bodies needed to be implemented to safeguard the protection of human rights.
The Revival of Nineteenth Century Strategies and the Birth of New Advocacy Models

Most NGOs in the post-World War II era made the UN the preferred means for pursuing human rights (Moyn, 2010). Few NGOs dedicated their work to a general human rights agenda, and those that did, like the International League for the Rights of Man, had borne little fruit (Moyn, 2010). Amnesty International (AI) and Helsinki Watch, later renamed Human Rights Watch (HRW), revived the successful advocacy strategies from the nineteenth century, while also developing unique procedures to secure the advancement of human rights. Their advocacy models proved tremendously successful and ignited the human rights movement in the 1970s.

Amnesty International

Amnesty International emerged out of the Cold War stalemate (Moyn, 2010) and “was established at a time when Cold War tensions were at a high point” (Neier, 2012, p. 186). In October of 1960, at a United Nations General Assembly, Soviet leader Khrushchev accused the British of sending planes over the Soviet Union, noting this as aggression (Neier, 2012). In January of 1961, a few days after President John F Kennedy was inaugurated, he warned that neither the Soviet Union nor China had “yielded its ambition for world domination” (Neier, 2012, p. 186). Two days after Kennedy’s address, the United States began test-firing missiles that would be aimed at the USSR, which caused increased international tensions (Neier, 2012). Neier (2012) notes that “the Cold War context played a crucial role in shaping a new institution that had the intention to operate worldwide and that wished to address the abuses of rights committed by those on all sides of the global struggle” (p. 186-7).

Amnesty’s later founder, Peter Benenson, had a long history of involvement with human rights. Benenson promoted civil liberties while he attended both Eton and Oxford University and had admired the American Civil Liberties Union (Neier, 2012). However, Benenson was reluctant to participate in the organization’s British counterpart, the National Council for Civil Liberties, because it was believed to be controlled and influenced by communists and/or communist sympathizers throughout the 1950s (Neier,

Benenson was inspired after reading a newspaper report detailing the story of two Portuguese students imprisoned for making a toast to freedom. He conceived of Amnesty as an organization that would seek to secure the release of prisoners through government-addressed written letters (Power, 2001). After grappling with the idea for some time, Benenson approached Eric Baker, a Quaker, and Louis Blom-Cooper, an internationally recognized lawyer, in the hopes of realizing his idea. Benenson believed that these two individuals would be interested in the concept and thought their reputations and contacts would provide the movement with necessary momentum (Power, 2001).

Benenson, Baker, and Blom-Cooper launched the organization in 1961, calling the campaign “Appeal for Amnesty, 1961.” The campaign objectives were limited: “to work impartially for the release of those imprisoned for their opinions, to seek them a fair trial, to enlarge the right of asylum, to help political refugees find work, and to urge the creation of effective international machinery to guarantee freedom of opinion” (Power, 2001, p. 120). Benenson approached his friend, David Astor, the editor of the Observer, a British weekly newspaper. Astor agreed to provide the men with space in the paper for the group’s opening plea (Power, 2001). On May 28th, 1961, Amnesty’s newspaper article “The Forgotten Prisoners” was published in the Observer, marking the beginning of Amnesty International. Amnesty’s article also simultaneously appeared in Le Monde and the next day, in the New York Herald Tribune, Die Welt, the Journal de Geneve, as well as newspapers in Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Italy, South Africa, Belgium, Ireland, India, and Spain (Power, 2001).

Benenson’s full-page article in the Observer resulted in numerous letters, donations, and information about thousands of other prisoners of conscience (Power, 2001). In response, Amnesty sought to put “sympathizers in touch with others who lived nearby” and urged schools and churches to organize groups that would each adopt a prisoner of conscience and work on his/her behalf (Power, 2001, p. 122). Groups were to
send letters to governments responsible for a prisoner’s imprisonment. Group members were also encouraged to send the prisoner’s family gifts, to raise money for their aid, and to send letters to prisoners of conscience in the hopes that he/she would know that people cared about his/her situation (Power, 2001).

Although Benenson had an extensive legal background, he did not believe that international legal remedies for human rights violations would be effective in protecting political prisoners (Clark, 2001). Rather, Benenson hoped that condemning the injustice felt by these prisoners would pressure governments to release them (Clark, 2001). Benenson publicized the situation and invited readers to write letters to urge the release of the prisoners discussed in his article and to contact his office for further information (Clark, 2001). Benenson relied on the media to garner support and encouraged mass participation to bring about change. Volunteers worked to extend the campaign to new countries, aiding more political prisoners (Clark, 2001).

Amnesty International was built on previous Christian peace movements, and unlike earlier human rights organizations like the ILRM, Amnesty made a direct and public connection with suffering (Moyn, 2010). Members lit candles to show solidarity and supporters were involved in letter writing (Moyn 2010). These gestures became important symbols that defined the organization in the eyes of the public (Moyn, 2010). Amnesty’s adoption groups or local chapters were set up throughout the world and would select three political prisoners to support, one from the first world, one from the second, and one from the developing world (Moyn, 2010). Amnesty’s model created a global network, which opened the organization up to mass participation (Moyn, 2010). In the organization’s first year, there were 70 groups working for the release of prisoners, most of which were in Britain (Amnesty International Annual Report, 1961-2). The number of working groups increased from 70 to 260 the following year, illustrating the rapid spread of the Amnesty movement (AI Annual Report, 1962-3).

Unlike those that came before it, Amnesty did not view the UN as the primary site for advocacy (Clark, 2001). Amnesty International received UN consultative status in 1964 (Clarke, 2001). However, Benenson was “skeptical about the UN as a forum for the
enhancement of human rights. He played down the importance of the UN in Amnesty’s early work, joking that, if nothing else, the UN consultative status added official weight to the tiny organization’s letterhead” (Clarke, 2001, p. 6). Instead of relying on the UN, Amnesty developed new procedures and approaches for the pursuit of human rights. Amnesty members wrote letters and used the media to publicize cases in their communities, organized assistance for families, raised funds for research on violations occurring worldwide, and published a Newsletter and Quarterly Journal (Clarke, 2001; AI Annual Report, 1961-2). Amnesty continued to grow as publicity reached new audiences. From 1963-1964, approximately 350 groups were working for the release of prisoners. This number reached 400 during 1964-1965 and by 1966-1967, there were 550 groups operating in 19 countries (AI Annual Reports, 1963-4, 1964-5, 1965-6, 1966-7).

In 1968, the UN Conference on Human Rights was held in Tehran, Iran (Moyn, 2010). The conference was convened with the hopes of furthering the human rights cause (Moskowitz, 1974). That year was also designated the International Year for Human Rights to mark the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Rao, 2003). The conference was convened “to enhance national and international human rights efforts and initiatives” (Rao, 2003, p. 134). The Preparatory Committee suggested to conference participants that to achieve the most desirable results, an atmosphere free from political accusations and retaliations was necessary (Moskowitz, 1974). However, the orientation of the conference was undeniably political, and the proceedings illustrated that advancing human rights was not the main goal of conference participants (Moskowitz, 1974). This was not the first time that human rights discussions were clouded by political motivations. It was clear early on that “human rights masked other agendas” (Moyn, 2010, p. 46). Human rights remained subordinate to state sovereignty in the development of the United Nations Charter and “it was Hitler the warmonger, not Hitler the architect of European extermination, who preoccupied the drafters” (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 52-53). The United Nations Charter made the state the authority in human rights affairs and emphasized international security issues (Ishay, 2009). Moreover, Ignatieff (2003) notes: “Nation-states were encouraged to promote human rights, but never commanded to do so” (p. 52).
Amnesty International developed an advocacy model encouraged by those attending the International Conference of NGOs in 1968 at UNESCO (Moyn, 2010). During this conference, world leaders and representatives finally acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the pursuit of human rights through the United Nations (Moskowitz, 1974). Sir Egerton Richardson, Jamaica’s ambassador to the UN and initiator of the Tehran Conference, stated that the most serious critique of the conference in Tehran was that it failed to examine reasons why so little human rights progress had been made in the past twenty years (Moskowitz, 1974). He also suggested that the defects limiting the advancement of the human rights program were the same defects and problems that plagued the United Nations body (Moskowitz, 1974). The global protection and advancement of human rights was dependent on cooperation between nations to achieve these ends, however, international cooperation was growing weaker (Moskowitz, 1974). Richardson acknowledged the lack of achievements in Tehran and suggested that it was necessary to rely on people to promote human rights, rather than governments (Moyn, 2010). Amnesty International provided a new style of mobilization that was encouraged by those at the International Conference of NGOs and a model that other NGOs would imitate (Moyn, 2010).

Amnesty was not the only organization moving away from the UN based model in the post war period. Moses Moskowitz broke ties with the American Jewish Committee, as the organization “was moving away from its prewar ethos toward ‘a so-called mass organization…a pressure machine, issu[ing] pamphlets, leaflets’” (Moyn, 2010, p.123). Moskowitz, unhappy with the changing face of human rights advocacy, “criticized Amnesty International for ‘inventing all kinds of procedures, all kinds of approaches and building up a Babel, a Tower of Babel which w[ould] ultimately destroy the program’” (Moyn, 2010, p. 123). The International League for the Rights of Man slowly shifted focus away from the United Nations, while others, like the Anti-Slavery Society, amped up UN activism (Neier, 2012; Korey, 2001).
Helsinki Watch, established in 1978, emerged as an outgrowth of the Fund for Free Expression, an organization that protected the rights of authors (Neier, 2012). On a trip to Moscow to sign a copyright agreement with publishers in the Soviet Union, Robert L. Bernstein, the CEO of Random House, met with Russian authors published by his company and heard of the persecution that some had personally experienced (Neier, 2012). Bernstein felt the need to assist these individuals and others like them and it was during his trip that he had become convert to the human rights cause (Neier, 2012). Bernstein recruited help in the form of American publishers and authors to assist in launching the Fund for Free Expression (Neier, 2012). To help with the launch of Helsinki Watch, Bernstein called upon the help of two more: Orvill Schell Jr, a prominent New York lawyer, and Aryeh Neier, the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (Neier, 2012). The organization received financial support from the Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation (Neier, 2012).

Helsinki Watch’s primary role was to release statements that denounced the Soviet Union’s human rights abuses and those committed by other nations that had signed the Helsinki Accord (Neier, 2012), an agreement between the East and West that brought some stability to Europe and reduced the risk of war (McMahon, 2009). The document also included provisions designed to protect human rights in East-West relations (Brown, 2001). The Soviet Union participated in the conference to have the West recognize the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe (McMahon, 2009). The West, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that human rights provisions were included in the final agreement in the hopes of seeing a change in Communist Europe (McMahon, 2009). Principle 7 of the Accord directly referenced human rights and freedoms and by signing the agreement, the East acknowledged the need to protect and ensure these rights to its citizens (McMahon, 2009). Therefore, the Helsinki Accord “confirmed states’ sovereign rights and the status quo, while it simultaneously allowed domestic issues to be considered by an international institution and empowered individuals, providing them with ideas and mechanisms to promote interstate as well as human security” (McMahon, 2009, p. 378).
Helsinki Watch’s successful advocacy model was one developed by its first executive, Jeri Laber. In 1973, Jeri Laber joined the Riverside Amnesty Group in New York shortly after reading an article written by Amnesty activist Rose Styron (Laber, 2002). Laber joined a group of academics writing to political prisoners and her background in Soviet Studies helped her in writing letters to two Soviet prisoners (Laber, 2002). Although participating in letter writing, Laber felt that this type of campaign would not make a substantial difference, so she started to brainstorm other ways to advance the cases she worked on (Laber, 2002). After receiving information on Valentin Moroz, a prisoner Laber wrote on behalf of, she had an idea for publicizing his situation (Laber, 2002). Laber wrote an essay detailing the Moroz case and submitted it to the op-ed page of the *New York Times*, which was published in November 1974 (Laber, 2002). Laber used Amnesty International information as her source and publicized it to attract attention to human rights violations (Laber, 2002). Through this process, Laber had developed a successful formula for advocating human rights: she would provide a detailed description of a form of torture, explain where this form of torture was being practiced, and would make a plea to the perpetrating government to end it (Moyn, 2010). Laber’s method was to publicly “name and shame” abusive governments (Human Rights Watch, n.d.).

Bernstein met Laber in 1975 at a demonstration organized for Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet dissident, and had read her human rights work in the *New York Times* (Snyder, 2011). Bernstein hired Laber for a position at the Association of American Publishers’ International Freedom to Publish Committee (Snyder, 2011). Laber continued to work with Bernstein at the Fund for Free Expression and Helsinki Watch, which was initially proposed as a project under the umbrella of the Fund for Free Expression (Laber, 2002).

Jeri Laber continued to publicize prisoner situations by issuing press releases, writing op-eds, and speaking publicly about the issue for Helsinki Watch (Snyder, 2011). Helsinki Watch employed innovative tactics in its communications, “mixing well-researched reports with poignant stories that enabled individual connections to the issue” (Snyder, 2011, p. 119). Helsinki Watch also emphasized the visual representation of
dissidents beginning in 1979, when Jeri Laber photographed activists she met with during a visit to Moscow (Snyder, 2011). These photographs were then published in *Life* magazine (Snyder, 2011). Laber’s advocacy efforts “were part of a concerted campaign by Helsinki Watch of ‘symbolic politics’ to make repressed human rights activists familiar to the broader public” (Snyder, 2011, p. 119). The organization wanted the public to be able to identify with dissidents and know of their names and plights. This, those working at the organization believed, would encourage the public to rally for the human rights cause (Snyder, 2011).

The evolution of Helsinki Watch was largely shaped by political events that occurred across the globe, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the establishment of Solidarity in Poland in 1980 (Neier, 2012). Perhaps the most influential of these events, however, was the election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States in 1980 and his inauguration in 1981 (Neier, 2012). Helsinki Watch leadership became aware that they needed to broaden the organization’s mandate after learning that Reagan’s administration sought to repudiate Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy (Neier, 2012). The organization noticed that the Reagan administration held “governments to different standards depending on their geopolitical alignments,” only denouncing the human rights violations of the Soviet Union and other antagonists to the United States and not those of its allies (Neier, 2012, p. 206). Under the notions of the Reagan administration, some military dictatorships across the globe, like those in Latin American and East and Southeast Asia, “would no longer be subject to criticism” (Neier, 2012, p. 206). Rather, these governments would “expect praise for (supposedly) making progress towards democracy” (Neier, 2012, p. 206).

Leaders of the organization feared that Helsinki Watch, being an American organization that denounced human rights abuse in the Soviet Union, would lose credibility because it would be perceived as a “mouthpiece for an administration that had made clear its intention to use accounts of human rights abuse as a stick to belabor its enemies while serving as an apologist for severe abuses by its friends” (Neier, 2012, p. 206). In response, Helsinki Watch leaders established Americas Watch, which began operating in 1981 (Neier, 2012).
Recognizing the growing prominence and success of Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch, Helsinki leaders wanted to expand the organization’s reach to other areas of the globe, but decided to proceed slowly (Neier, 2012). Helsinki leaders “had learned that they could make a greater impact by concentrating sustained efforts on particular countries, acquiring expertise on them, establishing close contacts with domestic human rights monitors, and publishing frequent reports” (Neier, 2012, p. 215). They had also learned that “it was also essential to build relationships with the journalists who reported on those countries and with policy officials in the US government, in international institutions, and in the countries suffering from human rights abuses” in order to build and develop new, successful branches of the organization (Neier, 2012, p. 215). Asia Watch Committee was launched in 1985, followed by Africa Watch in 1988, and Middle East Watch in 1989 (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Helsinki Watch was renamed Human Rights Watch in 1987, which indicated a global mandate (Neier, 2012). Human Rights Watch finally received consultative status to the United Nations in 1994 (Welch, 2009).

INGOs played an important role in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was organizations like Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch/Human Rights Watch that added momentum to the human rights movement (Moyn, 2010). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch revived the reliance on people to promote and protect human rights. Both organizations used the media, like early societies in the nineteenth century, to publicize the situations of sufferers. Most importantly, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, through different channels, desire to create a direct connection between distant sufferers and the general public. Amnesty International does so by having group members write letters to specific sufferers after learning of their plight. On the other hand, Human Rights Watch attempts to achieve this connection through publicizing the stories and photographs of individual sufferers so the public can familiarize themselves with them. Both organizations, while relying on the means of public cooperation and media use that was utilized by nineteenth century philanthropic societies, introduced new strategies and procedures to advance human rights. Amnesty introduced letter writing, while Human Rights Watch used the media to publicly “name and shame” abusers. Despite attaining UN consultative status, both organizations have
opted to develop new strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights rather than relying on the UN as the primary means and locale for activism.

Conclusion

While the nineteenth century is often described as a period of intense nationalism, international efforts to promote peace and protect minority rights also took root. Private citizens rallied together in the nineteenth century to establish societies that brought about immense social change, including the abolition of slavery. Moreover, these private humanitarian societies developed successful advocacy models: using the press to raise awareness of social issues, holding conferences, collecting research, and having sufferers discuss personal experiences to inform the public. While much progress was made in this period, heightened international tensions, which eventually led to the outbreak of World War One, prevented the sustainability of the humanitarian movement. Nations were far more interested in protecting their own sovereignty than protecting the rights of their citizens, a notion that remained true until the end of the Cold War.

Despite noble efforts, the League of Nations was unable to protect human rights in times of turmoil. The League of Nations was unable to halt the rise of Nazism and Fascism, and could not prevent member nations from severing ties with the organization. While the League of Nations had great intentions, its inability to enforce its mandates and encourage active participation during times of international tension led to its ultimate demise. The United Nations further evidenced that sovereignty took precedence over the protection of human rights on a global scale. Although small to medium sized nations and international nongovernmental organizations lobbied for the global superpowers to incorporate human rights into the United Nations Charter, human rights remained subordinate to state sovereignty in the development of the United Nations Charter (Ignatieff, 2003). As Ignatieff (2003) succinctly notes, “It was Hitler the warmonger, not Hitler the architect of European extermination, who preoccupied the drafters” (p. 52-53). The United Nations Charter emphasized international security concerns and made the state the authority in protecting human rights—however, nations were only encouraged to do so (Ishay, 2009; Ignatieff, 2003). Moreover, during the Cold War, with international tensions heightening, nation-states, once again, sought to protect their sovereign interests...
rather than the interests of their citizens. Those nations that once seemed interested in promoting and protecting human rights were far more concerned with advancing their own economic and geopolitical interests. The United Nations was being used by nations as a place to pursue self-interests under the guise of human rights. To this day, tensions still exist between international cooperation regarding the protection of human rights and the desire of nation states to protect their own sovereign interests.

Organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch relied on the public to promote and enforce human rights through lobbying efforts, a practice that was called upon during the Tehran Conference in 1968. These organizations reverted back to advocacy models from the nineteenth century, though utilizing them on a much larger scale. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch used the press to educate the public, much like humanitarian societies did throughout the nineteenth century. AI and HRW sought to connect the public with distant sufferers through the press, sharing individual stories and illustrating how the public can support sufferers.
Chapter 2: Fundraising, Marketing, and Branding Human Rights: Two Case Studies

Introduction

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch use the mass media to educate the public, raise awareness of the organization’s work, and to attract donations and volunteers. As illustrated in Chapter One, the use of the mass media to publicize abuse and rally support has proven to be a useful strategy to protect human rights and critique the power of sovereign states. The use of the mass media also enables these organizations to develop a global identity and to brand themselves in the eyes of the public, which helps in fundraising efforts and attracting volunteer support. The development of a strong, identifiable brand has helped some nonprofit organizations attract donations and has helped to define and distinguish each organization amongst a pool of competitors.

Building an identifiable brand is just one of the many ways in which these organizations have been inspired by the commercial sector to increase revenue, reduce costs, increase effectiveness, and increase visibility in the human rights marketplace. Salamon (2003) argues that the nonprofit sector has adopted commercial practices in numerous ways, including the marketing of products, formulating business plans, and “incorporating the language and style of business management in the operation of their agencies” (p. 62). Nonprofits are increasingly outsourcing their communications and fundraising and are looking to corporate donations, sponsorships, and partnerships to help reach larger audiences and increase funds to fulfill their missions.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International generate the vast majority of their revenues from public donations. In 2011, public contributions and grants accounted for 85% of revenue for Human Rights Watch. Amnesty USA generated 80% of its revenue from individual contributions, comparable to 84% at Amnesty UK. However, each organization’s additional fundraising efforts should not be overlooked. Marketing, branding, and fundraising are undeniably interrelated. The adoption of a fundraising strategy not well aligned with the organization’s values has the ability to tarnish the brand
and impair the ability to collect donations, even if the strategy only produces a small amount of revenue. Moreover, the use of private-sector strategies may indicate the future fundraising trajectory of each of these organizations.

This chapter highlights the marketing, branding, and fundraising initiatives undertaken by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, some of which have been inspired by commercial practices. Furthermore, Chapter Two attempts to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages in the use of such strategies and the implications these efforts have on the organization’s brand and ability to raise revenue. Lastly, the ways in which these organizations work with corporations and the ways in which they have safeguarded themselves from corporate pressures are highlighted throughout this chapter.

**Adopting Commercial Practices for Fundraising and Effectiveness**

Davis (2004) has found that NGOs have adopted commercial strategies in order to diversify their income sources. This includes the selling of products, user fees, licensing their name or “brand,” and investing (Brinkerhoff, 2007). This allows nonprofits to generate income alongside donations and other sources of revenue, such as government and grant-making trust/foundation donations, and corporate support (Bennett & Sargeant, 2005). NGOs have also turned to corporate strategies for the “adoption of management practices from the private sector; the professionalization of procedures and staffing; a ‘bottom-line’ culture that stresses efficiency, effectiveness, and results; and a strong responsiveness and accountability to funders” (Brinkerhoff, 2007, para. 1).

Many nonprofit organizations engage in outsourcing. Tuckman and Chang (2006) state that nonprofit organizations “engage in private market transactions,” which include: “buying advertising, hiring consultants and employees, paying to ship their goods, and contracting for a wide range of commercially produced goods and services in a variety of markets” (p. 632). Nonprofit organizations are outsourcing activities ranging from fundraising, events planning, and advertising to the solicitation of donor contributions and membership management, among others (Carbone, 1993). Many nonprofits outsource marketing and fundraising work, as fundraising and marketing experts “offer a wealth of experience and knowledge” and “know the industry, regulatory requirements,
‘best practices,’ systems, and technology” (Silverman, 2008, p. 124). The firm “can evaluate an organization’s operations and control to assess their effectiveness and provide a range of services that the client organization could not afford to provide with its own internal staff or resources” (Silverman, 2008, p. 125). Nonprofits can also realize cost savings through their outsourcing practices (Berman, 1998). However, Tuckman and Change (2006) state: “Outsourcing…the internal activities of nonprofits can have a substantial impact on the way that nonprofit services are delivered” (p. 633). Furthermore, outsourcing can decrease the need for internal staff and can change the nature of fundraising and the fundraising solicitation process (Tuckman & Chang, 2006).

The boundary between nonprofit and for-profit sectors has been blurred by corporate sponsorships, corporate and nonprofit joint ventures, licensing agreements, joint issue promotions, and strategic alliances (Bennett & Sargeant, 2005). Private sector research has also acknowledged the breakdown of the barrier between both sectors, with “nonprofits now shar[ing] territory with for-profits, sometimes as competitors and sometimes as collaborators” (Ryan, 1999, p. 134). Dees and Anderson (2004) argue that that there is “sector-bending” between nonprofit and for-profit firms, as nonprofit organizations are behaving and operating more like for-profit companies (p. 52). Moreover, nonprofits often accept corporate donations that provide additional funding. By announcing funding from corporations, the nonprofit demonstrates the “worthiness of one’s cause and [it] may improve the ability of the nonprofit to raise funds from other sources in the future” (Wymer & Samu, 2003, p. 5). Corporations donate to nonprofits to generate “favorable publicity, enhanced public goodwill, and greater public awareness of the business or its brand” (Wymer & Samu, 2003, p. 5). Since the corporation is donating funds where it sees fit, the business maintains “a good measure of power over the collaborative relationship” (Wymer & Samu, 2003, p. 5). James (2004) acknowledges the blurred boundary created between nonprofit and for-profit firms, but sees little problem with it, so long as “the charitable goal of the nonprofit remains the driving force” behind the organization (p. 74).

Csaba (2005) states that the integration of commercial principles and marketing into nonprofit organizations has caused an “erosion of [nonprofits’] higher values and
public ideas by a crass, debasing, calculative commercialism” (p. 130). He states further that the “spread of managerial principles represents commodification and illustrates a further advancement of the capitalist logic and weakening of civil society and democracy” (Csaba, 2005, p. 130). Salamon (1999) argues that nonprofits, through the adoption of market strategies, are hindering their own success, making it difficult for nonprofit organizations to subsidize their mission-related activities when competing against for-profit firms. He also says that the accountability and effectiveness of these organizations has been called into question since the adoption of commercial techniques (Salamon, 1999). Bush (1992) states that nonprofits can easily lose “sight of the spirit of cooperation and participation traditional[ly] in the nonprofit sector” when private sector strategies and tactics are used by nonprofit firms (p. 392). Eikenberry and Drapal (2004) worry that the adoption of private-sector strategies “may harm democracy and citizenship because of its impact on nonprofit organizations’ ability to create and maintain a strong civil society” (p. 1).

On the other hand, some researchers have little problem with the adoption of commercial strategies by nonprofit organizations. Child (2010), a sociologist, argues that the increased revenues available from commercial strategies help to sustain nonprofit missions. Wallace and Willhelm (2006), private sector researchers, suggest that for-profit strategies allow for increased revenue to be put towards social missions. Business academics, like Dart (2004), also support the competitive nature and efficiency of the commercialized nonprofit sector. Child (2010) sums up the debate nicely: “It is not surprising… that observers on both sides of the debate acknowledge that the stakes are high and the potential consequences of commercialization significant” (p. 147).

Marketing, Advertising, and Branding the Cause

Marketing and Advertising the Cause

The American Marketing Association (2008) defines marketing as “the activity, set of institutions, and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large.” In this sense, marketing activities include decisions regarding a business or organization’s
product/service, pricing, distribution, communication, and research (Kumar & Sharma, 1998). Therefore, advertising can be understood as a marketing tool, or component of marketing, that informs potential consumers about the organization or business and its services in the hopes of generating “a call to action,” or to “encourage the consumer to act” (Mason, 2011, p.16).

**Social Marketing**

Andreasen (1994) defines social marketing as “the adaptation of commercial marketing technologies to programs designed to influence the voluntary behaviour of target audiences to improve their personal welfare and that of the society of which they are a part” (p. 110). Andreasen (1995) argues that social marketing is usually employed in situations where individuals engage in unsafe behaviours, where behaviour change could improve an individual’s personal wellbeing as well as the wellbeing of society. Social marketing attempts to change the behaviour of individuals, groups, and organizations (Macfayden, Stead, & Hastings, 1999). Social marketing uses marketing principles and techniques “to influence a target audience to voluntarily accept, reject, modify, or abandon a behaviour for the benefit of individuals, groups or society as a whole” (Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2011, p. 5). Commercial marketing tools including consumer research, segmentation and targeting, the marketing ‘mix’, competitor analysis, branding, and stakeholder marketing have been applied to social issues (Gordon, McDermott, & Hastings, 2008). Using these tools, social marketing targets the public and society as indirect customers, suggesting they can aid in fulfilling the organization’s mission/goals by changing their attitudes and behaviour (Helmig & Thaler, 2010).

The products being “sold” through social marketing tend to be more complex, as they are often ideas as opposed to physical goods and services, making social marketing goods difficult to conceptualize (Macfayden et al, 1999). Unlike commercial marketing, which is focused on meeting shareholder objectives, social marketing’s goal is to meet society’s desire to improve the livelihood of its citizens (Macfayden et al, 1999). Moreover, the goal of social marketing should be to improve the welfare of society, not
to benefit the organization presenting the social marketing campaign (Gordon et al, 2008).

Providing evidence proving the effectiveness of social marketing is often challenging due to the difficulty in proving that complex social interventions work (Gordon et al, 2008). Furthermore, there is confusion surrounding the term and too many definitions that contradict one another exist (Gordon et al, 2008). Regardless, some scholars remain skeptical of social marketing and object to the application of commercial marketing concepts to social issues. Laczniak, Rush, and Murphy (1979) found that there are implications resulting from the application of commercial marketing tactics to social marketing, including the emergence of propaganda. Wallak (1990) argues that social marketing is too expensive, time consuming, and does not eliminate or change the environment that causes unwanted behaviour. He argues that social marketing’s effectiveness is limited (Wallak, 1990). Similarly, Wymer (2010) indicates that “simply targeting individuals with public service messages is unlikely to yield major improvements in instances in which there are negative influences reinforcing the undesirable behaviours” and suggests that in time, the role of social marketers will align with those of activists rather than advertisers (p. 102). Others however, have had little issue with the application of commercial concepts to social issues and some have found social marketing initiatives to be effective in changing behaviour in a positive way (Stead, Hastings, & McDermott, 2007).

Cause Marketing

Businesses and not-for-profit organizations have been collaborating with one another through cause marketing relationships, a practice that has increased steadily since the early 1980s (Wymer & Sargeant, 2006). Andreasen (1996) defines a cause marketing relationship as follows: “A corporation donates a specific amount of cash, food, or equipment in direct proportion to sales revenue—often up to some limit—to one or more nonprofits” (p. 49). Proponents of cause marketing argue that all parties involved in the relationship receive substantial benefits that make the partnership worthwhile (Andreasen, 1996). Corporations seek to partner with nonprofits to increase sales and
profitability, gain favourable publicity, gain public awareness of the corporate brand, and improve employee morale and recruitment (Andreasen, 1996). Andreasen (1996) also indicates that corporations tend to use their funds to advertise their support of the cause, which increases the public’s awareness and support for the organization. For example, in 1997 Coca Cola partnered with Mothers Against Drunk Driving and donated a sum to MADD after the purchase of every case of its product. Coca-Cola was able to use MADD to enhance its social image, while MADD received funds to apply to its social missions (Salamon, 2003; Heal, 2008). On the other hand, nonprofit organizations benefit from increased financial support (Andreasen, 1996), which allows these organizations to meet their goals and objectives (Wymer & Sargeant, 2006). Moreover, consumers, through the purchase of goods linked to philanthropic causes, feel they are making a substantial difference in the world (Eikenberry, 2009).

However, cause marketing is not without critics. Some “fear that the needs of capitalism will overshadow the cause and in some cases, expenses used to promote the cause are larger than the revenue raised” (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2011, p. 498). Moreover, in light of recent cause-marketing campaigns such as Product (RED), some scholars have expressed concern that cause-related marketing “might crowd out philanthropic contributions if people feel that buying a RED item is a substitute for charitable giving” (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2011, p. 498).

King (2006) reminds us that “marketing professionals are explicit in their belief that cause-related marketing should be first and foremost a strategy for selling products, rather than an altruistic or philanthropic activity” (p. 9). King (2006) argues that a new form of subsidized philanthropy has emerged in response to shifts in the practice of corporate philanthropy and marketing in the past few decades. The emphasis on efficiency and cost cutting in businesses, changing psychological conceptions of the consumer, and consumer demands for ethical forms of capitalism, have had an impact on the development of a corporate philanthropic strategy that is vital to its profit-making ability (King, 2006). The techniques of breast cancer cause marketing are a way to “understand, represent, and act upon the desires of consumers to be generous and civic-minded citizens in the service of selling products” (King, 2006, 2). However, this new
form of corporate philanthropy indicates that consumption can bring about solutions to social problems. King (2006) states:

> These [cause-related marketing] tools produce a constant flow of images suggesting that the key to solving America’s problems lies in corporate philanthropy, personal generosity, and proper consumption. While cause-related marketing sells goods through this promise, it also packages generosity as a lifestyle choice through which individuals can attain self-actualization and self-realization…(p. 2).

Cause-related marketing, while attracting consumers to purchase products from companies that make donations to charitable organizations, may actually be considered by consumers as a substitute for direct donations. Moreover, consumers may feel that they are making a substantial difference by purchasing consumer products. Eikenberry (2009) outlines the “hidden costs” of consumption philanthropy: it replaces virtuous action with buying, provides individual solutions to collective world problems, and hides how markets may create social problems that these campaigns seek to redress. For these reasons, she believes that consumption philanthropy, or cause related marketing, is “unsuited to create real social change” (Eikenberry, 2009, para.1). Eikenberry (2009) also notes that some fear that “as consumption philanthropy becomes ubiquitous… it may… desensitize the public to social ills while decreasing other forms of philanthropic action” (para. 19).

**Nonprofit Branding**

Marketing practices communicate the organization’s brand, which “is a collection of perceptions about an organization, formed by its every communication, action, and interaction. It is what people collectively say, feel, and think about [the] organization” (Daw, Cone, Merenda, & Erhard, 2010, p. 2). Csaba (2005) argues that in order to recruit members and maintain a public profile, nonprofit organizations need to attract media attention. Alvin Schlechter, the chairman of Interbrand Foundation, states that nonprofit firms use branding in order to communicate their mission, to attract necessary resources (donations, volunteers), and to motivate employees (Beardi, 1999). These organizations are competing for media attention and “branding will portray their reason for being in an arresting way” (Beardi, 1999, 120).
Ritchie et al (1998) argue that branding provides many benefits for NGOs. Branding allows nonprofit organizations to communicate their values to a number of public groups simultaneously, including donors and the government, as well as clients and volunteers (Ritchie et al, 1998). Tapp (1996) states that most charities believe that their mission, vision, and values are explicitly exposed to donors through their communication materials. A brand also allows organizations to communicate trust and helps with the development of goodwill that protects the organization from negative public opinion (Ritchie et al, 1998). A nonprofit’s brand helps to attract and retain human and financial resources in a highly competitive market, while also helping to “carve out a unique position for themselves in the public mindset” (Ritchie et al, 1998, p. 29).

Hankinson (2001) suggests that branding offers strong benefits to any charity: the ability to differentiate the organization from its competitors and the ability to attract more donations. Csaba (2005) also acknowledges this, stating that branding implies a “greater emphasis on differentiating the organization from other nonprofits and establishing a unique position in the minds of donors and other stakeholders” (p. 134).

Ritchie et al (1998) warn that branding is not for all organizations, as some feel as though it is “too commercial,” immoral, and can be too costly for organizations to keep up with (p. 36). Moreover, when donors have little knowledge of a charity’s image, these donors can ignore or distort the message put forth by organizations in order to avoid donating funds (Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996). Nonprofit branding may turn nonprofits into rivals that compete on branding skills (Csaba, 2005). This can increase media and communication costs and the adoption of branding by nonprofits may actually prove not to be beneficial in the long run (Csaba, 2005). Furthermore, the high visibility and exposure that comes with branding may lead to scrutiny and may open up the brand to criticism (Csaba, 2005). If the organization is perceived as being unable to achieve the “standards and performance expectations created by branding, or forms alliances with corporate partners that come under fire, the reputation of the organization can suffer great damage” (Csaba, 2005, p. 137). Hudson (2007) argues that some donors may not support the organization’s spending on branding and would rather the money be spent on other service activities. Spruill (2001) argues that organizations compete more with one another when emphasis is put on organizational branding, which prevents these organizations...
from working together for specific causes. Spruill (2001) argues that “issue branding” would be more beneficial, where a collaborative strategy should be employed across organizations in order to foster social change.

Research indicates that “NGOs have become the new sophisticated communicators and perceived instigators of change in the global marketplace” and “are no longer perceived as small bands of activists but as new ‘super brands’ surpassing the stature of major corporations, government bodies and even the media among consumers” (Wootliff & Deri, 2001, p. 159). Human rights organizations are included in this “super brand” classification, as some scholars suggest that Amnesty International is a prime example (Crane, 2005). Laidler-Kylander, Quelch, and Simonin (2007) note that “nonprofit brand valuations are on par with major international corporations” (p. 253).

However, it may be easier for nonprofit organizations to earn the trust of the public than commercial firms, making this a crucial distinction between the branding of advocacy NGOs and corporations (Laidler-Kylander et al, 2007). Laidler-Kylander et al (2007) state that brand ownership for advocacy organizations like Amnesty International and World Wildlife Fund lies in the hands of members, who are relied upon by the organization for membership fees and volunteer work. Developmental and relief organizations, like the Red Cross and Unicef, have no members, but receive their donations from periodic donors who are less involved in the organization (Laidler-Kylander et al, 2007). Therefore, the public does not influence the branding of organizations like the Red Cross and Unicef (Laidler-Kylander et al, 2007).

Tapp (1996) acknowledges that a charity’s brand image is important for generating donation income, with trust being one of the most important values to have associated with a charitable brand. Bennett and Sargeant (2005) state that “charities need a salient image and a sound reputation,” as it enables organizations to “withstand occasional adverse publicity, stimulate trust, encourage donor loyalty” (p. 800). Moreover, a sound reputation can enhance the fundraising position of a nonprofit (Bennett & Sargeant, 2005). Tapp (1996) mentions that “reinforcing charity values, avoiding conflicting messages, consistent tone of voice and style, [and] how the charity is
positioned” are of great concern to nonprofit organizations in their communication with donors, which are similar to the concerns of for-profit corporations (p. 330).

**Case Study One: Amnesty International**

*The 1960s and 1970s – Financing, Fundraising, and Professionalizing Procedures*

The Amnesty International movement was built on earlier Christian peace movements and the organization is known to make a direct and public connection to suffering, inviting members and supporters to light candles in solidarity and engage in letter writing to support political prisoners and help ensure their release (Moyn, 2010). The success of Amnesty’s movement hinges on the ability of members to generate awareness, inspire membership and collaboration, and raise revenue for the organization’s work. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Amnesty’s fundraising, financing, and publicity decisions were largely inspired by the organization’s desire to strengthen its movement and reiterate the organization’s grassroots origins.

Amnesty International faced financial adversity throughout the 1960s and struggled to find a steady source of revenue. The International Secretariat, the organization’s central hub, relied heavily on fees paid by national sections and donations from foundations, including the Prynce Hopkins Foundation and the United Automobile Workers Union of the USA, to subsidize missions and basic operations (AI Annual Reports, 1961-2, 1962-3, 1963-4). However, Amnesty could not depend on foundations to donate annually and the organization was hesitant to rely solely upon foundations to support its work (AI Annual Report, 1961-2). In light of Amnesty’s search to develop new revenue streams, the organization began to sell goods to members and the public. Typically, not-for-profits sell goods “as a sideline to supplement their main income from donations” and do so to “gain a more diversified revenue flow and [to] reduce their vulnerability to external shocks…” (Tuckman & Chang, 2006, p. 629). Normally, a nonprofit’s sale of goods corresponds with its mission (Anheier, 2005).

Amnesty began selling Christmas cards in 1961 in the hopes of increasing revenue (AI Annual Report, 1961-2). Each batch of 12 cards sold on behalf of Amnesty International was enclosed with a list of political prisoners to whom the cards could be
mailed, and envelopes containing the AI cards were sealed with Amnesty’s barbed wire logo (AI Annual Reports, 1961-2, 1962-3). The 1961 card was printed in six different languages and contained quotes about freedom (AI Annual Report, 1961-2). The cards were mailed by Amnesty members and supporters to prisons across the globe and the cards “brought much hope and comfort” to prisoners, who sometimes responded to the Christmas cards they received (AI Annual Report, 1961-2, p. 11). In 1961, Amnesty sold 5,000 Christmas cards and by 1963, this number reached 20,000, accounting for 7.3% of revenue (AI Annual Reports, 1961-2, 1962-3). By 1963, Amnesty added to its product line, selling ball-point pens inscribed with the organization’s name (AI Annual Report, 1962-3). Amnesty International also sold publications and literature to national sections and the public, including a quarterly journal entitled Eustomy (AI Annual Report, 1963-4).

In 1965, Amnesty’s product line expanded to include the Kit Scheme, later renamed the “Postcards for Prisoners” campaign (AI Annual Report, 1964-5). Each purchased kit contained 36 cards (33 Amnesty greeting cards and three Amnesty Christmas cards) and a handbook containing examples of messages to be sent to card recipients depending on the person and country (AI Annual Report, 1964-5). The Kit Scheme was developed to allow people to engage in Amnesty’s work without joining a Threes group and the Kit Scheme “reproduce[d] in miniature the working of an adoption group” (AI Annual Report, 1964-5, p. 10). The program was ideal for supporters in remote areas of the world or those areas where Amnesty’s movement had yet to reach (AI Annual Report, 1964-5). The main concept behind the implementation of the Kit Scheme was “to build up the number and distribution of kit holders so that governments [were] eventually deluged by an international mail of cards” and the scheme was especially useful for cases that required immediate, urgent action (AI Annual Report, 1964-5, p. 10). Amnesty International’s early efforts selling commercial goods encouraged participation through letter writing, while simultaneously raising revenue. The organization’s decision to sell tangible goods was based off its need to increase financial stability and the desire to strengthen the organization’s movement by including outlying supporters.
After Amnesty’s first operating year, the organization sought to expand the work of “threes” groups to include fundraising and publicity activities in addition to letter writing (AI Annual Report, 1961-2). The organization encouraged members to approach local papers, magazines, or journals to publish articles about AI and to speak to local organizations about Amnesty’s work (AI Annual Report, 1962-3). In 1962, the BBC devoted two programs to Amnesty’s work on its British home service (the “Liberty to the Captive” and “Political Prisoners”) and gave Amnesty publicity on many of its overseas networks (AI Annual Report, 1961-2). Also in 1962, the Dutch television corporation KPRO created a film outlining Amnesty’s work at the London office (AI Annual Report, 1962-3). The Canadian Section organized a ten minute talk about the organization’s work over a local CBC radio station and published an article on the formation of a Montreal based group (AI Annual Report, 1963-4). The British section organized an art sale to increase revenue, selling works from artists including Annigoni, Graham Sutherland, and Ben Nicholson (AI Annual Report, 1963-4).

Members orchestrated Amnesty’s fundraising and publicity activities and these initiatives educated the public and encouraged public participation, while simultaneously raising revenue. Groups needed to raise funds to aid in the relief of prisoners’ family and for group fees to be paid to the International Secretariat. These fundraising and publicity initiatives included: street collections and/or garden parties; art exhibitions; book fairs; marches; lectures; pop concerts; canvassing people in neighbourhoods; organizing plays and poetry sessions; selling candles, craftwork, jewelry, and literature; and using information stands at universities and libraries to reach the public (AI Annual Reports, 1970-1979; Amnesty International, 1970). Members and supporters were creative in their means to generate revenue. For example, a group of British students invested money they borrowed from their parents, donating the profits from their investment to the organization after paying back the loan (AI Annual Report, 1969-70). Amnesty’s publicity and fundraising decisions were the responsibility of members and this reinforced the community feel of the organization and its grassroots origins.

Volunteers working at the International Secretariat made Amnesty’s growth as a movement possible in the early 1960s. Amnesty established a Prisoner of Conscience
Library in 1961 and by 1963, the library had grown and was managed by one paid full-time staff member, one paid part-time staff member, and a number of volunteers (AI Annual Reports, 1961-2, 1962-3). “Threes-groups” spread from Great Britain to nations including Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA, and numbered 260 by the end of Amnesty’s second year of operation. The letters written by groups were sent to the Threes Department in the London office and were “dealt with by an entirely volunteer staff” (AI Annual Report, 1962-3, p. 7). Amnesty’s research bureau was also managed entirely by volunteers (AI Annual Report, 1963-4). The research bureau was established to prepare background papers. These papers prepared by the organization’s volunteers “give a survey of the political and religious situation of the types of political or religious prisoners, and the conditions under which they are held, [and] of the means of making contact with the prisoner and his family…” (AI Annual Report, 1963-4, p. 8).

As Amnesty’s movement grew, the International Secretariat was unable to sustain its activities on the meager finances brought about by membership fees and national section dues. The financial instability of the International Secretariat became a concern of the organization’s International Executive Committee and it “necessitated a reassessment of the administrative and financial structure” of the organization (AI Annual Report, 1967-8, p. 4). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Amnesty International began to “grow and take on more corporate-like structures and bureaucratic procedures” (Forman & Stoddard, 2003, p. 257).

In 1967, sub-committees of the International Executive Committee studied the financial position of the organization, the planning and execution of field operations, and the day-to-day operations of the International Secretariat (AI Annual Report, 1966-7). The work of the sub-committees resulted in the establishment of basic staff requirements and responsibilities and the approval of an annual operating budget (AI Annual Report, 1966-7). In 1972, Amnesty worked with McKinsey and Company Inc., a consulting firm that helped plan Amnesty’s expansion and see to it that the organization achieved maximum efficiency (AI Annual Report, 1971-2). In 1973, the organization’s executive secretary worked with the information office to formulate a strategy for the development
of the organization (AI Annual Report, 1972-3). The strategy recommended many changes, calling upon “the improvement of service and communication amongst existing members, the expansion of categories of membership, the establishment of new publication policies, the broadening of international press work, [and] the intensifying of fundraising efforts…” (AI Annual Report, 1972-3, p. 13).

As Amnesty International continued to grow in terms of groups and national sections, the Executive Committee decided to “provide a broader based staff structure” to ensure that the organization would not “become overburdened by its own growth rate” (AI Annual Report, 1969-70, p. 1). The International Secretariat sought to “ensure greater efficiency in its operation and professionalism, while at the same time maintaining the essential character of [the] organization” and noted that it needed to “avoid becoming a bureaucratic machine without a soul” (AI Annual Report, 1971-2, p. 5). From 1971 to 1972, Amnesty’s International Secretariat transitioned from “an operation which had relied heavily on volunteers to an office staffed by professionals” (AI Annual Report, 1971-2, p. 15). Staff costs increased from £36,358 in 1970-71 to £48,775 in 1971-72, an increase that reflects the increase of staff at the International Secretariat from 23 in April of 1971 to 34 in April of 1972 (AI Annual Report, 1971-2). The majority of expansion occurred in Amnesty’s Research Department (AI Annual Report, 1971-2). The number of paid staff members would increase again in 1973 to 41 full-time staff members and six part-time staff members (20 volunteers), and again in 1974 with 52 full-time staff members and 11 part-time employees (13 volunteers) (AI Annual Reports, 1972-3, 1973-4). It was the “growing size of the movement, its increased participation in society, and its intensified interactions with official actors” that led the organization “to establish organizational structures in order to keep up with the greater demands for coordination” (Martens, 2006, p. 20). Amnesty’s internal structural changes were required “to ensure the ongoing success of the movement” (Martens, 2006, p. 20).

Amnesty had “taken on more corporate-like structures” in the early 1970s, which resulted in the development of “a culture of clash…between the values of voluntarism and professionalism” (Forman & Stoddard, 2003, p. 257). Nonprofits that transition towards a more professionalized organization are often concerned about “losing their
organizational soul and succumbing to the global ‘commercial Zeitgeist’ or creeping ‘corporatization’ of culture’” (Forman & Stoddard, 2003, p. 257). However, Forman and Stoddard (2003) suggest that the professionalization of NGOs is a moral imperative:

Professionalization is not simply a measure of the inevitable bureaucracy and standardization that accompany organizational growth, but rather a moral imperative. If NGOs are truly to be accountable to their beneficiaries, then they are ethically obligated to provide the highest-quality, most cost effective services possible. In circumstances where promoting the voluntaristic spirit is at odds with that obligation (for instance, sending volunteers on missions where their presence will be more of a logistical burden than a value), morality dictates that it be sacrificed in favor of a professionalized operation (p. 257).

The shift towards a professionalized staff base was important for the organization to ensure that it was working efficiently and effectively, as well as to maintain the momentum of Amnesty’s growing movement.

*The 1980s to Present – Large Scale Events, Celebrity Activist Models, and Building the Brand*

Beginning in the 1980s, Amnesty International slowly removed some aspects of fundraising and marketing from the hands of members and outsourced these initiatives to corporate firms in the hopes of increasing revenue and building a more identifiable brand image. Amnesty’s USA section saw revenues increase with the use of improved direct-mail campaigning (Hopgood, 2006). The USA section increased its contribution to the movement from $1,000 in 1972 to $1 million in 1981 (Hopgood, 2006). In 1984, Amnesty’s USA section outsourced some of its fundraising efforts to Craver Mathews Smith, a marketing and fundraising agency, which helped develop and manage fundraising initiatives (Craver Mathews Smith, n.d.). Craver Mathews Smith helped Amnesty “increase its net income by upgrading the size of members’ gifts and increasing the number of gifts given per member” by introducing a “new high-dollar program, a retooled monthly giving program, and the launch of a ‘renewable fund,’ the Women’s Action Council (WAC)” (Craver Mathews Smith, n.d., para. 2). The WAC was a special renewal series that targeted WAC members in the hopes of soliciting donations above and beyond their annual membership support of Amnesty (Craver Mathews Smith, n.d.).
To do so, the program was given its own branding so that members would perceive it as a separate initiative from Amnesty’s other programs (Craver Mathews Smith, n.d.).

Amnesty International Canada outsourced some of its fundraising initiatives to Stephen Thomas Ltd, a Toronto based marketing firm that helped kick start the organization’s direct marketing programs in Canada, growing its direct mail list from 2,000 to more than 80,000 from 1980-1990 (Thomas, 2011). In 1983, Stephen Thomas Ltd. also helped to develop magazine advertisements on behalf of the organization. Amnesty Canada’s early marketing material utilized celebrities, including Margaret Atwood, to help solicit donations. As Stephen Thomas noted: “People look to celebrities as role models” and say: “if my role model gives, I should give” (Ottawa Citizen, 1984). Typically, the public “prefer[s] celebrities who are committed to their cause” and Margaret Atwood “was involved with Amnesty International and wrote poetry about prisoners of conscience long before she was asked to sign fundraising letters” (Ottawa Citizen, 1984). The expertise of contracted marketing firms, like Stephen Thomas, may lead to increased donation income based on the firm’s understanding of best practices and successful techniques. The use of contracted firms may also lead to the development of higher quality materials. When professional marketing texts are used, donors often perceive the organization as being more trustworthy, professional, and committed (Project Manager at Nyman Ink, personal communication, June 8, 2012). However, if the marketing is “too jazzy or looks really expensive, then people hesitate to…[donate their] money…” because the marketing material is perceived as being overpriced and superfluous (Project Manager at Nyman Ink, personal communication, June 8, 2012).

Amnesty’s star studded “Conspiracy of Hope” and “Human Rights Now!” concert tours, featuring the likes of Sting, Bono, U2, and the Police, are exemplary of Amnesty’s newfound celebrity based activist model. By combining humanitarianism with entertainment—also termed “charitainment” or “politainment”—Amnesty International was able to bring resources and increased media attention to international development

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2 All interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld.
issues (Kapoor, 2013). Celebrity entertainers “have significant access to the halls of power, and the ability to galvanize publicity on a global scale,” making it possible for these individuals to “help fundraise, increase awareness, and shape media perceptions on a range of global issues” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 18). Amnesty International’s US Section organized the 1986 “Conspiracy of Hope” concert tour headed by U2, Sting, Peter Gabriel, Lou Reed, Bryan Adams, Joan Baez, the Neville Brothers, and the Police (AI Annual Report, 1986-7). The “Conspiracy of Hope” tour was organized to celebrate the organization’s 25th anniversary and sought to publicize the plights of six prisoners of conscience in particular (Martin, 2011). Event organizers targeted concert-goers as “freedom writers” and inserted kits of pre-addressed postcards into concert programs in the hopes of educating those in attendance (Martin, 2011, p. 72). By distributing postcards, the organization was also hoping it would reach its goal of distributing 25,000 letters to each nation that housed a prisoner of conscience the concert sponsored (Martin, 2011). More than 55,000 people attended the twelve-hour finale concert in New Jersey and millions more watched on television (AI Annual Report, 1986-7). The “Conspiracy of Hope” concert tour increased membership from 100,000 in the early eighties to 200,000 in the months after the concert tour (Martin, 2011). Although the event wasn’t held for the sole purpose of raising money, the concert tour managed to raise a total of $2.4 million (Martin, 2011). While Amnesty International’s marketing success is often understood in terms of revenue raised, concert attendance, and increases in membership, the true success of the organization’s marketing and campaigning should be measured by the number of political prisoners released, the number of letters that land on the desks of political leaders, and the degree to which public opinion changes in direct response to their initiatives.

In 1988, Amnesty organized the “Human Rights Now!” concert tour that included international rock musicians Bruce Springsteen, Sting, Peter Gabriel, Tracy Chapman, and Youssou N’Dour. These artists performed for more than a million people in 19 countries and audiences in over 50 countries viewed a broadcast of the concert tour on December 10th, International Human Rights Day (AI Annual Report, 1988-9). The tour, like the concert tour that preceded it, resulted in a significant increase in the interest of Amnesty’s work and a rise in membership across the globe, with membership reaching
420,000 following the concert tour (Martin, 2011). Moreover, through the use of
celebrities in concert, Amnesty International engaged in music marketing, using the
songs of celebrities to create product identity for the organization (Beers, 1988).

Despite the rise in membership, donations, and awareness brought about by the
use of celebrities and increased exposure made possible by Amnesty’s concerts, some
believe the use of celebrities is counterproductive. Many artists performing in Amnesty’s
concerts indicated the pure intentions of their involvement (Martin, 2011; Ullestad,
1992). For example, Springsteen stated that he wanted to help Amnesty in making the
world a less oppressive place (Ullestad, 1992). However, Kapoor (2013) notes that
celebrity humanitarians may have knowledge of world issues and may engage in public
displays of care, but these actions are “not pure or neutral, but motivated and invested;
[they are] anchored in the expectation of generous economic and psycho-symbolic
returns” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 25). The music sales of performers increase substantially after
concert tours and involvement with organizations dealing with social issues benefit the
brand image of celebrities (Kapoor, 2013). Kapoor (2013) argues further:

Celebrities are already tied to the corporate world through their professional work. Not only are humanitarian celebrities deeply immersed in capitalism, but their charity work is entangled with it and unquestioningly promotes it. Yet, what they fail to realize (or admit) is that it is this very capitalism that is so often the root cause of the inequality they seek to address through their humanitarianism (p. 32).

Artists typically donate their time to these events and play for free (Garofalo, 1992). However, the impact of performing in front of a large audience leads to increased record sales following the event and “every artist who performs probably has one of the biggest paydays of his or her career” (Garofalo, 1992, p. 33). The music sales of the performers at Amnesty’s event likely increased after their performances, as this was the case with artists like Queen, U2, and Madonna, who “saw record sales soar…after a global promotion to an audience counted in billions” at the Live Aid concert in 1985 (Birrell, 2011, para. 19). High profile celebrity musicians are “backed by powerful interests (corporate, nationalist)” and are “positioned to act as political brokers and decision makers” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 39). Kapoor (2013) maintains that “celebrities…feel entitled to…[act] under the guise of well-intentioned altruism, despite their lack of
accountability,” but there is little to no mention of the economic and social gains that celebrities benefit from by participating in humanitarian aid events (p. 39). Moreover, concert-goers and spectators of humanitarian events “become the means by which celebrity charity work is legitimated, acting as witnesses to…celebrity media events…Politics thus becomes a mediated spectacle, with citizens transformed into fans, consumers and bystanders” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 39).

Amnesty’s “Human Rights Now!” concert tour in 1988 relied on support from the tour’s sponsor: The Reebok Foundation. Reebok, after clearing a background ethics check, provided a $2 million advance for the 19-city concert tour (Hopgood, 2006). The concert generated $3 million dollars in tour losses (sales were $23 million and costs were $26 million), and Reebok was enlisted to underwrite the losses (Hopgood, 2006). Typically, in event partnerships, the corporate company “pays an amount of money to the nonprofit in exchange for the right to display its name, logo, or products at some event, on the premises, or in conjunction with some program of the not-for-profit” (Galaskiewicz & Colman, 2006, p. 190). The use of corporate sponsors can also result in brand concessions for the nonprofit. A Marketing Coordinator at Trojan One notes that corporate sponsors “have very strict brand guidelines,” ranging from “limiting the background colour their logos can appear on, to the appropriate sizing and placement” of the logo. In order to accommodate this, nonprofits “sometimes need to make sacrifices to their creative look and feel to accommodate the needs of corporate sponsors” (Marketing Coordinator at Trojan One, personal communication, June 12, 2012). However, the Reebok name appeared only on hospitality tents and the sides and back of the stage (Miller, 1988). Reebok’s CEO Joseph LaBonto believed that a lot of advertising focusing on the corporation’s name would “undo the purity of the event” (Koten, 1997, p. 163). The Reebok name was understated as much as possible during the concert event, with small, discretely placed text stating “made possible by the Reebok Foundation” (Koten, 1997, p. 163). The Reebok name was also placed on concert merchandise (Miller, 1988). Reebok also refrained from asking concert performers to wear its apparel (Miller, 1988). In addition, Reebok released print, radio, and television ads that focused on human rights and the actions that individuals could undertake in response to human rights abuse (Miller, 1988). These ads only mentioned Reebok’s name briefly (Miller, 1988). These
efforts resulted in little commercial feel to the concert event (Miller, 1988). However, Jack Healey, Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, stated that he did have some concerns about corporate involvement, but without Reebok’s help, the concert tour would have been unable to perform in the developing world (Beers, 1988).

The corporate sponsorship proved mutually beneficial. By the end of the concert tour, Amnesty International reached over one million people who attended stadium concerts and millions more who watched the concert tour on HBO (Beers, 1988). Amnesty was able to reach out to “relatively affluent young people…bathe them in their favorite music, [and] gather names” for petitions (Beers, 1988, p. 20). The organization also received increased publicity and was able to expand its membership, which increased revenue and “translate[d]…into more letters landing on some official’s desk demanding that the government behave itself” (Beers, 1988, p. 20). Reebok agreed to underwrite the concert because they wanted to give back to the community and the company had an orientation to freedom of expression—Reebok believed working with Amnesty on this event was a logical pairing (Beers, 1988). Reebok generated good publicity in the eyes of the human rights community and had a “backdoor association” with the tour’s performers, most importantly Bruce Springsteen, a musician who notoriously refused to endorse any corporation that approached him (Miller, 1988). Reebok also received benefits in the form of employee motivation and engagement: “…it motivates and energizes their employees to know that the company stands for Amnesty and so employee engagement and employee motivation is a key driver for companies. It’s promoting the brand, but if they can get a spinoff that makes employees feel better about the company they work for, that’s a double win” (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012).

Amnesty’s brand image and identity were an important topic of consideration for concert tour organizers (Hopgood, 2006). AI had to make decisions that worked for an international project and an organization with transnational locations (Hopgood, 2006). All of Amnesty’s national sections shared a globally managed brand (Hopgood, 2006). While these national sections ran their own affairs, one mistake in one nation could tarnish Amnesty’s name on an international level (Hopgood, 2006). Some concerns were
raised from national sections across the globe. For example, Amnesty’s Middle East region did not feel that rock music was the most appropriate tool for promoting AI in the Middle East because it could portray AI as “being a decadent Western organization” (Hopgood, 2006, p. 112). Meanwhile, discussions in the Americas Region indicated that rock music was something associated with the wealthy elite, and that pursuing a rock concert as a means to raise awareness would negatively affect AI’s image (Hopgood, 2006). Despite concerns from some national sections, Amnesty International went ahead with the concert, achieving branding gains elsewhere during the live event (Hopgood, 2006).

Not-for-profits often engage in event marketing “because it provides stakeholders with a unique consumer experience” that can be shared with others in the community and “promotes word of mouth promotion for their brand” (Marketing Coordinator at Trojan One, personal communication, June 12, 2012). Corporate partnerships can provide the organization with new revenue sources and increased visibility (Worth, 2012). This may help the organization in securing more revenue through traditional fundraising means (Worth, 2012). Live events, like Amnesty’s concert tours, may make the organization and its brand “more experiential and therefore more memorable,” while achieving a “much more proximal relationship between consumer bodies and brands” (Moor, 2003, p. 45). Amnesty’s concert merchandise acted as memorabilia, promoting individual remembrance of the event and enabling socialization of the experience with others (Moor, 2003). Branded artifacts miniaturized the original site of experience, making Amnesty’s concert portable (Moor, 2003).

In addition to sponsorships, Amnesty International also accepted corporate donations in the 1980s. To ensure that corporations and other large donors would not exert undue pressure on the organization, Amnesty developed basic rules governing corporate donations in 1988 (AI Annual Report, 1987-8). These rules stated that no one could make a “donation earmarked to support activity on a particular country” and that “donations can only be made to support the work of the organization as a whole or for a broad category of its work…” (AI Annual Report, 1987-8). Amnesty’s groups and sections were instructed not to accept donations that exceeded five percent of Amnesty’s
expected income in a given year without the approval of a higher governing body (AI Annual Report, 1987-8). These rules would ensure the credibility of the organization and that Amnesty was not subject to the pressures of major donors, whether they be corporate or not.

In the 1990s, Amnesty strengthened its partnership with The Body Shop, a corporation that has developed close ties with NGOs since it became a public company in 1985. The corporation sponsored posters for Greenpeace in its early years (The Body Shop, n.d.). Since its infancy, the Body Shop has supported the human rights cause and in 1990, the Body Shop Foundation was set up to help fund human rights and environmental groups (The Body Shop, n.d.). The Body Shop and Amnesty International first cooperated in 1988 when they jointly launched a human rights campaign celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Fabig & Boele, 2003). In 1991 the Body Shop launched a letter writing campaign with Amnesty to acknowledge the 30th anniversary of Amnesty International and to increase the organization’s membership basis (Schlegelmilch, 1998; Wheelen & Hunger, 2002). The Body Shop strengthened its human rights commitment in 1995, when it hired a full-time human rights campaigner as a permanent staff member (Fabig & Boele, 2003).

The third joint campaign effort, perhaps the most influential, occurred in 1998, when Amnesty and the Body Shop launched the “Make Your Mark for Human Rights” campaign, the largest consumer-based human rights campaign to date (Arena, 2004). The Body Shop gave each retail store manager the ability to select a human rights defender to work for and store managers in 34 markets launched crusades to defend the human rights hero of their choosing (Arena, 2004). Body Shop stores engaged consumers through the use of print materials and merchandising, as well as through in store events where consumers could ask questions and interact with store representatives and Amnesty experts (Arena, 2004). In honour of the “Make Your Mark” campaign, the Body Shop launched a unique and innovative petition, whereby consumers and store visitors could leave their thumbprint in lieu of a signature as a sign of support (Arena, 2004). The key to the campaign’s success was in its inclusivity, as “everyone within the organization felt a part of it…[The Body Shop] turned each of [its] shops into action
stations...[and]...really educated [its] employees” (Arena, 2004, p. 122). Many other commercial companies participated in the campaign by collecting signatures, including television companies AVRO, MTV, and Al Jazeera (AI Annual Report, 1998-9). The Body Shop collected 3 million thumbprint signatures (Vinnicombe & Bank, 2003). The consumer thumbprints that were collected were later used as the primary visual element in a print advertising campaign—the thumbprints were turned into giant portraits of human rights defenders (Arena, 2004). Moreover, The Body Shop acted as worldwide sponsor for a Paris-based concert as part of the “Make Your Mark” campaign, which was made available on pay-per-view television (Jeffrey, 1999). The American sponsor, Best Buy, promoted the concert through in-store efforts and direct mailings (Jeffrey, 1999). However, the “Make Your Mark” campaign’s biggest accomplishment was “raising awareness of human rights and the work of human rights defenders in the minds of people who may not have otherwise encountered human rights issues” (Fabig & Boele, 2003, p. 276).

The Body Shop’s involvement with Amnesty “engages the company, probably engages its vendors, and guaranteed it engages the company’s customers…” (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012). Moreover, with signs of visible engagement in the store through product placement (e.g. Amnesty’s greeting cards and Human Rights Defender), customers may feel more comfortable making in-store donations to Amnesty International, benefiting both parties (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012). In a corporate partnership, there “tends to be a blending of …values, opportunity, and the relative strengths that each [entity] brings to a partnership,” says the Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada. “And good, lasting…transformational partnerships are based on those principles, where everybody comes together and recognizes what each partner has to contribute.” Both parties grow

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3 Formerly the Director of Resource Development at a large and successful not-for-profit organization. The interviewee has over 30 years of management, sponsorship, and fundraising experience.
through their partnership together. The Body Shop was a good match for Amnesty, as the company emphasized human rights. The Body Shop also exudes an NGO-style culture and aims to be viewed as a “business-NGO hybrid” (Fabig & Boele, 2003, p. 276). Amnesty and the Body Shop have a successful working relationship because they have shared values, or “beliefs in common about what behaviours, goals, and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, and right or wrong” (Morgan & Hunt, 1999, p. 25) when it comes to their partnership, human rights, and campaigning. Morgan and Hunt (1994) believe that shared values are important in order to build trust and commitment. Since the Body Shop shared similar values with Amnesty International, the Body Shop seemed “less likely to engage in behaviours that could damage the relationship and the reputation” of Amnesty International (Nowak & Clarke, 2003, p. 141).

Amnesty’s corporate partnerships continued into the late 1990s as well. In 1999, the Canadian branch of AI partnered with Vancouver based Citizens Bank, a credit union, and Visa to develop the Citizens Bank Amnesty Visa Card. Each time the card was used, ten cents was donated to Amnesty International (The Province, 1999). Bob Goodfellow, Executive Director of Amnesty International, stated: “Amnesty’s campaigning activities [would] benefit from the creation of this steady source of funding and [would] allow for greater continuity in planning” (Canada Newswire, 1999). The partnership, on the surface, appeared to be a good match, since Citizens Bank’s ethics policy states that the credit union “will not invest in or do business with any company involved in the manufacture or trade of weapons, instruments of warfare or torture, or technologies primarily used for military purposes” (Briscoe, 2001). However, Lori Briscoe (2001), case manager for the Sudbury Chapter of AI, believed that the partnership didn’t suit Amnesty International as well as it seemed. Briscoe (2001) alluded that the card could be used in nations like Myanmar and China, as well as other militarized nations, and could be used to purchase goods from nations that perpetuate human rights abuse. This marketing and fundraising initiative challenged the brand (and integrity) of the organization, as Amnesty could increase revenue through purchases that may have supported crimes the organization opposed. The Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership warns that “a charity has more to lose than a company does in taking a bad
partner because a company can just move on to the next sponsorship, the next event, the next promotion.” Furthermore, he notes that charities “need to do their own due diligence on potential corporate partners and not be swayed by… the potential of resources just flowing in the door… they need to value their brand, protect that brand, and do the diligence.”

Amnesty International Canada launched its website in 1998, followed by Amnesty USA a year later in 1999. A Marketing Coordinator at Trojan One believes that “websites are convenient for nonprofits, as they can be relatively cost effective and allow organizations to reach a vast audience.” Websites also “help disseminate messages” and “can be a place to post timely information” about the work of the organization. Therefore, websites also “provide nonprofits with a platform to help improve the overall perceived credibility of the organization” (Marketing Coordinator at Trojan One, personal communication, June 12, 2012). Often, the websites designed by marketing firms “will have a large section for blog posts or research,” in the hopes that “people will come, read about what the organization is doing” and will donate because they are happy with the organization’s work (Project Manager at Nyman Ink, personal communication, June 8, 2012). A Project Manager at Nyman Ink stated that potential donors often want to see the mission statement of the organization, need to know what the organization does, and want to know where donated funds are going in order to be motivated to donate. Amnesty’s section websites communicate all three of these must-haves. However, the website of each Amnesty section had a different look, feel, and structure, offering no consistency in branding until the 2000s, when sections began adopting the recognizable black and yellow branding associated with Amnesty International today.

Amnesty International outsourced fundraising efforts into the 2000s. Amnesty International Canada has worked with Impact Outsource to “increase supporter bases, boost donor income and develop new revenue streams in partnership with Fundraising Initiatives Inc” (Impact Outsource, 2011, para. 1). Fundraising Initiatives Inc. helps to produce marketing materials and manage fundraising teams. These two companies work together, especially for door-to-door and face-to-face fundraising (Impact Outsource, 2011). Amnesty International Australia’s face-to-face fundraising is partially handled by
Cornucopia fundraising (Cornucopia Fundraising, n.d.). The UK chapter of Amnesty relies on NTT Fundraising for telemarketing and over-the-phone campaigns (NTT Fundraising, n.d.). Outsourcing fundraising does raise some concerns for AI. Outsourced fundraisers are only working indirectly for the organization and a large percentage of canvassers are involved solely for the paycheck (Stauch, 2011). Outsourced fundraisers lack the “devotion to the cause of the nonprofit that they [represent]” (Stauch, 2011, p. 3). It would, of course, be more effective if Amnesty’s fundraisers were volunteers, as they would have zero overhead cost and people asking for donations would “be doing so from a sense of pride and association” (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012). However, Imagine Canada’s Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership states: “You can’t get that many volunteers…Amnesty has volunteers that want to be involved in human rights activities, that want to protest, that want to deliver service offshore or internationally. But can they get 5,000 volunteers to canvass Toronto, Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver? Probably not.”

The outsourcing of fundraising is considered to be one of the most controversial aspects of commercialization and has “stir[ed] resentment and controversy among donors and public officials” (Burlingame, 2004, p. 84). However, outsourcing does not negatively impact brand image. The Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada states: “Amnesty and anybody else would make the case that outsourcing is cheaper and more cost effective relative to the return. The real question from an ethical perspective is: are those individuals paid a flat fee or are they on commission?” Commission is asking the donor to pay the fundraiser (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012).

In 2006, the organization initiated a global identity project (Stone, 2011). Many at the International Secretariat and Amnesty sections did not like the term “brand,” as it “was rooted in questions of allegiance… is your commitment to the cause or to your own image” (Stone, 2011, p. 2)? Building a uniform global brand proved difficult for the organization because each of Amnesty’s sections had a difference in concerns (Stone,
Amnesty’s larger sections in the US, UK, and the Netherlands did not believe a single identity would be beneficial for them in their own countries, as the messages would not be suited to their own needs (Stone, 2011). Some sections did not trust the idea of building a global brand: “People thought the communications team was trying to define what Amnesty is…In a movement, the movement defines what it is,” stated Markus Beeko, the leader behind the global identity project (Stone, 2011, p. 3). For these reasons, the proposal of a “single-minded brand was shelved” and the organization’s management proposed a uniform visual identity utilizing the colour yellow and Amnesty’s candle logo (Stone, 2011, p. 3). The organization officially adopted this visual identity in 2007 at the International Council Meeting in Mexico (Stone, 2011). The Canadian section adopted this colour and font scheme for its online presence in 2010.

Amnesty’s uniqueness was also “becoming blurred both in its longstanding work on civil and political rights (where Human Rights Watch was increasingly prominent) and in its new work on poverty, social exclusion, and cultural discrimination (where a wide range of international NGOs were using the language of human rights)” (Stone, 2011, p. 4). Amnesty needed to develop its own approach to avoid being overshadowed by other organizations focused on the same issues. In this vein, Amnesty developed its brand to incorporate the value of unity (Stone, 2011). Amnesty wanted to represent the power of the individual and community to make a difference and wanted to exude that Amnesty was a source of human connectivity (Stone, 2011). The global identity team put together The Little Yellow Book, a book designed to convey the integrated brand to those in the organization (Stone, 2011). It outlined the visual identity adopted in 2007, Amnesty’s history, common identity, methods, and brand values (Stone, 2011). Amnesty transformed from an authoritative organization to one that was “unified with its members and those whose rights it seeks to advance” (Stone, 2011, p. 5).

Many of Amnesty’s national sections continued to partner with local Body Shop locations throughout the 2000s. The Body Shop Canada and the Canadian Women’s Federation teamed up with the Canadian Branch of AI for the campaign “Stop Violence Against Women” in 2002. The Body Shop Australia has supported Amnesty International in many ways: they have sold Amnesty Christmas cards since 1999, began distributing
the *Human Rights Defender* (a monthly magazine) in stores in 2004, and helped promote campaigns in 2009, 2010, and 2011 (The Body Shop Australia, n.d.). To date, the Body Shop has sold over one million Amnesty Christmas cards and has raised over $500,000 in additional revenue for the organization (The Body Shop Australia, n.d.).

The American section of AI recently partnered with Amazon.com. Amnesty’s webpage provides a referral link to Amazon.com, and purchases made using this link provide a donation of 5-10% of the sale to Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2012). Supporters can also sign up for Amnesty’s Wireless cell phone service through Credo Mobile, where 10% of every bill is donated to Amnesty International. Credo Mobile is a for-profit firm that helps fund nonprofit organizations like Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, and Greenpeace (Credo Mobile, n.d.). In 2008, Amnesty International launched a mobile campaign with the Mobile Giving Foundation and Mgive, where supporters could make $5 mini donations by sending a text message with a short code to a specific server (Maxfield, 2008). Amnesty International also partnered with Organic Bouquet. When flowers are purchased using a referral link on Amnesty USA’s website, 10% of each purchase is used to support Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2012).

Amnesty International also sells a more diverse array of commercial goods, or “tokens of altruism,” which promise to solve some sort of problem (Rutherford, 2000, p. 122). In 2005, Yoko Ono donated the recording rights to John Lennon’s solo songbook to Amnesty International and donated all music-publishing royalties (Amnesty International, 2007). Yoko Ono and Amnesty worked together with thirty musicians for the “Make Some Noise” campaign, developed as a global petition to the Sudanese government to protect human rights in Darfur (Amnesty International, 2007). In 2007, Amnesty launched a music CD, which raised $2.5 million (Amnesty International, 2011b). The organization released a second CD in 2009 (Amnesty International, 2011b). In addition to CDs, Amnesty’s online gift store (powered by Amazon) sells numerous promotional items including mugs, T-shirts, publications, magnets, temporary tattoos, posters, candles, jewelry, wallets, etc. Amnesty International even offers sales and promotions on their commercial goods, as suggested through their social media
accounts. In 2011, Amnesty International opened its first concept shopping emporium in London (Amnesty International, 2011a). Products offered to consumers include limited-edition jewelry, stationary, home-wares and prints that were created using ethically sourced materials (Amnesty International, 2011a). In 2010 and 2011, the sale of goods accounted for less than 1% of revenues for Amnesty’s USA section, resulting in additional revenue of $61,605 in 2010 and $216,518 in 2011. Although a seemingly miniscule amount of revenue dollars, the sale of branded materials promotes the brand and the work of the organization, and charities with “a strong recognizable brand attract more voluntary donations than those without” (Hankinson, 2001, p. 1). Moreover, members of Amnesty brand themselves through their consumption of fair trade goods (Clarke, Barnett, Cloke, & Malpass, 2007).

However, Eikenberry (2009) warns that consumption philanthropy, or the purchase of cause related marketing goods, “devalues the moral core of philanthropy by making virtuous action easy and thoughtless” (para. 6). Since the purchase of goods is too easy, the consumption philanthropy promoted by Amnesty “does not allow people to exercise their moral core” (Eikenberry, 2009, para. 21). Consumption philanthropy represents effort and the intent to buy a socially responsible good, but there is “little sacrifice… required. And so consumption philanthropy becomes divorced from the experience of duty” (Eikenberry, 2009, para. 22). When individuals sign up for Credo Mobile’s cell phone plan that donates to Amnesty or use Amnesty’s Citizens Bank Visa card, they “need not be aware of the supposed beneficiary of their actions” and the use of these products sidesteps contact with people in need, despite the fact that the morality of philanthropy comes from acting on behalf of others and determining what they need (Eikenberry, 2009, para. 23). Someone who uses a charity-licensed credit card may not feel obligated to determine whom he or she is helping and why he or she is in need of aid (Eikenberry, 2009). Eikenberry notes (2009) that without this information these

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4 For example, on November 25, 2011, the organization tweeted: “Black Friday sale in our online store! Save 20% on handmade, fair trade jewelry from around the world”
individuals may feel less empathy for sufferers and less compelled to alter the conditions that lead to their suffering.

**Case Study Two: Human Rights Watch**

Human Rights Watch has a much shorter history than Amnesty International. The organization began in 1978 with the emergence of Helsinki Watch. The organization developed the Watch Committees over the course of its early history—Americas Watch (1981), Asia Watch (1985), Africa Watch (1988) and Middle East Watch (1989)—and in 1988, the organization adopted the all-inclusive name Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). During its infancy, Human Rights Watch relied on donations from US based foundations, including the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Revson Foundation for financial support (Human Rights Watch World Report, 1989). Human Rights Watch also hosts special events, including an annual dinner in honor of human rights monitors worldwide, in the hopes of generating additional donations. Events of such magnitude educate the public and celebrate the work of the organization (Human Rights Watch World Report, 1989). Annual dinners are hosted by the organization to “present an award to a noted activist…invite well-to-do citizens, corporations, law firms, and foundations…to ‘buy a table’—by which is meant an invitee purchases the right to the dinner by reserving a table for a certain number of guests for a substantial donation” (Mutua, 2002, p. 51). This practice reinforces the organization’s image in the mind of “the great and the good” (Sklair, 2011, p. 24). In 1993, annual dinners accounted for 8.5% of revenue, reaching 10.5% by 1998.

While Amnesty International opts for large-scale concert tours, Human Rights Watch engages in a different form of experiential marketing: a human rights film festival. Amnesty’s previous concert tours had consumers purchasing concert tickets to see their favourite rock musicians perform live. Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, has participants purchasing tickets to view films that directly correlate with the organization’s mission, in the hopes of educating viewers on the human rights ills of the world. The Human Rights Watch Film Festival (HRWFF), established in 1988, for which Human Rights Watch is a sponsor, garners further support for the organization (Wong, 2011). The film festival occurs annually in New York and London, and travels to numerous
other cities (Welch, 2001). Wong (2011) notes that “sensitive issues that more mainstream cinema tends to overlook because of perceived controversies are stock topics for human rights festivals” (p. 173). At human rights film festivals, documentaries are used as educational tools in order to educate and empower audiences (Wong, 2011). The film festival allows one to “bear witness to human rights violations and create a forum for courageous individuals on both sides of the lens to empower audiences with knowledge that personal commitment can make a difference” (Human Rights Watch Film Festival, n.d., para. 1). Moreover, the Human Rights Watch Film Festival “brings to life human rights abuses through storytelling in a way that challenges each individual to empathize and demand justice for all people” (Human Rights Watch Film Festival, n.d., para. 1). HRWFF participants feel a direct connection to distant sufferers. In terms of branding, the Human Rights Watch Film Festival enables Human Rights Watch to leverage its brand through experiential marketing, as a “rich source of sensory, affective, and cognitive associations that result in memorable…brand experiences” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 21).

Just as Amnesty had begun to stress efficiency and corporate procedures in the 1970s, Human Rights Watch did so in the early 1990s. In 1993, an independent management study group examined and assessed the operations of Human Rights Watch (Korey, 1998). After examining the operations of the organization, the Management Assistance Group recommended a “system for effecting a much higher level of unity and coherence in leadership, strategy, and governance, which in turn, required a sharply delineated central structure and clearly defined central processes for reviewing work and approving important decisions” (Korey, 1998, p. 349). Therefore, the Watch Committees were then united under the umbrella of Human Rights Watch with “coherence through a clearly defined senior administrative team [that] would provide the organization with a clear identity…” (Korey, 1998, p. 349). The recommendations of the Management Assistance Group resulted in the increased professionalization of the organization, leading to new policies and management practices for the organization’s work and activities (Korey, 1998). It was based on recommendations of the Management Assistance Group that Human Rights Watch began to develop its international identity,
which eventually led to an increased marketing and branding presence in the mid to late 1990s (Korey, 1998).

Human Rights Watch accepts corporate donations on a case-by-case basis (Brown, 2001). All of the organization’s major gifts are vetted through the Business and Human Rights director and the development department’s policy makers (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). The organization also launches an investigation to determine how the donor generates its revenue (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). The organization’s corporate fundraising policy states that HRW will only accept contributions from corporations when the funds are unrestricted and in amounts less than $25,000. The organization’s corporate policy states that corporate donations “may be administered on behalf of a firm that is not affiliated with the government, has not been identified as complicit with human rights abuses, is not a significant participant in any business sector where [they] carry out substantial human rights investigations, has not been unwilling or unable to implement policies and procedures to remedy credible allegations about human rights violations, [and] is not credibly alleged to systematically engage in illegal or unethical practices” (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). This policy rules out many companies.

The Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch states that the organization refuses to “accept money from somebody … perceived as the owner or representative of a company in an industry” that the organization is investigating. He mentions that it is rare for corporations to donate to the organization and it is usually representatives of or owners of corporations that want to donate to the organization’s work, but do so through their corporation for tax purposes. “Corporations tend to steer clear of us—publicly at least,” stated the Director of Finance. “I think companies realize it’s bad for business to actively support Human Rights Watch because we’re criticizing the power brokers or the influence makers…” However, as the organization globalizes and looks for fundraising internationally, it will become more challenging to investigate potential donors (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal
communication, September 14, 2012). The Director of Finance warns that it becomes more difficult to investigate Chinese and Arabic donors, for example, who come from societies where information is more secretive and less accessible.

In 1999, Human Rights Watch diversified its revenue stream with the development of an endowment campaign, which “would support efforts that Human Rights Watch’s annual $15 million budget [could not] cover adequately” (Human Rights Watch, 1999, para. 6). These efforts include: “guaranteeing Human Rights Watch’s capacity to respond quickly to human rights emergencies anywhere on the globe…as well as providing funds for areas of the world that attract less financing because they are outside the limelight” (Human Rights Watch, 1999, para. 6). The endowment campaign received gifts from fewer than fifty donors, including the Sandler Family Supporting Foundation of Oakland, California, the Ford Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The Endowment Fund was “established under a formal arrangement, whereby HRW can spend no more than 5% of the Endowment Fund value… each year for operations” (Human Rights Watch Financial Statement, 2012). Moreover, the assets received as part of the Endowment Campaign are designated as temporarily restricted (Human Rights Watch Financial Statement, 2012). The goal of the endowment fund is “to provide a steady and reliable stream of income that is distinct from other sources of revenue” that provides up to 10% of the organization’s annual budget (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). The Endowment Fund is “not dependent on current fundraising efforts” and is “not …affected by fluctuations, changes, in the political environment,” which safeguards a portion of the organization’s revenue in times of political uncertainty, and during times where donor contributions may decline (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012).

Newman (2005) suggests that nonprofits that depend on few sources of charitable support are “particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties of the economy, vagaries of the stock market, and the instability of other funding sources” (p. 2-3). Decreasing revenue sources and rising expenses have led nonprofits to develop endowment funds to increase
revenue (Newman, 2005). Newman (2005) defines endowment funds as “funds containing financial assets that are held permanently by nonprofit organizations and invested to generate income and capital appreciation for the benefit of the organization” (p. 3). Part of the endowment’s value is spent each year to support the organization’s work and goals, and the remaining income is accumulated back into the fund, assuring its growth (Newman, 2005). Endowment funds provide numerous benefits, as they create an ongoing source of income, enhance the stability and prestige of the organization, enable program expansion and provide independence from economic, governmental, and political forces (Newman, 2005). However, potential donors may be unhappy that the organization has funds tied up in assets, instead of using these funds to put towards the organization’s main goals of research and education. Donors may also be unlikely to contribute if they feel an organization’s endowment fund is too large, as they may feel as though the organization has plenty of financing available but are simply choosing not to use it.

Human Rights Watch’s endowment fund, which reached a net asset value of $83,741,968 in 2012, contains all of the organization’s active investments, including its corporate bonds. Some nonprofits, like the World Wildlife Fund, invest in corporate stocks to “persuade their fund managers to raise concerns with companies on their behalf” (Waygood, 2006, p. 55). However, Human Rights Watch views this as a conflict of interest (Deputy Director of Finance at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). The Deputy Director of Finance at Human Rights Watch notes that HRW has a very strict social investing policy and is acutely aware of conflicts of interest. He notes that all investments have to be vetted by the director of the Business and Human Rights Division and must adhere to the Investment Committee’s guidelines. The organization refuses to invest directly in any industry within which it investigates (Deputy Director of Finance at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). For example, the Deputy Director of Finance notes that the organization would not invest in oil stocks since it investigates the extractives industry and the organization tends to stay away from commodity companies altogether.
In recent years, executives or those who have attained personal wealth through corporate means wish to donate. While Human Rights Watch is “acutely aware, especially with [its] brand,…of perceived conflicts of interests and reputational risks,” and how “one little slip can be devastating” (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012), the organization’s brand may suffer when it accepts donations from corporate donors that the public may perceive as being connected to human rights violations. Human Rights Watch recently accepted a $100 million dollar donation from George Soros, a key player in the hedge fund business (Kapoor, 2013). However, Soros has attained personal wealth through means that have weakened the ability to ensure socioeconomic rights are protected/maintained (Kapoor, 2013). Soros has been linked to major financial crises causing financial destabilization, which in turn worsened socioeconomic conditions in third world nations (Kapoor, 2013). For example, in 1997, Soros was involved in the Asian financial crisis (Kapoor, 2013). Soros’ Quantum Fund was one of many hedge funds that “dumped the [That] baht, which created investor panic and rapid capital outflow, spreading to…South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 60). The baht lost 50 percent of its value and as a result, “Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia all witnessed an increase in unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, and a deterioration in access to education,” with more than 50 million people living below the poverty line (Kapoor, 2013, p. 61).

Kapoor (2013) argues that Soros’ support of human rights groups is “barely a threat to the system; at most, it is reformist—establishing and defending individuals’ civil and political rights, but steering clear of the much more politically difficult area of collective socioeconomic rights,” an area which his actions have caused worsened conditions across the globe (p. 61). Kapoor (2013) states that Soros “gives with one hand, while…tak[ing] with the other,” producing “decaf capitalism,” whereby, Soros can balance out his profit making with charity work and reinforce a system that “exploits but still cares, wreaks social havoc but really worries, institutes a Wild West entrepreneurialism but also a Welfare state” (p. 61). Thus, Kapoor (2013) maintains that Soros’ actions fail to acknowledge the relationship between profit making and the creation of inequality that capitalism is partially responsible for.
Although not direct corporate donors, individuals who have attained wealth through Google, Apple, and Microsoft have donated to Human Rights Watch (interview with the Deputy Director of Finances, September 14, 2012). In light of scandals in recent years about the use of child labourers by Microsoft and Apple’s suppliers (like KYE, a factory in China) (McIntyre, 2010), these situations beg the question: how far removed do donations/donors have to be from human rights violations? Where do we draw the line between what donations should be accepted and which ones should be refused? Too stringent of policies will result in low revenue and operating budgets, and thus, less substantial work on behalf of the organization. However, accepting donations somehow, even distantly, connected to human rights violations can negatively affect the brand and public perception of the organization, which may make it more difficult to attract future donations.

In terms of fundraising and marketing, little has changed since Human Rights Watch’s early days. The majority of the organization’s revenue (approximately $73 million in 2012) is still collected from public support and foundations. The organization does not sell t-shirts, provide medical services, or distribute aid (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). The Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch has been looking for other activities to bring in different streams of revenue. This has proved to be a difficult task. “It’s not easy,” he says, “because of course, now you’re getting out of your rubric…Even if I had…a comically themed human rights restaurant with…Mussolini Fussili and…different funny named dishes that seemed to be educating people…[that’s] still not what we do. Who’s running this restaurant and how do you manage [it]? That’s not what we bring in people to do [here].” This type of fundraising would not relate to the organization’s charitable purpose and has no relation to human rights, making such fundraising efforts difficult for the organization to justify and align with its brand. Aside from the organization’s annual film festival, there are few centrally organized marketing efforts. The centrally organized marketing of HRW is limited to monthly direct mail pieces and annual emails to prospective donors. However, Human Rights Watch’s researchers organize local marketing appeals based on the needs of their research. These
appeals contribute to the brand image of the organization, however these campaigns are not integrated into an organizational approach to marketing.

Conclusion

Amnesty International emerged as a grassroots organization that emphasized the role of volunteers and the community to carry the movement. Members were responsible for the research work, publicity, and fundraising of the organization. Members also shared a common understanding for the need of basic human rights protection and shared the devotion to the organization and the cause. Local fundraising events in the 1960s and 1970s were organized by members to spread awareness of the work of the organization, attract more members, and raise revenue. However, by the 1970s and 1980s, Amnesty International began moving some elements of marketing and fundraising from members to professional marketing firms, as this was a cost-effective practice that utilized the skills of professionals who understood the industry’s best practices.

Beginning in the 1980s, Amnesty began a series of corporate partnerships and sponsorships designed to increase exposure and revenue for the organization. Small, locally organized fundraising efforts still exist, however, and embody the values of unity and togetherness that Amnesty’s brand symbolizes. Moreover, Amnesty’s recent fundraising efforts, like partnerships with Amazon and MGive, emphasize the ease and convenience in donating and supporting the organization. Amnesty International frequently partners with for-profit corporations and appears to be quite careful in its selection, choosing corporations with values that align with its own. However, there have been instances of disconnect, such as the Amnesty International Citizens Bank Visa card. In general, however, Amnesty pairs with corporations that make a strong human rights commitment. The purpose of the partnership is to more effectively publicize the work of the organization, reach an audience that the organization could not reach on its own, and generate additional revenue and support for the organization. However, the use of and reliance on consumption philanthropy, be it through ticket sales or the sale of related merchandise, has numerous drawbacks. Consumption philanthropy prevents donors from really grasping and questioning the underlying problems that have caused human rights suffering and promotes an easy, simple solution that relies on the act of proper
consumption (Eikenberry, 2009). Moreover, consumption philanthropy may partially prevent the ability to raise additional donor dollars, as the public often perceives its consumption as a donation, indicating that they have “done enough.” Amnesty’s use of consumption philanthropy as a marketing and fundraising tool fails to address or acknowledge that capitalism has caused conditions under which suffering occurs, despite the fact that Amnesty’s goods are ethically sourced. Eikenberry (2009) states:

Consuming more will not solve today’s social…problems. Indeed, consumption may very well create more of the kinds of problems that we had hoped philanthropy would fix. Relying on individual consumer choices, consumption philanthropy is unsuited to the scale or complexity of the problems it seeks to fix. Couched in market transactions, it neither acknowledges the voice of the transactions’ beneficiaries nor gives philanthropists the satisfaction of mindful virtuous action. And caught in the mechanisms of the market, it obscures the fact that the market caused many of the problems that philanthropy seeks to redress (para.40).

This isn’t to say that Amnesty International is solely interested in the transaction. The organization has cultivated a relationship with many of its members. Amnesty grew as a grassroots movement, but in recent years, the organization has turned to large-scale corporate partnerships for support—ones that often encourage consumption.

Eikenberry (2009) suggests “the most benevolent philanthropic agenda would not be infused with consumption,” but rather, “would give voice to those who suffer” (para. 32). She asks one to refer back to the “movements for workers’ rights, African-Americans’ civil rights, and women’s and gender rights in the United States,” noting that when the “aggrieved speak and the powerful listen…policies, political processes, and public perceptions can change” (para.33). She argues that social movements, including the American Revolution and the abolition of slavery, are examples of the significant changes that can be brought about by social action. As illustrated in Chapter One, Amnesty International was greatly influenced by nineteenth century social movements and emerged as a grassroots organization dependent upon the public to “do something.”

Members still partake in local fundraising events and write letters to political prisoners, but now, the public is being asked to also engage in market transactions to supplement these acts. If anything, this merely highlights a point of contention: how does
one balance out the need for additional financing with the need to maintain the purity of the movement? Moreover, this situation also indicates that it may depend on the public, just as much as the organization, to engage with the organization on a deeper level, rather than through private market consumption alone.

For those of the public that perceive Amnesty International as focusing too much on branding, it is important for the organization to disclose as much information as possible. “Charities, more than anything, are subject to individual value assessments,” says the Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada. Individual donors will perceive Amnesty’s efforts differently. Hudson (2007) states that some donors may not support a nonprofit’s spending on branding, as they would rather the money be spent on other service activities. Ritchie et al (1998) state that some feel as though branding is “too commercial” and can be too costly for organizations. To ensure that donors don’t perceive the organization’s fundraising efforts as excessive branding and unnecessary spending, the organization needs to disclose more information. That’s not to say that Amnesty International does not disclose—reports and financial statements dating back to the organization’s early years are available on its website and online library. However, the organization should consider disclosing even more than this. Amnesty needs to explicitly explain why it has chosen certain methods of fundraising and branding, what its plan is, the expected return, and the cost of these efforts. The best way to justify the organization’s decisions to brand is to disclose information to potential donors about the reasons why the organization is doing so (Director of Corporate Engagement and Membership at Imagine Canada, personal communication, October 3, 2012).

Human Rights Watch differs from Amnesty significantly in terms of its branding and fundraising. Human Rights Watch’s fundraising initiatives, such as its annual film festival, educate viewers and speak to the work of the organization, aligning these efforts with its overall goals. Annual dinners honour those who have made a strong human rights commitment and educate people about the work of the organization, reinforcing its brand in the mind of donors. The organization uses an endowment fund to generate revenue to supplement donations. However, potential donors may be unwilling to contribute if they
feel the organization does not need more donation dollars when an abundance of funds is tied up in assets. Regardless, Human Rights Watch is very careful with its investments and corporate involvement. The organization operates under strict corporate fundraising and social investing policies to ensure that conflicts of interest are not realized. The organization is aware that one poor decision can disastrously affect its brand. Rather than choosing cause marketing/consumption philanthropy as an additional means to raise funds, the organization often generates a substantial amount of revenue from wealthy individuals, including Soros and those who have attained wealth through major corporations like Google, Apple, and Microsoft. It is important for the organization to do its due diligence and ensure that the donor is not linked to any human rights violations. Wealthy donors, like George Soros, may be tied to activities that have led to personal wealth at the expense of others. These individuals are partaking in “decaf capitalism,” reinforcing a system that “exploits but still cares, wrecks social havoc but really worries, institutes a Wild West entrepreneurialism but also a Welfare state” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 61). This situation begs another important question: how far removed should donors be from human rights abuse?

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch utilize different strategies for the purpose of raising revenue, cutting costs, and increasing brand presence in the market. Both organizations strive to reach a balance between the need for financial support and the need to maintain the purity of the organization and the cause. The reasons for undertaking the fundraising strategies outlined in this chapter are obvious: to increase exposure, ensure the stability of the organization, ensure that each organization can provide the services and research it needs, and to attract the necessary assets (volunteers, public donations, funding, etc). However, the drawbacks to such tactics should also be considered, as they may negatively influence the image of the organization and the ability to attract future donations.
Chapter 3: “Mobilizing Shame” and “Post-Humanitarian” Communication

Introduction

This chapter considers the themes explored in Chapter One and Chapter Two, examining how humanitarian values and corporate practices are at play in humanitarian communication. Chapter One traces the historical development of international nongovernmental organizations, considering how the Enlightenment and religious revivalism enabled the moral regeneration of society. Private citizens joined together to form philanthropic organizations that mobilized action on behalf of sufferers. This translated into a civil society that employed mass media usage for social reform, a strategy later adopted by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that facilitated their ongoing international success. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch utilize the mass media to publicize abuse and suffering, to rally support for human rights, and to critique the power of sovereign states. Chapter Two highlights the commercial-inspired marketing, branding, and fundraising initiatives undertaken by Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. Building a strong identifiable brand has helped each organization attract donations and increase visibility, allowing each organization to define itself amongst a pool of competing organizations and causes. Chapter Three investigates how the humanitarian values and historical roots discussed in Chapter One and the commercial practices discussed in Chapter Two have manifested and intertwined in the visual promotional texts created by AI and HRW.

This chapter argues that the promotional texts of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch lean upon and propagate the pervasive axiom of “mobilizing shame,” which has become predominant practice for human rights organizations (Keenan, 2004). This axiom maintains that political injustices can be remedied by exposure, whereby susceptibility to the force of public opinion will necessitate reform. By analyzing two video campaigns, I will illustrate how mobilizing shame has become a predominant feature of human rights campaigning. I also argue that Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have redefined humanitarian action, inviting the spectator to partake in speech-acts and technological tools to show support. Using two print advertisements for analysis and critique, I will illustrate how Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch break from the traditional “registers of pity” associated with older forms of humanitarian communication. Drawing upon Chouliaraki (2010), I argue that these appeals are exemplary of “post-humanitarian communication,” which is to say, these appeals break with the mechanism of moral agency typical of shock effect and positive image appeals. Instead, these appeals emphasize the brand equity of the organization at hand (Chouliaraki, 2010). This analysis will also highlight some of the predicaments that face contemporary humanitarian communication.

**Advertising and Promoting Human Rights: How It Works**

Human rights advertisements “combine signs to affirm cultural association between brand and significant cultural ideas” (MacRury, 2009, p. 201). McCracken (1986) argues that advertising acts as a “potential method of meaning transfer,” where an image of the culturally constituted world is combined with a consumer product in the frame of an advertisement (p. 74). When a representation of the culturally constituted world is combined with an image of the product, the viewer registers similarity between the two, resulting in properties of the culturally constituted world being transferred to the good (or in this case, organizational brand) (McCracken, 1986). In advertisements, the “known properties of the culturally constituted world…come to reside in the unknown properties of the consumer good” and meaning is transferred from the image in the advertisement to the product (McCracken, 1986, p. 74). Indeed, human rights advertisements act as a cultural system and they contribute to the “organization of experience through the shaping and reflecting of our sense of reality” (Sherry, 1987, p. 441). Advertising has the ability to absorb and fuse symbolic practices and discourses together (Leiss, Kline, & Jhally, 1990). The images in advertisements are “appropriated…from an unbounded range of cultural references” and “recombine[d]…around the theme of consumption” (Leiss et al, 1990, p. 192). Advertising also brings goods (and ideas) into social life and gives them cultural significance (Leiss et al., 1990).
Advertisers and NGOs act as cultural intermediaries and are involved in “symbolic production” (Featherstone, 1991, p. 35). Advertisers mediate between NGOs and the cultural world, producing images and symbols that they present to audiences (Featherstone, 1991). Advertising “adopts, revises, and shapes other cultural message systems” and “it appropriates the social structure of markets for goods and audiences of media, and recycles them as strategies…” (Leiss et al., 1990, p. 190). Therefore, social change is mediated through advertising (Leiss et al., 1990).

Advertisements are social texts that are based on meanings and symbols that exist in a culture’s history (Danesi, 2010). Advertisers attempt to “steer meanings” in a certain direction (Goldman, 1992, p. 40) and most advertising images have a preferred meaning by the producers (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). Meaning is constructed during the production of the advertisement, as producers draw upon cultural codes and conventions to encode the text (Hall, 1980). Image producers are not in full control of the meanings generated from an advertisement, however, because “meanings are the product of a complex social interaction among image, viewers, and context” (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009, p. 55). Therefore, advertisers “cannot guarantee interpretations” (Goldman, 1992, p. 40). Receivers of advertising texts are interpellated or “hailed” to generate meanings from the advertisement (Williamson, 1978, p. 41). Althusser (1998) indicates that individuals become ideological subjects once they have been interpellated and that “individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects” (p. 163). Thus, advertising helps to shape us as ideological subjects (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). The viewer-receiver creates the meaning of an advertising text by making connections between signs, a task that would be impossible without an understanding of the cultural world (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009). Advertisements are embedded with connotative meaning, which enables receivers to decode and comprehend messages. Furthermore, advertisements are often viewed as shared texts that possess a dominant meaning (Sturken & Cartright, 2009). Nevertheless, spectators are “active agents in the production of meanings,” as they may generate meanings that are unintended or unanticipated by the producer (Sturken & Cartwright, 2009, p. 55).
Mobilizing Shame

Enlightenment principles emphasize moral conscience, which in turn, emphasizes our awareness of the suffering of others (Barnett, 2011). This heightened emphasis on morality gives rise to the notion that every human being shares basic rights and that humanity is contingent upon adhering to moral codes (Barnett, 2011). This proposition was put forth by Immanuel Kant, who believed that “all rational beings are members of a single moral community” bound by “the laws of morality grounded in reason” (as cited in Vestergaard, 2011, p. 29). A morally grounded community often defines itself as loving, compassionate, and good-hearted, sharing a common understanding of morality and what constitutes as legitimate material progress (Barnett, 2011). However, events that expose negative actions that challenge or contradict this understanding of the community sometimes occur, leaving community members feeling remorseful and ashamed (Barnett, 2011). In response to events that “shock not just the conscience but also our own sense of humanity,” community members often seek to develop strategies and institutions to ensure that such events will not happen again (Barnett, 2011, p. 28). One of these strategies has been called “mobilizing shame” (Keenan, 2004).

Exposure is a fundamental element of the mobilization of shame, as publicity and media imagery increases public awareness, which in turn creates a “demand that something be done in the face of conscience-shocking suffering” (Barnett, 2011, p. 29). Said differently, “mobilizing shame presupposes that dark deeds are done in the dark, and that the light of publicity….has the power to strike preemptively on behalf of justice” (Keenan, 2004, p. 446). The idea here is that perpetrators will feel embarrassment and therefore, compelled to change their behaviour in response to the sensations of shame brought about by the other’s gaze. The feeling or sensation of shame engenders a sense of awareness and this is thought to link knowledge with positive action (Keenan, 2004). Hence, the mobilization of shame supposes “that those agents whose behaviour it wishes to affect—governments, armies, businesses, and militias—are exposed in some way to the force of public opinion” and that these agents are vulnerable to feelings of embarrassment and disgrace (Keenan, 2004, p. 435-436). The strategy of mobilizing shame is undeniably rooted in Enlightenment thinking. However, as Keenan (2004)
notes, these roots are contradictory at best. He states: “the Kantian moral subject is fully realized only when his or her reason is liberated from the guidance, surveillance, pressure, or context of others, but at the same time when it is destined for public exchange, exposure, or enlightenment” (Keenan, 2004, p. 436).

Mobilizing shame became common practice in the humanitarian culture of the post-Enlightenment era. By the time of the Cold War it became easier to mobilize action on behalf of distant sufferers, as the number of NGOs increased and print and visual media were made more accessible to ordinary citizens (Barnett, 2011). Human rights organizations emerging in the 1960s and 1970s—including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—adopted the axiom of mobilizing shame into their work. As discussed in Chapter One, publicly accessible op-ed articles, powerful images of sufferers and activists, and immense research made available by these organizations had the power to mobilize action and support on behalf of the human rights cause. The axiom of mobilizing shame is evident in the methods of both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. As Keenan (2004) notes, “mobilizing shame is the predominant practice of human rights organizations, and the dominant metaphor through which human rights NGOs understand their own work” and has become the “watchword of the international human rights movement” (p. 437-438).

**The Axiom of Mobilizing Shame in Advertising**

**NGOs: The Money-Morals Dilemma**

While NGOs concern themselves with “saintly principles,” they also require the finances to keep operations running (Barnett, 2011, p. 42). While money is limited for these organizations, those in dire need of their aid and services are not (Barnett, 2011). NGOs have developed considerable marketing expertise to tap into the purse-strings of donors. As discussed in Chapter Two, NGOs use contemporary marketing techniques to solicit donations. These include celebrity endorsements, company sponsorships and partnerships, and cause marketing. These organizations also market the cause by circulating gut-wrenching images of human suffering (Barnet, 2011). In addition, these organizations often use the mass media to brand themselves and to prove their relevance
and involvement in world issues (Barnett, 2011). The use of images of suffering to solicit donations may appear to be insensitive and manipulative, however, it is successful in generating resources necessary to alleviate the misery of many (Barnett, 2011). Consequently, some NGOs “will advertise if not embellish the tragedy in order to tap into the guilt of the rich” (Barnett, 2011, p. 43). In this way, the use of images of suffering oscillates between being exploitative and utilitarian (Barnett, 2011). Yet, NGOs “believe they need to risk commodifying the suffering of strangers because nothing else works quite as well” (Barnett, 2011, p. 43). Using images of human suffering in advertising campaigns reflects the tension between awareness and fundraising, between morals and money (Barnett, 2011; Lissner, 1977).

*Mobilizing Shame Through Images: How Images Inspire Action*

While Keenan’s understanding of shame targets the perpetrator, images of suffering evoke feelings of shame in the anonymous spectator. Negative and positive images reflect a moral emphasis on pity and have a tendency to “tell” the spectator how they should feel (Chouliaraki, 2010). Operating under the logic of Boltanski’s (1999) “politics of pity,” positive and negative images are characterized by the way that they distinguish between “those who suffer and those who do not” (p. 3). These types of appeals emphasize the spectacle of suffering, or the observation of those who suffer by those who do not experience suffering directly (Boltanski, 1999). Pity, then, is characterized by distance between the spectator and the sufferer and “does not ask whether the misery of the unfortunate is justified” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 4-5). Appeals that depend on registers of pity to inspire political action tend to consider the unfortunate en masse, as a group, though individual cases may be highlighted at times. Perhaps most importantly, these campaigns assume that suffering can be dealt with in a political manner, since pity generalizes to deal with distance and the “principal mechanism of generalization is political” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 6). Consequently, a “politics of pity” is characterized by the necessity of the spectator to contemplate suffering and partake in reflective action in response (Boltanski, 1999).
The use of shocking images in NGO promotional material was common practice until the 1980s (Benthall, 1993). Yet more recently, the use of negative images has been criticized as being untruthful, demeaning, lacking dignity, and dehumanizing (Lidchi, 1999; Lissner, 1977). Likewise, these appeals often victimize and patronize sufferers, depicting them as passive and pathetic and portraying them in gruesome and brutal photographs (Campbell, 2004; Cohen, 2001). Shock appeals operate on the “logic of complicity,” as “complicity renders the spectator a witness of the horrors of suffering and, in so doing, makes our inaction a personal failure to take responsibility for their misfortune—a sense of everyday or banal complicity in distant suffering that taps into feelings of shame” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 111). These feelings are turned into action by “identifying the figure of persecutor in the very audiences [that are] address[ed] as potential benefactors” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 111). Conjuring up feelings of indignation and anger, images of suffering leave the spectator feeling as though the subject’s suffering is unjust (Boltanski, 1999). In response, the spectator directs feelings of anger and indignation toward the perpetrator through accusations (Boltanski, 1999). However, denouncing the actions of a perpetrator is only a “commitment….in words, which costs nothing and appeases the spectator’s moral unease without reducing the unfortunate’s suffering in any way” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 70). Defending the sufferer is also suspect of being phony because the spectator has little in common with the sufferer, as he does not share in the unfortunate’s experiences (Boltanski, 1999). As a result, the act of denunciation is motivated by social esteem (Boltanski, 1999). In addition, the act of denunciation also proves the irresponsibility of the denouncer, since his words may not harm his own position, but can bring about serious reprisals for the sufferer (Boltanski, 1999).

In light of immense scrutiny regarding negative appeals, NGOs responded by employing positive images. In this type of image, emphasis is placed “on the sufferer’s agency and dignity,” usually depicting an empowered and dignified survivor (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 112; Cohen, 2001). These types of appeals “singularize donors by addressing each one as a person who can make a concrete contribution to a sufferer’s life” and often spring from the perspective of the benefactors rather than the perpetrators (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 112). However, these images are often criticized because they fail
to emphasize the true extent of human suffering (Lidchi, 1999). In contrast to negative appeals that evoke feelings of guilt and shame, positive images stir up sensations of tenderheartedness (Boltanski, 1999). Positive appeals also assume that a spectator will be moved by the spectacle of suffering and will take action, much in the same manner as negative appeals (Chouliaraki, 2010). Action inspired by this type of appeal proves problematic in that the spectator is “surrendering to an introspective description of his own affliction” and is interested only in oneself, or indulgence (Boltanski, 1999, p. 98).

_Pity, Political Inaction, and Overexposure_

Traditional shock effect and positive image campaigns that operate within the limits of a politics of pity have “established a dominant discourse about public action that relies heavily on the language of grand emotions about suffering…” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 108). To spark and justify political action, those involved in the media industry have resorted to an “emotion-oriented discourse of suffering” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 108). However, this poor and problematic conception of the political, Chouliaraki (2010) argues, is reflective of “the inadequacy of the discourse of pity…to activate grand emotions, such as indignation and guilt… and so to sustain a legitimate claim for public action on suffering” (p. 109). Humanitarian communication “both reflects and reproduces the inadequacy of the conception of the political” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 109). Along similar lines, Sliwinski’s _Human Rights in Camera_ (2011) reveals that the use of images of suffering, though sparking feelings of horror amongst the political spectator, have not prompted political action. The circulation of media images and their effect has indicated an “ethics of failure” (Sliwinski, 2011, p. 134). She states:

…despite their political potential, the long history of technologically reproducible images has yet to secure the practical social and political effects they are asked to procure. Indeed, far from fulfilling the dream of bringing the world’s suffering to an end, the evocative signs that are addressed with increasing frequency to the world spectator through the global circulation of pictures have only inaugurated a crisis in the venerable category of reality. Although the spectator of human rights now finds herself in extreme proximity to political events of distant places, this proximity has failed to produce ethical or moral certainty. By the end of the last millennium, world spectators found themselves inches away from the dead of Nyarubuye, yet this new propinquity to genocidal violence only aroused feelings
of repulsion and dread that threatened to overwhelm any capacity for thought or action (Sliwinski, 2011, p. 136).

Furthermore, Boltanski (1999) notes that in light of viewing images of suffering, the spectator may consider an individual’s suffering as neither “unjust nor touching, but as sublime” (p. 113). In this case, pity is contained or repressed (Boltanski, 1999). This reaction proves problematic too, as it “leaves us disarmed in the face of suffering which is explicitly political” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 146).

Keenan (2004) explains that the “dark side of revelation is overexposure,” with the saturation of images having important implications for the human rights cause (p. 438). Consumers are constantly confronted with images of suffering and have become “so used to the spectacle of dreadful events, misery or suffering that [they] stop noticing them” (Tester, 2001, p. 13). Compassion fatigue, as this is called, leaves one feeling exhausted by reports and images of suffering, with the mindset that nothing can be done to help (Tester, 2001). The use of images of suffering is proving less effective as compassion fatigue sets in (Moeller, 1999). Moreover, the human rights crisis is weakened and distorted when images of suffering are placed amidst other commercial images (Moeller, 1999). This may absolve viewers of their feelings of responsibility to act (Moeller, 1999). Moeller (1999) argues that viewing suffering has become a form of entertainment, where pain is commercialized and suffering becomes infotainment and a commodity. Essentially, viewers “are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of [their] own efforts to alleviate it” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 67).

“Post-Humanitarian” Communication: A Break with Registers of Pity

Lilie Chouliaraki (2010) indicates that humanitarian communication has moved beyond a “politics of pity,” where post-humanitarian appeals break “with the traditional registers of pity as motivations for action” (p. 114). Unlike shocking images and positive appeals that draw upon universal discourses of ethics, post-humanitarian appeals emphasize the organizational brand of the not-for-profit entity (Chouliaraki, 2010). The shift towards post-humanitarian communication can be regarded “as a reaction to a much-
criticized articulation between politics and humanitarianism, based on universal morality and grand emotion” and as a response to the media saturated environment that humanitarian organizations operate in (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 107). Chouliaraki (2010) notes that post-humanitarian appeals may still employ images of suffering in humanitarian appeals. However, these advertisements “shift away from photorealism as authentic witnessing towards photorealism as yet another aesthetic choice by which suffering can be represented” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 116). Thus, images of suffering are understood as representations rather than the “truth” of suffering (Chouliaraki, 2010; Vestergaard, 2008). Moreover, post-humanitarian appeals still rely on the same regimes of pity emphasized in traditional humanitarian communication, including guilt, indignation, and shame (Chouliaraki, 2010). Yet, Chouliaraki (2010) maintains, “…these regimes…do not appear as immediate emotions that may inspire action but rather as objects of contemplation to be reflected upon” (p. 118). She states further:

These regimes, however, reappear not as elements of a politics of pity, partaking a grand narrative of affective attachment and collective commitment, but as decontextualized fragments of such narrative that render the psychological world of the spectator a potential terrain of self inspection (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 119).

Therefore, these appeals rely on the reflexivity of the spectator, encouraging her to rely on her judgment as to whether taking action is appropriate or desirable (Chouliaraki, 2010).

Challenges to the Axiom of Mobilizing Shame: Photo-Ops, Performance, and Media Manipulation

Given consistent overexposure and media saturation, Keenan (2004) asks: “What role can publicity, the exposé, and shame (still) play” (p. 439)? Keenan (2004) offers two examples that illustrate the tensions faced by the axiom of mobilizing shame in contemporary society. He illustrates that perpetrators are unafraid of the camera, often engaging in behaviour in full knowledge of its presence. This was the case in Kosovo when Serbian policemen looted and destroyed the village of Mijalic for the cameras. The men “were watching the cameras that watched them, and acted in full knowledge of the fact that their deeds were being recorded,” even going so far as to wave at the camera
By doing so, the “policemen announced the effective erasure of a fundamental axiom of the human rights movement in the age of publicity: that the exposure of violence is feared by its perpetrators, and hence that the act of witness is not simply an ethical gesture but an active intervention” (Keenan, 2004, p. 446). This merely implies that instances such as this have become “photo-op[s],” which Sliwinski (2011) states “call[s] into question the assumptions that underwrite the ethics and the politics of human rights struggle writ large, splintering faith in the very power of truth and representation” (p. 125).

Keenan’s (2004) second example illustrates how images have created unique opportunities for performance and spectacle. In Somalia, reporters and cameras met a small group of Special Forces Marines on the landing beach of Mogadishu as the troops arrived to ensure that a humanitarian relief effort would proceed safely. The Pentagon had told reporters to be there and encouraged press coverage. This put the Marines in risk of danger, though no hostile action ensued. It seemed that the “strategy was the imagery: the creation of images” and “the imagery was also a tactic, a ground-level move in the prosecution of the operation” (Keenan, 2004, p. 442). Keenan (2004) illustrates that “the high-speed electronic news media have created new opportunities not just for activism and awareness, but also for performance, presentation, advertising, propaganda, and of political work of all kinds” (p. 442). This research raises serious doubts about the use of media in the coverage of suffering.

States, regimes, and opposition groups, have learned that mass misfortune attracts massive amounts of aid, attention, and action (Barnett, 2011). This has enabled governments and militant groups to manipulate aid for political purposes, which prolongs suffering and indicates, “when politics and aid clash, the latter will become an instrument of the former” (Barnett, 2011, p. 155). Linda Polman (2010) illustrates that during the Sierra Leone civil war, rampages led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels were strategically planned “to drive up the price of peace” (p. 166) and garner international attention. The RUF rebels amplified the atrocities of the war and encouraged the government to do so as well by deploying “cut-hands gangs” to maim civilian limbs, a practice that caught the attention of the international community.
Amputations, the RUF believed, generated increased press coverage (Gourevitch, 2010). As more amputees appeared, the United Nations and NGOs paid attention to the fate of Sierra Leoneans, and peace negotiations were the result (Polman, 2010; Gourevitch, 2010). The international community “promised a reconstruction operation if the parties would sign an accord, exactly as the RUF had planned…” (Polman, 2010, p. 167). Polman (2010) notes that many of the amputees, despite an abundance of prosthetics, still exposed their maimed limbs for the cameras in the hopes of attracting more aid and financing (Polman, 2010; Gourevitch, 2010). This is a direct reflection of the logic of the humanitarian era: “sowing horror to reap aid, and reaping aid to sow horror” (Gourevitch, 2010, para. 7).

Humanitarian INGOs based in the Western world communicate poverty, development, and human rights issues affecting the “majority world” (“Third World” or “developing world”) to Western audiences (Dogra, 2012). Oftentimes, Western audiences are provided with information that simplifies the political and historical context of distant suffering. In response, Western audiences often demand Western models of aid and justice to battle “majority world” problems without a sound understanding of the needs and desires of sufferers or an understanding of the historical and political context that caused these problems. Furthermore, reporters are often encouraged by humanitarian aid groups to magnify crises in order to increase fundraising, and to provide stories detailing suffering without the political and historical context (Gourevitch, 2010; Polman, 2010).

Aid agencies often stress the importance of their own work, which results in “exaggerated, dire predictions and stereotypes of pathetic dependency” (de Waal, 1997, p. 82). Moreover, Dogra (2012) illustrates that INGO representatives are characterized by the “dual logic of ‘difference’ and ‘oneness,’” as these appeals portray “the global poor as different and distant from the developed world and yet like us by virtue of their humanity” (p. 3). Some appeals also tend to “stretch the distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’” and employ stereotypes that construct the West and Western audiences as “superior—rational, progressive, and civilized in contrast with the inferior ‘disorder,’ ‘irrationality,’ and ‘primitivism’ of non-Europe” (as cited in Dogra, 2012, p. 15).
Journalists reporting on suffering provide an illusion that a solution is within reach and that the reader or viewer can be involved in it (de Waal, 1997). The journalist will select the most extreme cases of suffering and will give the impression that all sufferers are in the same condition, resulting in distortion and exaggeration (de Waal, 1997). In these stories on suffering, “the role of the villain is grossly simplified” and “the savior, a foreign relief agency, is not subjected to any form of analysis” (de Waal, 1997, p. 83). In addition, publicity can often lead to the misuse of aid and “skews attention and resources to regions that are judged of interest to Western audiences” (Terry, 2002, p. 31).

Two Case Studies: Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

The Mobilization of Shame and Redefining Humanitarian Action

Amnesty International: “Shine a Light on Human Rights” (Figures 1 and 2)

Amnesty’s 2011 campaign “Shine a Light On Human Rights” commences with the sounds of gunshots ringing against a visual screen of black (Amnesty International, 2011d). The sound of ammunition is countered by the sound and image of a typewriter in use—the clicking of the keys, the twisting of the knob, the cling of the carriage. The piece being written is dated May 28, 1961, with emphasis placed on the word “appeal.” The document, once removed from the typewriter, is signed by Peter Benenson and marked with a seal, paying homage to the historical founding of Amnesty International. The emphasis on the written word juxtaposed against violent action illustrates Amnesty’s desire to operate peacefully in its response to abuse and suffering. Upon completion of the signed letter, a candle is lit against a black backdrop to mark the start of the organization. It is no coincidence that the video’s limited colour palette of yellow light against a black backdrop reflects Amnesty’s current branding. The contrast between light and dark (good versus evil, the known versus the unknown, togetherness versus loneliness) is a recurring theme throughout the short video. Benenson’s written letter then encloses the candle, creating a lantern of light against the black backdrop of the film. Shortly thereafter, other lanterns appear out of the dark, lighting up the frame, signifying the growth of Amnesty’s movement and illustrating Amnesty’s grassroots mobilization.
As the lanterns increase in number, the light emulating from these small boxes confronts a child soldier who retreats in its presence. The light also embraces a young suffering woman, who stands in response. Later, the light of the lanterns shines through a prison cell, resulting in a noose loosening. The lanterns then form the shape of the globe, indicating the global reach of the organization and its members/supporters. The advertisement closes with a yellow visual screen with the text:

50 Years
Amnesty International

Join & Make a Difference
www.amnestyusa.org/join

Figure 1: Still image of lanterns from Amnesty International’s “Shine a Light on Human Rights” video appeal. Available from Amnesty International USA’s YouTube Channel (2011).
Human Rights Watch: “2100 in 2010” (Figures 3 and 4)

Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” video begins with text to contextualize the event portrayed on film (Human Rights Watch, 2010a):

Burma held its first elections in 20 years in November 2010.

But more than 2,100 political prisoners including monks, artists, journalists and activists remained locked up in Burma’s squalid prisons, unable to participate.

As part of its “2100 in 2010” campaign, Human Rights Watch created an event calling for the release of all political prisoners.

The short video depicts the hustle and bustle in New York City’s Grand Central Station, as a fast-paced clip of travelers in the station appears immediately following the introductory text. The video then cuts to the set up of HRW’s installation, which is comprised of 200 cells, each containing a black and white photograph of a Burmese political prisoner. The installation is interactive; the public can remove detachable pens
(which act as the prison bars of each cell) to sign a petition calling upon Burmese political military rulers to release those imprisoned. Burmese monks, dressed in their traditional garb, line either side of the installation. The film shows images of public reactions to the installation (typically awe and intrigue) and then cuts to an image of a sign placed in front of the installation, which reads: “Please touch the exhibit.” The video then cuts to footage of public interaction, where members of the public remove the pens to sign the petition. This footage is interrupted by the text: “As the pens are removed, so are the bars” and “Thousands of signatures of people from 86 countries were collected.” The camera provides evidence of this, as it pans over the petition, indicating that people from Russia, the United States, Mexico, Sweden, and many other nations signed the petition. A Burmese monk is then shown being interviewed by the press, illustrating that the event attracted global media attention. This is affirmed by on-screen text. Towards the end of the short video, the camera pans over the prison cells of the installation, showing the bar/pen-free images of Burmese political prisoners. The video is interrupted once more with the following text: “The petition book will be sent to Burma’s Senior General Than Shwe, the United Nations Secretary-General and leaders of countries that maintain close ties with Burma.” The advertisement closes with the image of a pen and text that reads: “The power to free Burma’s political prisoners is in your hands,” followed by the Human Rights Watch logo.
Figure 3: Still image of Burmese monks and installation from Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” video appeal. Available from Human Rights Watch’s YouTube Channel (2011).

Figure 4: Still image of pen removal from Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” video appeal. Available from Human Rights Watch’s YouTube Channel (2011).
Mobilizing Shame: Defining the Organizational Method

Amnesty International’s “Shine a Light on Human Rights” appeal emphasizes the organization’s central tenet of unity and collectiveness through the use of lanterns to represent the organization’s growing movement. Rather than having a specific member lend her face to the movement, the organization’s use of lanterns indicates action on behalf of a collective group. This highlights the organization’s mass-membership based structure. In another sense, the short film can be understood to represent the organization’s power in mobilizing shame: the film’s glowing lanterns (representing members) are indicative of a like-minded group within an international community that have mobilized to expose wrongdoings and seek their redress through acts of letter-writing. Each lantern is composed of a written letter, signed and sealed by the author, which is indicative of Amnesty’s primary advocacy tool: mobilizing the masses to enable social change through the force of public opinion. Members’ written letters are directed at those who perpetuate abuse and upon receiving these documents, perpetrators are theoretically susceptible to the gaze of their peers (Keenan, 2004). Amnesty’s appeal implies that this strategy successfully ends abusive behavior, as is evidenced by the images of the child soldier dropping his ammunition and the loosening of the noose in a dimly lit prison cell. The appeal implies Amnesty’s exposure of abuse—“shining a light on human rights”—is able to bring about the end of suffering when members exchange thoughts and emotions and take action by letter-writing.

Similarly, the public exchange of reasoning is evidenced in Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” campaign. The installation acts as a tool to educate the public in the hopes of inspiring action and exposes the human rights violations committed in Burma. The morally grounded public feels compelled to act in response to actions that oppose the good values of the community, taking to the petition log to show their condemnation. This implies that the organization enlists the public and international community for support. The petition book acts as a tool to shame Burma’s Senior General Than Shwe into upholding moralistic principles. This appeal also illustrates the power of the organization’s exposure of human rights abuses: the installation not only gives the public the necessary information and the means to take action (the pen enables
one to sign the petition), but the removal of the prison bars/pens also simulates a jail break that ends an unfortunate’s suffering.

In these appeals, both organizations clearly endorse the tactic of mobilizing shame, albeit in different ways. Amnesty’s appeal illustrates that the organization is concerned with exposing individual stories of suffering (prisoners of conscience), as only one suffering agent appears in each frame at a given movement in time—a child soldier, a suffering woman. Amnesty’s appeal also indicates that the organization is strongly oriented towards mobilizing public opinion, which is emphasized by the expansion of the movement and growing number of lanterns appearing throughout the short video. Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, appears to be more interested in exposing the details of human rights abuses through detailed investigations and reports. While Amnesty’s appeal speaks to human rights violations more generally, HRW focuses upon a specific incident of suffering in Burma and provides detailed factual information about the background of Burmese political prisoners, even inviting these subjects to participate in raising awareness. This signifies that extensive research based on sufferers’ testimony is of the utmost concern and guides branding appeals. It further illustrates that HRW’s appeal acts as a more publicly accessible and creative means in which to share research findings with the public. Moreover, HRW’s text reveals that the organization shames perpetrators through direct dialogue with political figures. This is done by sending a petition book with signatures to Burma’s Senior General and the Secretary General of the United Nations, illustrating the organization’s influence and involvement with this organization. While HRW and AI both engage in the tactic of mobilizing shame, these two advertising campaigns also illustrate the differences between these two organizations: Human Rights Watch appears to be more interested in investigating and educating the public about specific human rights abuses, while Amnesty appears more interested in building its network of supporters.

(Re)Defining Humanitarian Action: An Invitation to Act

The appeals of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch interpellate the spectator as a humanitarian who has the opportunity to act (Vestergaard, 2008). In this
case, the regimes of guilt, shame, and indignation appear as objects of contemplation for self-reflection (Chouliaraki, 2010). Amnesty suggests action can be undertaken by joining the organization’s movement and writing appeals, ending its short video with the statement “join and make a difference” and the organization’s website. The website merely offers a means to act, inviting the spectator to visit the website at his convenience. However, the spectator is not immediately compelled to act based on grand emotions of guilt and indignation. Rather, self-reflection and contemplation guide prospective acts (Chouliaraki, 2010). Human Rights Watch’s appeal encourages spectators to touch the exhibit and states: “The power to free Burma’s political prisoners is in your hands,” reinforcing the concept that action can be undertaken by signing the organization’s petition if the spectator deems it appropriate. The spectator can freely choose whether to touch the exhibit and participate or ignore it. Again, in this situation, the spectator is not overcome with guilt that inspires immediate action to relieve such feelings, but instead processes what is being viewed and contemplates whether action is worthwhile or appropriate. In this sense, action “does not take the form of a request or appeal, but precisely of an invitation” (Vestergaard, 2008, p. 488). If a spectator decides to “follow the invitation to the website” or to sign the petition log, “they are offered the possibility to step out of the spectator role and act” (Vestergaard, 2008, p. 488). The invitation-to-act approach of these appeals places emphasis on the reflexivity of the spectator (Chouliaraki, 2010). Moreover, by relying upon personal judgment to engage with the cause of suffering, these campaigns emphasize the “power of personal rather than collective action in making a difference in the lives of vulnerable others” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 121).

Transposing Payment and Speech into Action

Boltanski (1999) suggests that there are two distinct actions that may be undertaken by the spectator: paying and speaking. Paying is a problematic moral action undertaken by the spectator (Vestergaard, 2008; Boltanski, 1999), as it is impersonal and enables one to alleviate feelings of guilt “without genuine involvement in the situation of the unfortunate’s suffering” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 18). Hence, the “bond created between the donor and the unfortunate is…minimal and abstract” (Boltanski, 1999, p. 18).
Furthermore, paying is an individual act and is insufficient in creating a collectivity or group, which is needed to alter public opinion for social transformation (Boltanski, 1999). Boltanski (1999) notes that “donations are aggregated, but not the donors” (p. 18). Both humanitarian appeals analyzed above inadvertently seek donations. However, as Vestergaard (2008) notes, these organizations go “beyond donation[s] and...attempt to get the audience to draw the cause of the organization out of the sphere of representation and into the life world of the public” (p. 488).

The second action Boltanski identifies is speaking, which is more implicitly solicited in the two campaigns: specifically through letter-writing (in the Amnesty International example) and petition signing (in the Human Rights Watch example). In order for speech to be a legitimate alternative to the act of paying, speech must be effective, meaning it must be “oriented toward action with the intention to alleviate misfortune...must be embodied, involve the sacrifice of other actions, and testify to a commitment” (Vestergaard, 2008, p. 488). Human Rights Watch’s installation enables spectators to contemplate the situation of Burmese sufferers, leaving some witnesses desiring to act in response. By collecting signatures of these spectators, Human Rights Watch is able to establish a “political cause around this indignation”, which is “capable of inciting direct action in those who have the power to act at a distance” when the organization’s petition makes its way into the hands of the UN Secretary General and Burma’s Senior General (Boltanski, 2000, p. 6). Thus, these speech acts are collectively mobilized into a demand for political action (Boltanski, 1999). Similarly, Amnesty’s appeal creates a body of members engaged in letter-writing, and when enough letters reach the desk of abusers, they may inspire action by pressuring those who have the power to act. One disadvantage of speech, as Boltanski (1999) notes, is that it “seems to be detached from action” (p. 19). Human Rights Watch combats this apparent drawback in the minds of witnesses by directly linking a speech act to a physical action: the public must remove a pen, symbolically releasing a prisoner, in order to add their signature. Consequently, the spectator imaginatively participates in the alleviation of suffering with their speech act.
The act of speech in both of these appeals is dependent upon the witness’s signature. A signature “marks and retains [the signer] having-been present…”; it represents the absence of the petition-signer and letter-writer, while also indicating that the signer was present at a given moment in time (Derrida, 1988, p. 20; Wortham, 2010). In the case of these appeals, the signature implies the signer’s presence at the time of the installation (in the case of Human Rights Watch) or the time of composing the letter (in the case of Amnesty International). The ongoing presence of the signer made possible by the signature provides authority and legitimacy to the petition log and letter (Wortham, 2010), which reach the desk of political leaders in the physical absence of the signer. In order for a signature to function, it must be iterable, repeatable—“it must be able to be detached from the present and singular intention of its production” (Derrida, 1988, p. 20). While iterability is necessary for the working of the signature, it corrupts the signature’s singularity and identity, dividing its seal (Derrida, 1988). The repeatability of the signature is exactly what makes it valid, in that one only knows if a signature is authentic if there is another signature that can verify it (Derrida, 1988; Wortham, 2010).

**Technologizing Action and Simplifying Solutions**

Consistent with Chouliaraki’s (2010) findings, these campaigns technologize action, in that they simplify proposals to action to the simple click of a mouse. Amnesty’s “Shine a Light on Human Rights” campaign references the organization’s website, while Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” video campaign incorporated a direct response online banner advertisement that replicated the experience of spectators visiting the installation at Grand Central Station. The display advertisement featured a slideshow of images of Burmese political prisoners, turning them into an interactive call to action (Peterson, 2011). The online advertisement asked consumers to remove a prison bar (or pen) to sign the online petition (Peterson, 2011). The use of the Internet allows a speedy interaction with the organization and on the spot intervention, simplifying the spectator’s mode of engagement with the cause and suggesting that the spectator need only click “sign petitions,” “make donations” or “join now” links (Chouliaraki, 2010). The risk with cyber activism is that it may remain at the virtual level and can create a false sense of empowerment and social commitment to the cause (Nayar, 2010). Technology creates a
sense of effortless immediacy, which has come to characterize humanitarian communication (Chouliaraki, 2010). Chouliaraki (2010) states: “…this no-time engagement with technology suggests that expectations of effortless immediacy, the most prominent element of contemporary consumer culture, are increasingly populating the moral imagination of humanitarianism” (p. 117).

In addition to technologizing action, these appeals suggest that a signature has the ability to immediately and effectively alleviate suffering or rectify political injustice. For example, the public’s role to remove the bars and symbolically release political prisoners in HRW’s installation-captured-on-film implies a relatively simple solution to a complex problem. The removal of the pens/bars of the installation is easy, implying that securing the release of political prisoners is a relatively simple task that can be accomplished by quickly signing a petition. This simple act also implies the immediate release of political prisoners and ignores the complex, difficult, and time-consuming process that must be undertaken to ensure prisoners’ release. Sometimes the solutions provided to the spectator “…only work in the myopic reality of the film, a reality that deliberately eschews depth and complexity…” (Mengestu, n.d., para. 7). Humanitarian communication often simplifies problems for the sake of brevity and comprehension, and “since the problems are simple, so must be the solutions” (Mengestu, n.d., para. 14). As Mengestu warns:

Change has never come with a click…. We all want solutions, but why should we think or expect an easy one exists…The doctrine of simplicity is always at war with reality. Our best, most human instincts of compassion and generosity, if they are to be meaningful, can’t come from a marketing campaign as simple, as base, as an advertisement for a soft drink that promises you the world for a single sip (para. 17).

Since humanitarian appeals often simplify problems and solutions, consumers are left believing that every action they take is effective and really “makes a difference,” which may not always be the case (Mengestu, n.d.).
“Post-Humanitarian” Communication and Brand Identity

Breaking with the Registers of Pity: “Post Humanitarian” Communication

As previously noted, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch break with the registers of pity typical of older forms of humanitarian communication, marking these appeals as examples of post-humanitarian communication. These appeals evoke feelings of guilt and indignation for the purposes of contemplation and self-reflection, not as immediate emotions that inspire political action (Chouliarakí, 2010). In this regard, these advertisements break with the moral mechanism of emotion-oriented humanitarian communication, which maintains that the urgency of suffering will be translated directly into action (Chouliarakí, 2010). Post-humanitarian communication should be understood as “a specific response to the crisis of pity” or, the inadequacy of emotion-oriented appeals to “sustain a legitimate claim to action…that reclaims the legitimacy of humanitarian appeals by removing grand emotion from the call to action on suffering” (Chouliarakí, 2010, p. 120-121).

Post-humanitarian appeals do not offer a moral justification for action (Chouliarakí, 2010). These campaigns often utilize textual tropes that inspire self-reflection, which “manage[s] to retract grand emotions into…low-intensity affective regimes—regimes that insinuate the classic constellations of emotion towards suffering but do not quite inspire or enact them” (Chouliarakí, 2010, p. 119-121). Relying on the reflexivity of the spectator, each appeal “confronts the public it addresses with a mirror of their own world” (Chouliarakí, 2010, p. 121). However, one risk of this approach is that appeals may not move “beyond everyday playfulness…to inspire and re-constitute the moral agency of Western publics along the lines of civic virtues…” (Chouliarakí, 2010, p. 121). By removing the justification for action or the “moral question of ‘why,’” these appeals run the risk of perpetuating a “political culture of communitarian narcissism” (Chouliarakí, 2010, p. 121). This means that the emotions of the self determine our understanding of the larger cause of suffering (Chouliarakí, 2010).

Post-humanitarian advertisements continue to utilize images of suffering to illustrate the humanitarian cause, using photographic images that do not drop
photorealism (Chouliaraki, 2010). These appeals “shift away from photorealism as authentic witnessing towards photorealism as yet another aesthetic choice by which suffering can be represented” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 117-120). These appeals use textual games to engage with spectators, “remind[ing] us that we are confronted not with the ‘truth’ of suffering but with acts of representation” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 117-120; Vestergaard, 2008). An analysis of print advertisements from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will reveal the textual games utilized by these organizations and how they have adopted the “post-humanitarian” style of communication.

Amnesty International: “Cake” (Figure 5)

In 2009, Amnesty International released a series of print advertisements entitled “Cake” to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2009). A realistic image of suffering appears atop of each cake, along with two candles: a “6” and a “0.” Each cake has been strategically cut to visually remove a sufferer from an image of suffering. The advertisement tagline reads: “You can do more than celebrate. 60 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Amnesty International.”

Amnesty’s “Cake” campaign employs the textual trope of irony. Cronin (2000) maintains that “ironic meaning is made possible by the mobile interaction between the said/literal and the unsaid/reflexive, creating a meaning which is more than, and qualitatively different from, the sum of those parts” (p. 67). Irony operates here by positioning an image of suffering atop a celebratory cake, an alarming juxtaposition that contrasts the practice of Western celebration and festivity with distant human suffering. This appeal separates between us and them, the celebrators (non-sufferers) and the sufferers. The spectator in the Western world can celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is juxtaposed against the suffering of a distant unfortunate that stares down the barrel of a rebel’s gun, illustrating that he lives in a world of extremities where there is little protection from violence and violation. This juxtaposition hints at our cultural values and norms (gluttony, abundance, celebration) and how these differ from the norms of distant sufferers (starvation, scarcity, suffering),
which works to provoke feelings of guilt. Thus, the irony of the appeal leads to self-reflection and “conveys a sense of suppressed guilt that gently hints at the affective regime of ‘shock effect’ appeals” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 118). The use of irony in this appeal heightens the self-consciousness of the Western spectator, provoking contemplation of the self rather than contemplation of the other (Chouliaraki, 2010). This is done so by using an image “that creates a distance from our own taken-for-granted habits in a world of abundance” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 118). In this case, when the spectator cuts a piece of cake, he realizes he has taken the protection of his rights for granted and the image of suffering serves as a reminder that not everyone is as fortunate as he is.

Like Amnesty’s campaign analyzed in the previous section, this appeal extends an offer of invitation to act to the spectator. The spectator is put in the position of action by the visual frame of the advertisement: the spectator feels as though she is standing over the cake, as if she is responsible for cutting the piece of cake that strategically removes the sufferer from the image of suffering. This invitation to act is reinforced by the text at the bottom right hand corner of the advertisement that reads: “You can do more than celebrate.” Interestingly, however, the advertisement does not explicitly state how action may be undertaken or what “you can do,” unlike Amnesty’s “Shine a Light On Human Rights” appeal, which encourages letter-writing as an appropriate and necessary form of action.
Figure 5: Amnesty International’s “Cake” print advertisement. Available from *Ads of the World* advertising archive (2009).

**Human Rights Watch: “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” (Figures 6 to 8)**

Human Rights Watch released the “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” campaign in 2010, following the findings of its 2007 report that outlined the abuse that domestic migrant workers living in the Middle East face on a daily basis. The advertising campaign consisted of multiple print advertisements and a thirty-second video made available on the organization’s YouTube channel. The advertisements targeted governments, but also women who oversee domestic migrant workers on a daily basis, as they tend to be the primary abusers (Varia, 2010). In this appeal, Human Rights Watch utilizes a role reversal as a textual game to engage with the spectator. Designed to target the employers of domestic migrant workers, this appeal positions the spectator (the employer of a domestic migrant worker) in the role of the sufferer (employee or domestic migrant worker). The advertising campaign is “aimed at shaming employers into
treating…workers better” (Ayad, 2008, para. 34), which explains the organization’s use of a role reversal to prompt behavioural change or action. The woman in the frame wears traditional housekeeper clothing (e.g. apron), yet also dons an abundance of jewelry, make up, and manicured nails, signifying a wealth and social status that would be on par with an employer of a domestic migrant worker. Hence, the spectator or employer is symbolically placed in the position of migrant worker. This is reiterated by the text of the advertisement, which reads: “Put yourself in her shoes” (Human Rights Watch, 2010b).

Like Amnesty, Human Rights Watch’s appeal focuses upon the self-reflexivity of the spectator, heightening the viewer’s self consciousness and provoking contemplation of her role in perpetuating suffering, rather than contemplating the suffering other. The gestures of the woman in the appeal (e.g. a raised eyebrow and a hand on the hip) are exemplary of body language that would provoke spectator contemplation, as if asking: “Are you guilty of such behaviour?” or “How would you feel?” Therefore, the role reversal utilized in this campaign hints at the pity regimes of guilt and shame commonly associated with shock-effect appeals (Chouliaraki, 2010). However, the emotion of guilt in this appeal does not lead to immediate action, but rather to quiet contemplation and self-reflection (Chouliaraki, 2010).

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5 This is more clearly evidenced in the campaign’s short film, although the message across the print and video campaign is consistent. Images for both texts appear for reference.
Figure 6: Human Rights Watch’s “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” print advertisement. Available from Qortuba Valley Blog (2010).
Figure 7: Image still of woman’s jewelry from Human Rights Watch’s “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” video appeal. Available from Human Rights Watch’s YouTube Channel (2010).

Figure 8: Image still of woman’s makeup from Human Rights Watch’s “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” video appeal. Available from Human Rights Watch’s YouTube Channel (2010).
Emphasizing an Identifiable Brand

Post-humanitarian appeals abandon universal morality and communicate the brand of the organization instead (Chouliaraki, 2010). Branding enables nonprofit organizations to be “reflexive about [their] values and communicate these values more explicitly” (Vestergaard, 2011, p. 55) and advertising sends messages about the organization’s brand value to the public (O’Guinn, Allen, & Semenik, 2009). Branding also enables these organizations to communicate their purpose in an arresting way (Beardi, 1999). Amnesty’s “Cake” and Human Rights Watch’s “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” emphasize each organization’s visual identity (logo) and brand values. Amnesty’s “Cake” advertisement creatively employs the organization’s candle logo. Hence, the candle here not only reinforces the notion of celebration, but also cleverly pays homage to the organization’s brand and popular visual identity (a strategy also evident in Amnesty’s “Shine a Light on Human Rights” appeal). Human Rights Watch’s appeals always explicitly present the organization’s logo and reflect a consistent photographic style and manner of presentation. Furthermore, Amnesty’s appeal “Shine a Light on Human Rights” reinforces the organization’s name and identity by providing its website and employing the organization’s current black and yellow branding.

Abandoning the grand emotions of shock effect and positive appeals, these advertisements communicate the international success, reach, and reputation of each organization (Vestergaard, 2011). Amnesty’s appeal proves that it operates in remote locations, presenting an image of suffering to the Western spectator in “Cake.” Amnesty’s international reach is echoed in “Shine a Light on Human Rights,” as the letter-made-lanterns take the shape of the globe, illustrating the global span of Amnesty’s membership and the organization’s brand value of international solidarity (Vestergaard, 2011). Moreover, Amnesty’s brand value of critical dialogue (Vestergaard, 2011) is apparent in “Shine A Light on Human Rights,” as Peter Benenson’s appeal was written to challenge the actions of abusers and inspired others to follow suit. Human Rights Watch’s international reach is apparent in both of its campaigns, as “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” shows the organization’s work in Lebanon and Kuwait and “2100 in 2010” indicates the research work done on behalf of the organization in Burma. Human Rights
Watch’s value of accountability is made acutely aware through the “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” campaign, which holds perpetrating spectators accountable for their abusive acts. Lastly, the organization’s brand value of justice is apparent in its “2100 in 2010” campaign, which seeks to gather signatures to send to political leaders to rectify the situation. This proves that the organization wants to seek justice on behalf of distant sufferers. Thus, these advertisements “strategically replace moralistic exhortation with brand recognition, thereby moving from an explicit marketing of suffering as a cause towards an implicit investment in the identity of the humanitarian agency itself” and “allow consumption savvy publics themselves to engage with brand associations of solidarity and care as the autonomous creators of brand meaning” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 118).

Conclusion

The promotional material of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch propagates the pervasive axiom of “mobilizing shame,” maintaining that exposure can remedy political injustices by opening them up to the force of public opinion (Keenan, 2004). Amnesty’s “Shine a Light on Human Rights” campaign and Human Rights Watch’s “2100 in 2010” appeal extend an invitation to the spectator to take action. Each organization provides a means for action, either in the form of a website or petition log, which can be used by the spectator to take action after a period of contemplation and self-reflection (Chouliaraki, 2010). In this regard, the emotions of guilt, shame, and indignation evoked from each campaign appear as objects of personal contemplation, not immediate emotions that inspire political action to relieve such feelings (Chouliaraki, 2010). The spectator is offered the possibility to move beyond spectatorship to the realm of action if he deems that action is necessary or desirable, which emphasizes the reflexivity of the witness (Chouliaraki, 2010). These appeals also illustrate that speech-acts (e.g. letter writing and petition signing) are viable political actions. Speech-acts enable the demarcation of groups and communities that can pressure those in a position of power to take direct political action to reprieve suffering (Boltanski, 1999), a fundamental component in the process of mobilizing shame. At odds with this, however,
is that these appeals emphasize personal as opposed to collective action by relying upon individual contemplation and reflection (Chouliaraki, 2010).

These appeals also reflect some of the tensions existing in contemporary humanitarian communication. Spectators are often invited to take action through quick-paced, on-the-spot interventions made available by the online components of humanitarian appeals (Chouliaraki, 2010). This technologizes action and simplifies the spectator’s mode of engagement, suggesting that the click of a button is justified as a significant political action even though little time commitment to the cause is required (Chouliaraki, 2010). Moreover, these appeals simplify complex social and political problems, indicating to the spectator that any and all actions make a substantial difference in the protection of human rights. However, the public needs to be aware that there may be no simple solutions and the click of a button and signing a name on a petition may not always lead to the reprieve of suffering. Amnesty’s “Cake” advertisement and Human Rights Watch’s “Put Yourself in Her Shoes” campaign employ the textual tropes of irony and role reversal respectively. These appeals engage consumers in playful acts of consumerism that emphasize the brand equity of the organization at hand (Chouliaraki, 2010).
Conclusion

The thesis has outlined the historical development of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, tracing the gradual implementation of commercial strategies, especially those employed for marketing, fundraising, and branding purposes. In Chapter One I examined key important social, economic, and political factors that helped shape the development and emergence of humanitarian societies and non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights. Religious revivalism and the Enlightenment awakened humanity’s moral consciousness and inspired feelings of compassion in response to suffering, prompting the formation of national and international humanitarian societies designed to aid sufferers. Private citizens came together throughout the nineteenth century to establish organizations that brought about immense social change, including the abolition of slavery. During the nineteenth century, these groups employed many advocacy strategies: they utilized the press to raise awareness, held conferences, conducted research, and had sufferers discuss their personal experiences, all of which were later adopted by mass human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. As illustrated in Chapter One, most intergovernmental efforts to protect human rights proved ineffective due to the desire of political leaders to prioritize state sovereignty over the rights of their citizens.

Chapter Two illustrates how Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch integrated commercial strategies into their operations, especially with respect to fundraising, marketing, and branding strategies. Beginning in the early 1980s, Amnesty employed commercial strategies, as seen with outsourcing the production of marketing materials to companies specializing in that line of work. Amnesty’s celebrity activist model began with the production of direct mail campaigns endorsed by celebrities like Margaret Atwood. This model evolved as seen with the corporate-sponsored “Human Rights Now!” concert tour in 1988. World-renowned musicians headlined the concert tour, which enabled Amnesty to generate publicity and awareness of its work on a global scale. The use of celebrities helped Amnesty to increase its membership and popular
interest in its work, but at issue here is how this model ignores celebrity motivations and their ties to the capitalist market.

Amnesty has also aligned itself with corporations for cause-marketing initiatives and consumption philanthropy efforts, which has changed the way that donors engage with the organization and its cause. While this avenue of fundraising may generate additional revenue and publicity, it sends a bold message to the public: the solution to social ills lies in certain acts of consumption. Eikenberry (2009) notes that this method of fundraising and marketing is “unsuited to create real social change” (para. 1). Moreover, cause marketing “devalues the moral core of philanthropy by making virtuous action easy and thoughtless,” preventing donors from exercising their moral core and leaving consumers unaware of the potential beneficiaries and their plights (Eikenberry, 2009, para. 6). Furthermore, this method of fundraising divorces philanthropy from the act of duty and sacrifice that was once a part of public action (Eikenberry, 2009).

The use of consumption philanthropy as a means to raise funds reflects an ongoing predicament facing nonprofits: the need to strike a balance between morals (or the organization’s “saintly principles”) and money (Barnett, 2009, p. 42). While consumption philanthropy enables the organization to generate new streams of revenue, it does not address the notion that capitalism has caused many of the conditions under which suffering occurs (Eikenberry, 2009). Ironically, many organizations, including Amnesty, fight to redress the social ills sometimes caused by capitalism, yet they endorse consumption philanthropy as one of the means to do so. Furthermore, consumption philanthropy may actually be inhibiting the organization’s ability to raise funds through additional revenue streams, as the public often believes they have contributed enough through their purchases. Thus, Eikenberry (2009) suggests that “the most benevolent agenda would not be infused with consumption,” but instead, “would give voice to those who suffer” (para. 32).

However, Amnesty’s more recent marketing and branding efforts that rely on market transactions have not entirely replaced the smaller, locally organized initiatives that reflect the organization’s grassroots origins. Rather, these efforts exist alongside
small fundraisers and locally organized community events. It appears that some of Amnesty’s consumption philanthropy efforts are meant to be an additional means for existing members to contribute to the cause. Yet, cause-related marketing initiatives and consumption philanthropy have changed the nature of the relationship between members and the organization. Amnesty members and supporters are no longer simply activists working on behalf of the organization’s cause, but they are consumers, purchasing goods from CDs to concert tickets to help the organization attain its social missions. Furthermore, the struggle to strike a balance between small, locally organized efforts with large scale events and cause-marketing reflects the tension between wanting to maintain the grassroots nature of the organization and the general need to raise revenues. Perhaps the onus lies with the public or donor to seek out a more involved relationship with the organization and with sufferers (aside from market transactions). In this vein, Amnesty has cultivated a strong relationship with many of its members across the globe and offers numerous ways, both financially and otherwise, to support the organization.

The money-morals dilemma is also seen with Human Rights Watch. For its revenues, it relies mainly on donations, supplementing this with occasional dinner and film festival fundraisers. The organization also has an endowment fund to generate additional revenue, carefully managing its investments and operating under a strict social investing policy in order to uphold its brand image in the eyes of donors. A majority of Human Rights Watch’s donations come from foundations and wealthy donors, such as George Soros. However, some of these wealthy individuals have accumulated a great deal of personal wealth at the expense of others and have been indirectly linked to situations that resulted in worsening human rights conditions. These individuals partake in a system that “exploits but still cares, wrecks social havoc but really worries, institutes Wild West entrepreneurialism but also a Welfare state” (Kapoor, 2013, p. 61). This begs a serious question: how far removed should donors be from human rights infringements in order for a donation to be accepted? It is essential for organizations to do due diligence to ensure that donors are disconnected from human rights abuse. But where does one draw the line?
The easy, thoughtless action made possible by consumption philanthropy is also evidenced in the communication materials discussed in Chapter Three. Both Amnesty and HRW extend call-for-action invitations to spectators, either through websites (in Amnesty International’s, “Shine a Light on Human Rights”) or direct banner ads (as part of Human Rights Watch’s, “2100 in 2010” campaign). These appeals emphasize the reflexivity of the spectator, allowing the spectator to decide if and when action is required (Chouliaraki, 2010). However, these texts technologize action, simplifying the spectator’s mode of engagement to the click of a button (Chouliaraki, 2010). These appeals signify that the click of a computer mouse is a significant political action that yields results, yet the spectator does not commit any time to the cause (Chouliaraki, 2010). Nevertheless, these appeals also reveal that political action can be undertaken through the speech acts of letter-writing and petition-signing, which facilitate the demarcation of groups and communities that can pressure state officials to take direct political action (Boltanski, 1999). In this sense, these appeals reveal that action is both collective (through the creation of groups) and individual (through the click of a button, writing one’s own letter, signing one’s own name).

The axiom of mobilizing shame was also examined in Chapter Three. In terms of mobilizing shame, the purpose of human rights promotional material is two-fold. Firstly, each appeal acts as a tool used to mobilize shame, in that each campaign exposes a type of political injustice and seeks to mobilize public opinion to produce beneficial outcomes. Second, these video appeals illustrate how the concept of mobilizing shame works within these organizations and the results that can be achieved. Said differently, these campaigns illustrate the process of mobilizing shame. However, both organizations have shifted away from imagery that shocks the spectator and ignites spectator feelings of guilt and indignation that triggers immediate political action. Rather, these more recent appeals are exemplary of what Lilie Chouliaraki (2010) calls “post-humanitarian” communication. In these ads, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch break with the traditional registers of pity and emphasize brand equity. The textual tropes of irony and role reversal are used in human rights campaigning to engage consumers in playful acts of consumerism that emphasize the brand values of the organization (Chouliaraki, 2010). However, by emphasizing each organization’s unique brand image, these organizations
compete more with one another, even if they have similar goals. Spruill (2001) suggests that issue branding would be a more beneficial approach, as it would encourage organizations to work together by implementing a collaborative strategy across organizations to foster social change. Yet, a collaborative strategy and common brand image may have similar disadvantages for an NGO as would a merger. The Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch notes that there is a financial disincentive to merge in the nonprofit industry, as organizations may actually receive less financing. Some foundations may only want to donate once to the merged organization instead of twice to two smaller organizations that work towards the same cause (Deputy Director of Finances at Human Rights Watch, personal communication, September 14, 2012). Perhaps the same can be said if a unified brand was used. In this case, would donors only donate to one organization instead of two if they shared the same brand image?

This thesis outlines the trajectory of human rights marketing, branding, and fundraising. It maps the gradual implementation of marketing, branding, and fundraising initiatives and outlines the dilemmas faced by human rights NGOs when employing such strategies. Human rights organizations are constantly faced with a money-morals dilemma. They are in constant search of new revenue sources as they operate in a competitive nonprofit market with limited donor resources. These organizations attempt to balance this need for increased revenue with the desire to maintain the grassroots principles and moral foundations of the organization. The money-morals dilemma has also seeped into the visual advertising texts of each organization. Each advertising appeal communicates the organization’s reliance on the axiom of mobilizing shame in its operations. Therefore, these appeals are designed to educate viewers and inspire reflective political action in the form of speech-acts. However, these appeals also seek donations and communicate the brand equity of the organization. A strong brand, as noted in Chapter Two, can secure more donations and revenue for the organization. Each organization has sought to project a unique brand image within their promotional texts, distinguishing themselves amongst a sea of competitors working in similar fields. But, is it effective to compete against one another if each organization is working towards similar ends? Furthermore, human rights organizations are faced with the need to attract the public’s attention in an age of consumerism and media saturation. This has led to the
development of fundraising, marketing, and communication strategies that enable fast-paced, on-the-spot interventions that require little or no time engaged with the cause or the organization.

This thesis only skims the surface of marketing and branding performed by human rights NGOs. More research is needed on how group members, donors, and the general public perceive marketing and branding efforts. Additional research is also needed on human rights representational practices and textual tropes employed in these ads. Future research might also consider a larger array of organizations (e.g. economic, social, and culture-related NGOs) in order to make comparative observations. Additional research may also consider how emergency/relief humanitarian agencies have been inspired by commercial strategies and market logic in their operations and marketing.
References


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Appendices

Appendix A: Ethics Approval Form

Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects

All non-medical research involving human subjects at the University of Western Ontario is carried out in compliance with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Guidelines (2010). The Faculty of Information Media Studies (FIMS) Research Committee has the mandate to review minimal-risk FIMS research proposals for adherence to these guidelines.

2011 – 2012 FIMS Research Committee Membership

1. R. Babe
2. A. Benoit
3. J. Burkell (alt)
4. E. Comor*
5. C. Hoffman
6. P. McKenzie (Chair)

Research Committee member(s) marked with * have examined the research project entitled:

The "Commercialization" of Human Rights NGOs and the Commodification of Human Rights

as submitted by: Daniel Robinson (Principal Investigator)
Danielle Morgan

and consider it to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects under the conditions of the University's Policy on Research Involving Human Subjects. Approval is given for the period from 1 September 2011 to 31 May 2012.

Approval Date: 25 January 2012

Pamela McKenziel, Assistant Dean (Research)
FIMS Research Committee Chair

The University of Western Ontario
North Campus Building, Room 240 • London, Ontario • CANADA N6A 5B7
Appendix B: Letter of Information for Prospective Participants

The “Commercialization” of Human Rights NGOs and the Commodification of Human Rights
Danielle Morgan (MA Candidate)
Faculty Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Daniel Robinson (PhD).

Participants can keep this document for their own records.

Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to assess the historical changes and present practices of human rights marketing and communications over the past two decades (from the 1990s to present). The brand image of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will be analyzed to determine how historical changes in the marketing practices have influenced their visual identity. This study also considers the working relationship between professional marketing firms and human rights organizations and how this may have an impact on the visual identity and branding of each organization. The data collected through interviews with participants will supplement the researcher’s analysis of promotional texts dating from the 1990s to 2011.

Procedures
Personnel with experience in the marketing, public relations, and/or communications of Amnesty International and/or Human Rights Watch will be interviewed. This includes those marketing firms/agencies that have worked with either of these human rights NGOs on an ongoing basis. A semi-structured interview guide will be used during the interviews. Interviews will take place over the phone, through email, or face-to-face, depending on the location of the participants. Interviews will be recorded for future reference and will be approximately an hour long.

Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. Participants can refuse participation. Participants can withdraw from this study at any time for any reason without the fear of any repercussions. If any questions leave the participant feeling uncomfortable, he/she can decline to answer without the fear of any repercussions.

Risks and Benefits
There are no psychological or physical risks associated with this study. Questions are open-ended, providing the participants with a strong degree of control over the interview. Questions that deal with confidential or sensitive subjects that may cause discomfort will be avoided.
Confidentiality of Information
The organization or corporation at which the participant is employed will be revealed in this study and direct quotations from the interview may be used in publications/reports. Information that may further help to identify the participant, including job title, department title, etc., will be kept anonymous in reports and publications that may result from this study. However, due to the fact that only two organizations are being studied and the few employees working on marketing and advertising at these organizations, participants may be easily identified. Since each participant’s work is done for public consumption, there should be little risk in having the participant’s identity potentially known. All physical copies of transcripts and consent forms will be locked in a secure cabinet. All electronic copies of emails, consent forms, transcripts will be stored on a password-protected computer. Only the researcher, Danielle Morgan, will have access to these materials. All information obtained from the participants will be destroyed upon five years of the completion of this study.

Compensation
There will be no financial compensation offered to the participants of this study.

Consent
Consent to participate in this study is indicated by the return of a signed and dated copy of the Interviewee Consent Form to the researcher.

Further Inquiries
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact:

Danielle Morgan, Masters Candidate
Graduate Program in Media Studies
Faculty of Information and Media Studies, the University of Western Ontario
Faculty Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Daniel Robinson

For more information on the conduct of this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact:

The Director
Office of Research Ethics
The University of Western Ontario
Appendix C: Interviewee Consent Form

Interviewee Consent Form

Participant’s Name:
______________________________________________________

By signing this document and agreeing to be a participant in this study, I have read the letter of information for prospective participants provided by the researcher. All questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction by the researcher. I hereby understand the purpose, procedures, and the general nature of this study, as explained by the researcher.

I understand that the organization/corporation at which I am employed will be revealed in this study and direct quotations from my interview with the researcher may be used in the reports and/or publications that result from this study. I understand that all other identifying information obtained by the researcher through my participation will be kept anonymous in reports and/or publications that result from this study.

I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time for any reason without any repercussions. I will notify the researcher of my withdrawal. I understand that I can decline to answer any questions that make me feel uncomfortable without fear of any repercussions.

By signing this document, I hereby give my permission:
1. to participate in a taped interview with the researcher;
2. to have the organization/corporation that I am employed revealed in the reports/publications resulting from this study, while keeping all other identifying information anonymous
3. to use the data collected from the interview for research, educational, and publication purposes.

_________________________________________      ________________________________
Participant’s Signature                                               Researcher’s Signature

_________________________________________
Date
Appendix D: Sample of Semi-Structured Interview Guide – Human Rights NGOs

Topic 1: Marketing Campaigns—Past and Present
The information gathered through this section will be used to supplement the information I have found on the marketing campaigns of human rights organizations. I have gathered this information through the analysis of each organization’s internal documents, trade publications, and campaign material.

A) What are the key marketing and advertising materials used by your organization?
B) Are certain marketing materials geared towards different goals (ie. education/awareness or attracting donations/members, etc)?

Topic 2: Organization Image and Identity
This portion of the interview will focus on how the identity of human rights organizations has changed over the last two decades. In this section I focus on visual stimuli such as logos, taglines, slogans, websites, etc.

A) How would you describe your organizational brand and do you feel your brand and marketing efforts accurately reflect (and are consistent with) the mission and vision of your organization?
B) Are changes in the representation of human rights deliberate? If yes, why were these changes made? How have these changes affected the brand of the organization?

Topic 3: Working Relationship—Human Rights NGOs & Marketing Firms
This portion of the interview will gather information on the nature of the relationship between human rights organizations and the marketing firms they employ to create their promotional material.

A) What marketing firms are employed to create the marketing and promotional material for your organization? Who is responsible for selecting the marketing firm and what are the reasons for selecting one marketing firm over another?
B) How involved is the human rights organization in the creation of the marketing and promotional material?

Topic 4: Implications of Human Rights Marketing
This portion of the interview will discuss the implications of an increased use of professional marketing and marketing firms in the creation of promotional material.
A) To what extent do the promotional texts released by human rights organizations reflect their commercialization?
B) Do you think changes in the promotional texts have changed donors’ perceptions of the organization?
Appendix E: Sample Semi-Structured interview Guide – Marketing Firms/Agencies

**Topic 1: Organization Image and Identity**
This portion of the interview will focus on how the identity of human rights organizations has changed over the last two decades. In this section I focus on visual stimuli such as logos, taglines, slogans, websites, etc.

A) How would you describe the organizational brand of AI or HRW? Do you feel the marketing and promotional material developed by your firm accurately reflect the mission and vision of the organization?

B) Are changes in the representation of human rights deliberate? If yes, why were these changes implemented? How have these changes affected the brand of the organization?

**Topic 3: Working Relationship—Human Rights NGOs & Marketing Firms**
This portion of the interview will gather information on the nature of the relationship between human rights organizations and the marketing firms they employ to create their promotional material.

A) How involved is the human rights organization in the creation of the marketing and promotional material?

**Topic 4: Implications of Human Rights Marketing**
This portion of the interview will discuss the implications of an increased use of professional marketing and marketing firms in the creation of promotional material.

A) To what extent do the promotional texts released by human rights organizations reflect their commercialization?

B) Do you think professional marketing and promotional texts have changed donors' perceptions of the organization?
# Curriculum Vitae

**Name:** Danielle Morgan  

**Post-secondary Education and Degrees:**  
University of Western Ontario  
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2006-2010 B.M.O.S.  

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