Spring 2002

Managing Historical Capital in Shandong: Museum, Monument and Memory in Provincial China

James Flath
The University of Western Ontario

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/historypub
Part of the History Commons

Citation of this paper:
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/historypub/363
Managing Historical Capital in Shandong: Museum, Monument, and Memory in Provincial China

James A. Flath

Introduction

For most people, the written texts of history are only pale reflections of the history they see in their everyday surroundings. An ancient building, a local museum, a statue in a park, or even a notable landscape can carry historical narratives in ways that are more immediate and lasting than any well-researched discourse on history. Yet these publicly accessible historical representations are also highly selective in the subjects they portray. Visitors often leave with little more than an impression of the event, person, or place represented by the site, and perhaps a souvenir or T-shirt as evidence of their historical experience. So although the historical site is a poor representation of the actual past, the immediacy and stature of historical monuments and museums imbue them with a strong capacity to configure history in the present.

This discussion considers how the past informs the present through the preserved and monumentally represented remains of provincial Chinese history. China, as we are frequently reminded, has the world’s longest continuous history and probably the greatest number of historical sites. We are
generally aware of the national symbols, like the Great Wall and the Forbidden City, which represent China at home and abroad. But beyond these monoliths are the hundreds and thousands of sites and artifacts that represent history on a less grand but more pervasive scale. By examining how those properties are protected, presented, and managed under various regimes, we may begin to understand the messages that the public historical system has been expected to carry, and the relation of public history to public policy. In general, although the state has always reserved the right to interpret history, most public history is actually managed by provincial, regional, and increasingly commercial interests that represent immediate interests first and leave the connection with the nation to develop on its own tenuous ground. The study of regional Chinese historical representation, therefore, demonstrates that national history is not the sum of its parts, and that the making of public history occurs at multiple levels of bureaucracy and through many levels of patronage.

The province of Shandong is an ideal subject for this study because it is characterized by one of the most diverse environments in Northeast China. To the east, Jiaodong Peninsula gives the province a lengthy coastline, the ports of Qingdao, Yantai, Weihai, and Penglai, and consequently a history of colonialism and imperialism. The central plains to the west are the cultural and political heartland of the province, historically occupied by several pre-dynastic states, the provincial capital of Jinan, a deeply rooted agrarian tradition, and historical figures as famed as Confucius and Mencius. Further to the south, the plains give way to a mountainous terrain that is home to China’s most revered peak, two of the country’s earliest Neolithic cultures, and the revolutionary base of the provincial branch of the Chinese Communist Party. But the south is also home to some of the poorest of Shandong’s 75 million peasants. Poverty prevails also in the rural hinterlands of the west and southwest, where the border regions with Henan and Hebei once produced China’s most famous bandits and peasant uprisings. This geographic and social diversity, not to mention well over five millennia of historical experience, has left the province with a complex historical identity supported by an extensive body of historical artifacts and monuments. For the province of Shandong, public history consists of the complex negotiations between that identity, the permanent remains of history, and the efforts to control their meaning in the present.

The Legacy of Public History in Shandong

In the early twentieth century, the first modern museums in Shandong enjoyed a brief period of remarkable success.¹ Foreign involvement ensured

¹ As Lawrence Sickman pointed out, Confucian temples had been collecting historical steles in their compounds for centuries before the arrival of any Western concept of the museum. See Lawrence Sickman, “ Provincial Museums of North China,” The Open Court 1, no. 937 (1936): 65. Attention could also be drawn to the excavation and preservation of the
that many of the artifacts collected for display purposes were destined for foreign museums, but at the same time several museums were established to display artifacts in their home province. The earliest museum in Shandong appeared in 1887 when missionary I. S. Wright opened the Yidu Museum in the east-central city of Qingzhou. Missionaries in the coastal city of Chefoo (Yantai) followed this lead with a small education museum as early as 1902,\(^2\) and in 1912 the city opened another exhibit hall in the

\(\text{Wulang Shrine by a Confucian scholar in the eighteenth century. See Wu Hung, } \text{The Wulang Shrine: The Ideology of Early Chinese Pictorial Art} \text{ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). Although not museums or archaeological sites per se, these examples demonstrate that if the institution of the museum was a foreign invention, the concept of collecting and exhibiting historical artifacts was not.}^2\)

2. Franz Boas, communication to Berthold Laufer, American Museum of Natural History, 10 April 1902.
Peizhen Library. In 1904, the science and history exhibits of Yidu Museum were moved to the provincial capital of Jinan, and the institute was renamed Guangzhiyuan (Academy of Broad Knowledge). The first really domestic Shandong museum appeared in 1906, when a returning overseas student, in association with the Tai’an Education Bureau, established the Tai’an Museum at the foot of the famous Mt. Tai. This was joined in 1916 by the Provincial Library, where the provincial inspector of education established an exhibition hall for the collection and preservation of ancient bronzes and steles. This would eventually become the Shandong Provincial Museum, which in 1936 was reckoned to be one of the best in China’s nascent provincial museum system. Attendance at the museums was exceptionally high, and during its first four months in Jinan, the Guangzhiyuan attracted 102,000 visitors. Undeterred by the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, tourism continued to grow. By 1912 the museum registered an annual attendance of 230,000; by 1919 attendance had increased to 400,000. In the early 1920s, a foreign observer noted “the turnstile records hundreds of thousands of visitors...during the pilgrimage season alone.” The Tai’an Museum was no less popular, receiving some 215,000 visitors in 1910. On one particular “ladies day,” some 2,000 women reportedly visited the Hall of Rare Things.

This period of apparent success was cut short when national political authority began to crumble during the 1920s. Hopes for a republican government under Sun Yat-sen had crumbled shortly after the 1911 revolution when Yuan Shikai, the erstwhile governor of Shandong, installed himself as military dictator. Yuan’s death in 1916 was taken as an opportunity for independent militarists to carve out personal domains across the country, leading to the highly volatile circumstances of the so-called Warlord Era. During this time, museums continued to develop in cities like Beijing and Shanghai, but public cultural development was decidedly not a priority for Zhang Zongchang (“the Dog Meat General”) and other warlord governors in provincial Shandong.

The research climate was not much brighter in Shandong, although some early archaeological digs were conducted at the ancient Qi state city in Linzi, and the discovery of the Neolithic Longshan culture site near Jinan in the

7. Zhang, Zhongguo xiandai hua dichu yu yanjiu, Shandong sheng 1860-1916, 200. The total attendance between 1911 and 1920 is recorded as 2.4 million.
10. Chinese museums in general (historical, commercial, science, etc.) grew from only ten in 1928 to seventy-seven in 1936, before declining to a low of eight in 1944 and recovering to seventeen by 1949. See Wang, Zhongguo bowuguanxue, 92.
mid-1920s revolutionized the understanding of early China. The latter find also led to the foundation of the Society for the Study of Shandong Antiquities. With delegates from the national Academia Sinica and the Shandong Provincial Department of Education, the society represented an early step toward organizing provincial antiquities into a national system.\textsuperscript{11} The exercise of state control over archaeology and its findings was given the force of law in 1930, when the government instated its first \textit{Law on the Preservation of Ancient Objects}.\textsuperscript{12} Such progress aside, the economic and political bankruptcy of the time stifled most material history research, and most of the archaeological record remained untouched.

Architecture provided another trove of historical resources, but as with other artifacts, there were few attempts to exploit it as public property. As public facilities, most Buddhist and Daoist temples had always been open to visitors and ornamental bridges and arches dedicated to cultural and moral paramours had long been designed and located with the intent of impressing the common people. But as late as 1950, other forms of architecture that are today regarded as public historical properties were then under the continuing (if in many cases faltering) supervision of private interests. The Shanxi-Shaanxi \textit{Huiguan} (merchant association hall) in Liaocheng, for example, had been alternately sacked by bandits and commandeered by Warlords in the 1920s, but had nonetheless remained the property of the original merchant association until 1938.\textsuperscript{13} A more prominent fixture was the complex of structures devoted to Confucius in his hometown of Qufu. While public veneration of Confucius was encouraged at local temples throughout China and at the Confucius Temple in Qufu, most Qufu sites, including the Kong (Confucius) family mansion and the Confucius Forest, were still under the private management of the lineal descendants of the Great Sage. When Harry Franck visited Qufu in the early 1920s, he noted that large numbers of people made pilgrimages to the Confucius temple. Concerning the Confucius forest and tomb of Confucius, however, he cited a local guidebook: “Those with letters of introduction, or persons of distinction are the only ones admitted; but others may be by tipping the guardian.”\textsuperscript{14}

In terms of distinct modern monuments, the KMT government fared only slightly better than it did with museums and historical architecture.

\textsuperscript{11} Li Chi, ed., \textit{Ch’eng-tzu-yai: The black pottery culture site at Lung-shan-chen in Li-ch’eng-hsien, Shantung}, trans. Kenneth Starr (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), 32.

\textsuperscript{12} J. David Murphy, \textit{Plunder and Preservation} (Hong Kong, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 183. The law was revised in 1931 as the \textit{Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on the Preservation of Ancient Objects}.

\textsuperscript{13} Ke Fang, \textit{Shan-Shaan Huiguan} [Shanxi-Shaanxi Merchant Association] (Liaocheng, Shandong: Jinling Shushe, 1997), 50.

That is not to say that the KMT government failed to understand the benefits of establishing a regime of monumental symbol. In fact, the KMT occasionally pursued monumentalism quite aggressively, as can be seen in the splendid Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and Memorial Hall in Nanjing. Yet in provincial localities, there was little progress in establishing monuments to KMT history, or in appropriating the state symbolism of previous regimes.

Of the few provincial monuments established during this time, most were martyrs’ shrines, and they followed the museums in being strategically located near popular tour destinations. The first of these markers, erected in 1928 at Jinan’s famed Baotu Springs and Tai’an’s Dai Temple, were intended to commemorate the infamous “5-3” battle of earlier that year, when a Chinese army clashed with Japanese troops then occupying Jinan. In 1929, another “5-3” monument was erected on Mt. Tai, along with a monument to commemorate the burial of Sun Yat-sen. Other shrines were placed on Mt. Tai in 1933 and 1936 by former warlord Feng Yuxiang to honor the martyrs of the 1911 Revolution and the 1924 Luanzhou Uprising. But although he used state money for the latter, Feng’s tenuous relationship with the KMT and his claim to a pivotal role in the Luanzhou battle make it difficult to view these as true KMT monuments.\(^{15}\) The conclusion of World War II provided a further opportunity to celebrate martyrs, and in 1946 Mt. Tai received yet another commemoration of war dead, as did Yantai the following year. These, however, made only a brief contribution to KMT prestige before being taken over by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1948.\(^{16}\)

In consideration of this record, it may be said that at the end of the KMT mandate, the state of public history was problematic at best. The fact that pilgrimage sites had historically received large numbers of visitors shows that tourism and exhibition culture had been present in some form well before the arrival of any Western conception of public history. Indeed, the few early museums and monuments in Shandong owed no small part of their success to being deliberately situated on traditional pilgrimage routes. Although the KMT government evidently understood this resource, it generally failed to exploit it. This is first of all symptomatic of a weak government incapable of exerting a sustained interpretation of its central role in history, through which it might have gained some legitimacy. But secondly, the absence in most provincial locations of any publicly sponsored historical site, museum, or monument indicates that by the late 1940s, the concept of a history made for and accessible to the public was still in its infancy.


Material History in Mao-era Shandong

The management of material history entered a new stage of development with the consolidation of communist power in Shandong after 1948. One consequence of the overall failure of the KMT government to establish its regime in symbol was that the incoming CCP was not required to deal with leftover KMT symbolic capital. And because those monuments that did remain commemorated the defeat of a common enemy (Japan, Manchu) or the glory of common heroes (Sun Yat-sen), they could easily be incorporated into revolutionary discourse. Ironically, the real material base for public history would come into public possession through the nationalization of the private assets of the wealthiest segment of society—the chief targets in the class war that helped fuel the revolution. For populist revolutionaries who had staked their reputation on overthrowing the “bourgeoisie” and other “counter-revolutionaries,” the nationalization of mansions, monasteries, ancestral shrines, and temples presented a complicated ideological problem. The result was at first a grudging recognition of key historical sites, followed by a serious attempt during the Cultural Revolution to erase all but the most important structures.

Cultural artifacts. Before coming to power in Shandong, the CCP had already issued orders concerning artifact preservation under the conditions of its land reform act, and had established a cultural artifact protection agency (wenwu baoguan weiyuanhui). When the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took Jinan in September of 1948, a fifty-person team was dispatched to take charge of the cultural artifacts in the city. And as the CCP extended its control across the country, Premier Zhou Enlai ordered the compilation of a catalogue of architectural and cultural sites, which was forwarded to the various units of the advancing PLA.17

These initial protection measures immediately extended to three top-priority sites in Shandong: Dai Temple in Tai’ an,18 the Confucian relics of Qufu, and the Zoucheng relics of Mencius.19 Another committee of this nature was established in southwestern Dongming County in 1950, although with no significant artifacts to manage, its purpose is not entirely clear. A fourth management committee was established in 1952 at the more obvious location of the Daoist mountain retreat of Laoshan, followed in 1954 by a committee to protect the former residence of the writer Pu Songling (1640-1715), whose concern for folklore was shared by the populist CCP.20

18. Other Mt. Tai relics were brought under the responsibility of the city of Tai’ an in 1956. Shandong Sheng Difang Zhi Bianxuan Weiyuanhui, Shandong shengzhi: Taishan zhi, 42.
19. The Mencius committee was reorganized at the country level in 1952. The Qufu committee also went through a series of changes, going from county level in 1949, to provincial in 1952, back to county in 1955. Jiang Yingjun, Shandong bowuguan tonglan (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1993), 270.
20. Ibid., passim.
In 1961, a major political shift occurred in the highest offices of the communist party. Mao Zedong was sidelined, and Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi proceeded to institute national social and economic reform. *Provisonal Regulations on the Protection and Administration of the Cultural Heritage* established principles for central and local enforcement of artifact protection measures, and a ranking system for recognized antiquities. These changes affected the management of provincial historical sites when state-level recognition was extended to eight high-level archaeological sites and antiquities. These included the above-mentioned Longshan Culture site, the Warring States city sites of Qi (Linzì) and Lu (Qufù), Jinan’s Simen Tower (ca. 570 AD) and Litangshan Shrine (ca. 600 AD), the Confucius complex, and the artistically rich Han dynasty Wuliang tomb. Although the program was embedded in politics and heavily favored central Shandong and the provincial capital, the historical and archaeological value of each of these sites is beyond question, and the reasons for their selection as state level antiquities are relatively transparent.

*Museums.* By the mid-1950s, provincial and regional cultural authorities had also begun to establish and re-open museums. In 1956, the original Guangzhiquan Museum was reopened as the Shandong Provincial Museum—the first of its type in the People’s Republic of China. In 1958, local museums were opened or reopened in Yantai, Zibo, and Pingdu. These were followed in 1959 by museums in Qingdao, Jinan, Tai’an, and Qingzhou. Also in 1959, Jinan opened a memorial hall for Li Qingzhao (1084-c.1151), widely regarded as the most accomplished female poet in Chinese history, followed in 1961 by another memorial hall to the patriotic Song dynasty poet Xin Qiji (1140-1207), who led an uprising against the Jin during an invasion in 1161.

In many cases, the establishment of a museum also served the function of preserving a historic building, despite the frequent religious and capitalist “bad class background” of the host property. The Yantai City Museum, for example, was located in the former Fujian Merchant Association Hall. Pingdu Museum was located in a former Daoist temple, and both Qingdao City Museum and the Provincial Museum in Jinan were located in former Daoist monasteries. Similarly, the Jinan City Museum was established in the Baotu Springs Garden, and the Zibo City Museum, Li Qingzhao Memorial

23. The Provincial Museum was first sanctioned in 1954. In keeping with its science background, the Provincial Museum still contains a large natural history exhibit, consisting of glass cases of exotic animals, mounted and in a macabre state of decay. The highlight of any visit to the museum is certainly the giant bipedal “Shandongosaurus.” The inclusion of a six-legged calf is apparently intended to represent an anomaly in the evolutionary process that links Shandongosaurus to the present-day pandas and pangolins in the neighboring displays.
24. Jiang, *Shandong bowuguan tonglan*, 97, 57, 73. Although it was chartered in 1959, the Qingdao City Museum did not open to the public until 1965.
HISTORICAL CAPITAL IN SHANDONG

Hall, and Xin Qiji Memorial Hall were each located in former ancestral halls.25

Monuments. In post-revolutionary Shandong it might be expected that the provincial government would take measures to construct a network of monuments to its revolution. Surprisingly, only two revolutionary monuments were built before 1965: the Martyr’s Shrine and Exhibition Hall in Jinan (1948), and the Yangshan Battle Memorial at Jinxian (1950). Two of the monuments appearing after 1965 were devoted to somewhat unlikely heroes: Zibo’s Jiao Yulu, a model party and political cadre member; and Wang Jie, a former PLA soldier who had sacrificed himself to save his comrades from a misplaced explosive. The third and last monument inaugurated in 1965 was Jinan’s Liberation Tower, built on the site where the PLA breached the city wall in 1948. In terms of independent provincial monuments, therefore, the CCP fared no better in its first fifteen years in Shandong than the KMT had during its mandate.

With the advent of the “Four Olds” campaign to eliminate “Old Customs, Old Habits, Old Culture, and Old Thinking” and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, large segments of museum holdings and most examples of ancient architecture were classified as feudal artifacts blocking the path of China’s continuing revolution. Stripped of state protection, and targeted for destruction by radical Red Guards, many of Shandong’s historical sites and much of the material basis for public history was obliterated. One remarkable directive, possibly backed by the progressive Premier Zhou Enlai in 1967, was the State Council Opinion Concerning Protection of Cultural Relics and Books in the Cultural Revolution, which directed that some historical sites and artifacts be retained as “bad examples.”26 This directive could not protect many of China’s historical treasures, but it may have intervened in the destruction of some of the most important of them. Only with the death of Mao and arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, however, did remaining historical properties regain any measure of security.

An overview of historical management up to the mid-1970s shows that there were as many as ten historical museums, but no more than a dozen protected historical sites in Shandong, some of which received only de facto protection as active museum compounds. Considering the number of sites that would later come to be designated as heritage properties, this appears as a dismal record, suggesting that in Maoist China, material history was a cultural liability for which both provincial and national governments avoided responsibility. Certainly the resource shortages of the 1950s limited

25. The tendency to locate museums in existing traditional structures was continued in the reform era. For example, Liaocheng Museum is in the former Shanxi-Shaanxi Huiguan, Tengzhou City Museum and Longkou Museum are in former ancestral halls, and Weifang City Museum was housed in the landlord mansion of Shihuyuan until being relocated to the new economic development zone in 1999, where it is now accessible to a large international hotel, casino, and Disney-like amusement park.
26. Murphy, Plunder and Preservation, 49.
what cultural agencies could do with historic properties, but the policy should also be seen in relation to Soviet influence and the 1956 National Working Conference on Museums. According to the Three Natures and Two Tasks resolution adopted at this conference, the “nature” of the museum was to conduct scientific research, promote cultural education, and collect and conserve artifacts and natural specimens, whereas the “tasks” of the museum were to support scientific research and to serve the people. According to the comments of Zheng Zhenduo, then Deputy Minister of Culture, the nature and tasks of the museum were to be taken as an organic whole. But in fact, the order in which these resolutions were presented was a clear reflection of their relative priority, with artifact collection and protection falling well behind the national priority of scientific development. Stationary structures were expensive to maintain and difficult to revise, and often contradicted the accepted truth of the revolution. For ideologues seeking to create a new culture, it was more efficient to emphasize the theoretical aspects of historical materialism and a text-based history of revolution that could be disseminated through the media.

Post-Mao Shandong: From Historical Materialism to Materialist History

The effective end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 brought about a tentative return to the type of historical management that had begun with state recognition of certain historical properties in 1961. The random destruction of the Cultural Revolution had earlier been brought to an end, but it was not until 1977 that provincial authorities began to account for cultural relics, initiate protection policies, and build and restore museums and archives. In 1979, the National Cultural Artifact Bureau also issued a new directive, effectively reversing the 1956 policy by affirming artifact collection as a top priority for museums. Sadly, due to the wide-scale destruction of the 1960s, by this time there remained significantly fewer artifacts to collect and preserve.

Reforming the historical system, 1977–1992. Under the 1977 commitment to preservation, provincial recognition was extended to a total of 146 sites across Shandong. These included a total of eight stone “grottoes, statuary, and carvings,” twenty-six examples of “ancient architecture and historical memorial structures,” fifty-two “ruins and relics,” and thirty-one “ancient tombs and burial grounds.” The antiquities included a selection of badly damaged sculptures (often of religious nature); several examples of ancient architecture, including the home of Pu Songling and the Confucius

Temple in Qufu; and ancient tombs, including those of Mencius’ famous mother and the Sultan of Sulu in Dezhou, who died there on a fifteenth-century tribute mission to Beijing. The fact that many of these had been officially recognized before the Cultural Revolution shows that earlier statutes were no longer considered effective.

The 1977 provisions targeted many of Shandong’s most important ancient cultural sites, but the province also included twenty-nine revolutionary artifacts and memorials, commemorating visits to various locations in Shandong by Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De. These were joined by civil war battlefields, martyrs’ shrines, and memorials to Shandong revolutionaries. In continuing recognition of imperialism and the Chinese response are a number of sites dedicated to heroic resistance to Japan, and the site of the Juye Incident, in which extremists murdered two German missionaries in 1898. Indicative of the political uncertainty and continuing radicalism of the period was the 1977 promotion of the ancestral home of Kang Sheng to the status of Kang Sheng Memorial. But although this hard-line CCP security chief could conceivably have attained such an honour in his hometown of Zhucheng, it comes as no surprise that Zhucheng historians neglected to memorialize Jiang Qing, who left this city first to become a Shanghai movie-star, then to wed Chairman Mao, and finally to become public enemy number one as the putative instigator of the Cultural Revolution.

The dissolution of the Kang Sheng Memorial in 1980 was a clear indication of a further shift in the political wind, as Deng Xiaoping consolidated his grip on power and began to move the country into the reform era of economic liberalization. The national level of cultural protection resumed activities in 1982, when state authorities issued the Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics and published their first list of national heritage sites. In Shandong, this included only the Tang Dynasty Lingyan Temple near Mt. Tai, the Penglai Seawall and Pavilion, and the Neolithic Dawenkou site near Tai’an. This was followed in 1988 by a third list that included a number of the sites already under provincial protection, including Liaocheng’s Shaxian-Shanxi Merchant Association Hall, and the Guangyue building, best known as the temporary headquarters of the Qianlong emperor during one of his southern excursions. These were joined by the site of the Sino-Japanese naval battle at Liugong Island.

29. Although designated in 1977, the tomb of the Sultan of Sulu was not repaired until 1980. In 1981 a Sino-Philippine joint venture produced his story as a movie, Sultan and the Emperor [Sudan and the Emperor]. Xia Chunjiang, “Dezhou Suluguo Dong Wang mu sanji” [Notes on the Tomb of the Eastern King of Sulu in Dezhou] Wenwu tiandi 2 (1985): 57. So in addition to receiving state level recognition and popular media attention, the tomb has also become a focal point for Sino-Philippine friendship relations, regardless of the fact that Sulu was originally an independent sultanate, and would probably like to be again.


31. This action provided the pretext for the German occupation of Shandong in 1898, and so indirectly provoked the Boxer Uprising of 1900.

(Weihai), the tomb of Feng Yuxiang on Mt. Tai, Shihu Garden in Weifang, and Dai Temple in Tai’an.\textsuperscript{33}

The province published its second list of heritage designations in 1992 to coincide with the national protection and rescue policy on conservation and the newly revised Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics. Using the same categories adopted in 1977, the province designated another 251 sites, including; eleven “revolutionary artifacts and memorials”; sixteen stone “grottoes, statuary, and carvings”; fifty-two “ancient architecture and historical memorial structures”; 137 “ruins and relics”; and thirty-five “ancient tombs and burial grounds.” So whereas revolutionary sites had fallen off slightly from 1977, all other categories had grown significantly, especially ruins and relics, which increased to 137 from just thirty-one in 1977.\textsuperscript{34}

Imperialist relics chosen in 1992 included several architectural examples from the German colonial period in Qingdao, such as the German governor’s elaborate mansion, the police station, and the Catholic cathedral. In Yantai, recognition was extended to a set of battlements from 1891, the maritime customs post, the former British Consulate, and the Presbyterian Church.\textsuperscript{35} Whereas in 1977 the only references to imperialism had been resistance themes, in 1992 the actual sites of imperialism were being appropriated as elements of officially sanctioned history. Many other prominent colonial sites, however, have not received recognition, including the turn-of-the-century Wilhemine railway stations in Qingdao and Jinan.\textsuperscript{36}

Another site, apparently of more interest to foreigners than domestic historians, is the Ledao Academy in Weifang. Established by the American Presbyterian Church in the late nineteenth century, the academy was among the earliest postsecondary institutions in Shandong and began educating girls a decade before the Qing government included women in its education policy. During World War II the academy gained infamy under Japanese occupation as one of the central internment camps for foreign nationals, and it was here that Olympic hero Eric Liddell died and was buried. The academy is now a middle school that preserves some of the original buildings and a well-concealed commemoratve marker to Liddell. There is, however, no effort to advertise the site, and no way for any but the most motivated investigator to locate it.

Revolutionary history sites guaranteed under the 1992 provisions included the residence and tomb of reformer Kang Youwei,\textsuperscript{37} the birthplace of

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Shandong sheng renmin zhengfu gongbu [Shandong Provincial Government Decree], 20 June 1992, in Wang, Qilu mingwu bolan, 359-364. The Confucius complex also received recognition as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994, as had Mt. Tai in 1987.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Jinan’s “German” railway station no longer serves its original function, and is off limits to visitors.

the communist *Dazhong* Newspaper, and a number of revolutionary battle-grounds, tombs, and memorials in the Yishui district, including the original wartime headquarters of the Shandong branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). What is most remarkable about the selection of the CCP headquarters and Kang Youwei residence as heritage sites at this time is that they were not designated much earlier. This anomaly may best be explained by the fact that these “revolutionary/reform” sites are located within structures that confuse the ideological distinction between nationalism and imperialism. The Shandong CCP headquarters are in a former Catholic church; Kang Youwei’s former residence is a comfortably appointed Wilhelmine house, with room for his multiple wives. Because these structures inherently contradicted the dichotomised truisms of the revolution, no cultural authority could touch them without risking the taint of imperialism. By the 1990s, however, the policy of opening to the West had been firmly established, and the rhetoric used to describe imperialism had been sufficiently softened to allow for a cautious reconciliation of imperialism and revolutionism/reformism within public history.

*History and the corporate ethic: “Originating from real life but rising above it.”* Prasenjit Duara, a prominent historian of modern China, has argued that the place of the museum within the nation (China as elsewhere) is to serve national interests by helping to propagate an interpretation of the nation as a “selfsame, national subject evolving through time.”38 In reference to China, this argument is certainly correct in some respects, since Mao-era museums were undeniably designed to support national, as well as socialist narratives, with overt emphasis on revolution. But museum and relic management in the post-Mao era reveals that although stateist narratives are still promoted in some contexts, that interpretation is now divided by subnarratives that promote a localized and increasingly commercialized interpretation of the past that has a problematic relationship with the nation.

The state and its revolutionary history are most evident at certain museums and monuments in locales that have closer physical ties with the revolution. Ju County Museum, for example, possesses an excellent collection of artifacts from the Neolithic Longshan and Dawenkou cultures, and early dynasties up to the end of Han. But the mountainous topography that allowed early civilization to develop in south Shandong also gave rise to a history of rebellion and, in the twentieth century, revolution. County historians interpret regional history as one of violent struggle against oppression ending in revolution. As evidence, they cite specific incidents of peasant uprisings in 519 BC, 99 BC, 14 AD, and 99 AD, followed by a loose string of unrelated dynastic peasant uprisings and patriotic rebellions against the alien Manchu dynasty (1644-1911). This finally establishes the link to the birth of the local branch of the CCP in 1929, and the patriotic anti-Japanese resistance beginning in

On the basis of similar remnants, historians in neighbouring Yishui note the value of artifacts in promoting education in “patriotism, historical materialism, socialism, and revolution.” Remote Meng County has also designed a revolutionary history for itself through an impressive museum and monument near the battleground of Menglianggu, where the PLA once scored a victory that is now represented as a major turning point in the Civil War fight for Shandong.

Although these museums and monuments do have a legitimate claim to revolutionary history, the extent to which they support an explicitly state-centered interpretation of the past should also be seen as a consequence of their incapacity to raise independent funds. These locations are far from the present economic and cultural center of the province, and so have few opportunities to attract a share of the burgeoning tourist market. As a consequence, the exhibits continue to rely on government support, and so are the most likely to support the increasingly obsolete state narratives based on patriotism, historical materialism, socialism, and revolution.

The state narrative is much less evident in the many new museums that have been developed to reflect local character through unique aspects of history or local production. In Zibo, for example, one can visit a range of museums from the provincially protected Pu Songling and Wang Shizhen memorials, to the Boshan Glassware Museum, or the Zibo Coal Mining Exhibition Hall. In Weifang and the surrounding region, folk culture is promoted through the Yangjiabu New Year Picture Museum, Weifang Kite Museum, Gaomi Folk Art Exhibition Hall, and Shijiazhuang Folk Customs Village. Qingdao continues to stress its relation with the sea through the Marine Products Museum and the Naval Museum, and the coastal city of Penglai has also developed its maritime heritage by adding the Dengzhou Ancient Ship Museum to its original historic harbour. Penglai has also attached another shipping museum to the Tianhou Temple on the fabled Changdao Islands, which have been designated as an amusement park largely devoted to the legend of the Eight Immortals, in which the islands figure prominently.

But the most striking changes in museum organization during the reform era are the adjustments toward commercialization. Su Donghai, a senior museologist in China, explains that museology has until recently been guided by the traditional principle of “preferring justice to profit” (anpin ledao), but notes that this ethic is currently being replaced by the market economy principle of “combining justice and profit into one.” This is directly relevant to state policy of actively dismantling the planned economy and pressuring the inefficient State Owned Enterprises to achieve fiscal  

41. Su, “Museums and Museum Philosophy in China.”
solvency. And although we generally think of this policy in terms of steel mills and coal mines, since the mid-1990s these same principles have been applied to museums. To solve their financial problems, many museums have been turning to commercial sponsorship to aid in cost recovery. In 1998, for example, the Weifang Museum opened an exhibit entitled *Alcohol Culture*, including biographies of famous drinkers in history, and drinking vessels arranged in chronological order to cover a period from Neolithic times to the modern era. The exhibit concluded with displays devoted to contemporary alcoholic beverages, and it was at this point that the viewer realized the exhibit was sponsored by a local distillery. The image here is clearly not representative of the self-same, national subject evolving through time that has been suspected of monopolizing historical representation. Rather, the nation is overshadowed by a self-same evolutionary subject of drinking in history—proving that as much of the former state sector, historicism is no longer the monopoly of the state.

The city of Weihai provides a more comprehensive example of how commercial management is changing the nature of historical representation. Weihai’s pleasant seaside environment and its official designation as the “#1 Clean City of China” have made it a top tourist destination. Access to international markets has also made it the focus of much investment by entrepreneurs based in nearby South Korea and elsewhere, making it one of the newly rich cities of coastal China. Historically, Weihai (Weihaiwei) was a prominent naval fortress and the site of the defining battle of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. But beyond the events surrounding this war, and the city’s former status as a second-rate treaty port, it must be conceded that Weihai has a comparatively shallow history. Undeterred by this handicap, the city has been able to exploit earnings from the tourist trade and commercial development to construct a significantly inflated local history. This is achieved in part by arranging a thin collection of artifacts and a large interpretative exhibit of colonial history in an elaborate new museum, located outside the original city and in close proximity to the economic development zone.

The climax of Weihai’s commercialized history, however, is Liugong Island, the fortified base of the former Beiyang Fleet. In 1990 a visit to the island required only a few yuan for boat fare, and once there, visitors could choose what they wished to see. Later, the management of the island was turned over to a city-controlled joint-venture management commission that began to develop the island for tourism. At present, the boat fare must be purchased as part of a package including admission tickets to most of the island sites, including an expensive new museum dedicated to the disastrous defeat dealt to the Beiyang fleet by the Japanese Imperial Navy in 1895. The museum makes up for a lack of historical relics by presenting the visitor with large dioramas of Herculean Chinese defenders crushing insipid Japanese foes. There are few reminders that most of the actual crushing came at the hands of the Japanese aggressors. In 1998, a staggering 1.3 million visitors
were funnelled through these sites, and the commission is currently seeking investment for a new series of attractions including a “submarine world” and a cable car to connect the island to the mainland and boost visitor capacity to 1000 people per hour.\textsuperscript{42}

Another commercial success is the memorial garden to Pu Songling, the master teller of fox spirit tales. Once a simple cottage and tomb, the whole Pu garden has now become a monument to commercial tourism, and although it had been named early on as a protected area, the site has also been turned over to a corporation to be developed as a theme park. This includes the large Liaozhai Hall, which has nothing to do with the historical Pu Songling, but contains a version of the classic amusement park haunted house, with themes drawn from Pu’s famous work \textit{Strange Tales from Liaozhai}. Outside, shops and vendors push a wide variety of souvenirs, including toy foxes and fox hides, which may or may not have originated with the actual “foxes of the world” penned up in an enclosure near Pu Songling’s tomb. Although the actual Pu Songling residence is the original historical article, it too has been overlaid by the mythological fox theme, which includes fox gate-guards in place of the traditional lions, and a classical garden where sculpted foxes play among the rockery. Although it may delight the tourist, this and other modern additions throughout the environment present an abrupt challenge to the historical integrity of the site.

Tensions over this form of commercial tourism became graphically clear at the Confucius complex of Qufu late in 2000 when the China Confucius International Tourism Co. Ltd. attempted an unauthorized restoration of some Confucian artifacts. This company had been formed as a partnership between the municipal government of Qufu and a tourism development corporation that operates under the slogan “originating in real life and rising above it, discarding the dross and selecting the essential.”\textsuperscript{43} The company, having signed a contract to assume management of eight prominent Confucian sites (formerly under the care of the local cultural relics bureau), undertook to clean the ancient steles and painted wooden plaques and murals in preparation for the 2550\textsuperscript{th} birthday of Confucius. The State Bureau of Cultural Relics later accused the company of using water and scrub brushes to accomplish the task, which caused extensive damage to the delicate artifacts. The municipal government and its local relics board predictably denied the allegations and insisted on the correctness of what they called “reform” to attract higher earnings.\textsuperscript{44} The actual circumstances are not yet clear, but whether the cleanup was botched or not, this case

\textsuperscript{42} Lingong Island Administrative Committee, “Lingong Island,” 1999.
\textsuperscript{43} Shenzhen OCT Tourism Development Co. is best known for its construction and management of Overseas Chinese Town, a large “folk-village” in the southern city of Shenzhen. Cultural traditions, ethnic minorities, and architectural styles are imported from around China, and most of the country’s major historical sites are represented in miniature.
demonstrates two problems: the state is losing practical control over its most prized antiquities, and the overlapping and frequently contradictory laws and regulations work at cross-purposes to a comprehensive system of protection for historical properties.

Within the spiralling commercialization of history, the state continues to make its presence felt through the overt patronage of high officials. Examples can be seen at Liugong Island, where President Jiang Zemin’s calligraphy graces the entrance to the First Sino-Japanese Battle Museum, and at Pu Songling’s residence, where the village entrance is decorated with a large sculpture depicting the PLA “liberation” of Pujiuzhuang in 1948. But token endorsement aside, the state is effectively forfeiting its claim to dictate public historical interpretation, and is relinquishing control to developers who are most concerned with creating profit-earning historicism. Meanwhile, peripheral sites face budgetary crisis and have little opportunity to support their collections and specific forms of historical narrative. The extinction of more remote museums is already evident in smaller centres and economically deprived regions of Shandong such as Heze, Pingyi, or Anqiu, where they have either closed permanently or operate only during high season.

**Conclusion**

From Confucius to mountain rebels, and Neolithic cultures to Communist Revolution, Shandong has produced some of the great moments in Chinese history. But the preservation and representation of those moments in modern times has emerged as a complex problem. The management of museums and monuments has progressed from the general underdevelopment of museums and monuments in Republican China, to the promotion of science and theory in the 1950s, the destruction of museums and monuments in the 1960s, and finally the economic exploitation of historical capital in the post-Mao reform era. Chinese historical capital, therefore, has evolved in direct relation to national political and economic policy. But heritage has never been an unproblematic tool of the state, and seldom has it been entirely constrained by direct control.

The contradictions inherent in the nationalization and management of a body of largely elitist historical relics by an ideologically populist state posed difficulties throughout the early years of the communist era, climaxing with the “Four Olds” historical eradication campaigns. Having generally discarded populist ideologies in the present, the relationship of the state to the nonrevolutionary historical site is much more benevolent, but the state is still seeking to divest itself of both the ideological and economic complexities of public history by turning management over to the private sector. This has changed the historical landscape in ways that would have defied the
imagination a decade ago, and promoted the consumption of public history at rates not thought possible under the old planned economy.

But one thing these changes have not altered is the popular and perhaps justifiable perception that Shandong is one of the most historically profound regions of the world’s most ancient continuous civilization. With the rise in disposable income brought on by market reform, that perception increasingly finds its expression in historical tourism. This creates a problem for public historians: although they may be able to cite the ancient ideal of preferring justice to profit, they are still under pressure to make ends meet by developing a popular interpretation of the past for mass consumption.

At present, the nation still prefaces itself as subject, but falling state subsidies, the practical logistics of representation, and the local and commercial nature of much new public history tends to be irrelevant to that subject. This does not mean that nationalism has disappeared from public history, because in some cases cultural nationalism has proven to be a highly marketable commodity. But although this may serve the patriotic interests of the nation, it is not a meta-narrative under the prescription of the state and actually appeals to an appreciation of the historical past that transcends the narrow definitions of the state. It must also be said that the public historical site increasingly transcends the narrow definitions of the historian, whose sense that historical sites should maintain historical integrity is being lost behind principles like “originating from real life but rising above it.” But neither state nor historian can deny that commercial developers are gaining momentum under the support of a national economic mandate that is resistant to central planning and friendly to a growing tourist industry. Public history is thus set to follow the same path as any other state-owned industry faced with compulsory market reform. Those histories that adapt to the market economy may become dominant tropes, whereas those that do not may become footnotes in the public history of Shandong.
**Appendix**

**Chronology of Chinese History and Major Events in Modern Shandong**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawenkou Culture</td>
<td>ca. 4300 BC–ca. 2500 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong Longshan Culture</td>
<td>ca. 2500 BC–ca. 2000 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xia</td>
<td>ca. 2200 BC–ca. 1600 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang</td>
<td>ca. 1600 BC–1066 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou</td>
<td>1066 BC–221 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring and Autumn Period</td>
<td>ca. 800 BC–ca. 300 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warring States Period</td>
<td>770 BC–221 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucius</td>
<td>551 BC–479 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mencius</td>
<td>372 BC–289 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin</td>
<td>221 BC–206 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>206 BC–220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Kingdoms</td>
<td>ca. 220–280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin</td>
<td>265–420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of Disunity</td>
<td>420–581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui</td>
<td>581–618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang</td>
<td>618–907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five dynasties</td>
<td>907–960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song dynasty</td>
<td>960–1279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuan (Mongol) dynasties</td>
<td>1279–1368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming dynasty</td>
<td>1368–1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qing dynasty</td>
<td>1644–1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Sino-Japanese War</td>
<td>1894–1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Occupation of Shandong</td>
<td>1898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxer Uprising</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinhai Revolution</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>1912–1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation of CCP</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warlord Era</td>
<td>1917–1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Northern Excursion</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinan Incident</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Sino-Japanese War (WWII)</td>
<td>1937–1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Liberation of Shandong</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation of Peoples Republic of China</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Revolution</td>
<td>1966–1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Mao Zedong</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Era</td>
<td>1978–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>