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Urbanization in Cuba

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ABSTRACT

URBANIZATION IN CUBA

The paper examines the urbanization in Cuba from 1950 to the present and a brief look into the future. The period before the 1959 revolution will be contrasted with that since that time.

The period before 1959 is typical of a country in the beginning of the third part of the demographic transition. Since 1960 governmental policies have slowed down rural to urban migration and have affected the growth of Havana.

Cuba is still a highly urbanized society. Current governmental policies with respect to capitalism will change the rate of rural to urban migration, and the urban population will increase somewhat. However, there are still some social and economic policies that will affect the demographic process of spatial distribution and urbanization. Cuba is doing what the Plan of Action proposes of not ignoring the demographic variables when socio-economic planning is being put in place.

Cuba is an urbanized society. The rate of growth of the urban population is low; but rural to urban migration is likely to increase this rate.

Key words: Cuba, urbanization, Havana, cities, urban areas.

URBANIZATION IN CUBA

1. Introduction

The process of urbanization in Cuba has many aspects. This paper will examine the current level of urbanization, the rate of growth of the urban population, the cities of Cuba, and the policies relating to urbanization from about 1950 up to 1996, as well as a look at projection up to 2020 and 2025. Other aspects of the process will be treated in another paper.

An attempt is made not to overburden this paper with tables of statistics. Statistics will be used to make the point. This, hopefully, may attract more readers. Figures were obtained from government publications, population centres figures, the United Nations, and three field trips to observe the urban problems currently facing Cuba

The level or urbanization is high in Cuba. This could be even higher had it not been influenced by government policy. Before the revolution of 1959 Cuba had passed into the third stage of the demographic transition and was under a capitalist economy. Havana would be perhaps, twice its current size had not central planning played a part. Santiago de Cuba would have grown to again double its current size. Cuba would perhaps have the same level or urbanization as Chile; and Havana would be even more dominant in the urban hierarchy. In this respect Cuba since 1960 is very much like China since its socialist revolution. There has been development and both countries have made progress in demographic transition, but internal migration and urbanization have been retarded by governmental policies.

Since Cuba is about 74 percent urban in 1996, and with the low rate of population increase, the level of urbanization will increase moderately in spite of governmental influence. With somewhat less planning and with some movement towards some aspects of a capitalist economy, some cities will grow rapidly due to rural-urban and urban to urban migration.

The high level of urbanization under a socialist economy makes, on the surface, Cuba look different from its Caribbean and Latin American neighbours. Some truths and myths about urban life in Cuba, would point to the fact that there is better housing, everyone is employed, everyone eats, good health facilities, good education, better roads, no prostitution, lower malnutrition levels among the children, less pollution, safer water, and pension and health care for the elderly.

The recent easing up of some aspects of the economy will change some of these problems of the urban society and will aggravate others. The "have-dollars" and the "have-not dollars" is developing a two class system. Even under the socialist government, things are changing and especially so for the urban dwellers. The tourist growth areas will develop new urban centres and these will be quite different from the others.

Cuba will continue to increase the level of urbanization at a moderate rate and will be over 80 percent urban by 2015. Havana will have about 22 percent of the total population. But uneven development between urban and rural areas may see the level of urbanization move up to 85 percent and see Havana at 25 percent of the total population. These kinds of development will have major implications for the society.

2. Cuban urbanization from the literature

There have been some writings about the urbanization process in Cuba. We know that by the time of the 1959 Revolution, Cuba had levels of urbanization equivalent to three countries of South America; Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. Cuba had made similar progress through the demographic transition and its spatial distribution and migration transition were similar. All four countries had primate cities as their capital. Except for Chile they were basically agricultural countries; and Chile had agriculture and mining, and in the case of Cuba almost a monocrop in sugar. We would expect, that if there was no revolution, all four would have levels of urbanization above 85 percent. However, Cuba has 74 percent of its population living in cities and Uruguay has 90%, Argentina 87% and Chile 86% (United Nations 1996 and Population Reference Board, 1997). Cuba, among the Greater Antilles, has about the same percentage of its population in urban centres as Puerto Rico. These two are ahead of the Dominican Republic (61%), Jamaica (50%) and Haiti (32%). Other countries that were well behind Cuba in terms of the percentage living in urban areas in 1960 are now ahead, Venezuela (85%), Brazil (76%), and Colombia, Peru and Mexico are just a little behind (70%, 70%, 71%) respectively). Cuba has fallen behind the Southern Cone countries and others have increased their urbanization and are ready to pass Cuba. Cuba's rate of urbanization since 1960 is the slowest in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Hernandez-Castellon (1988) made the point that in Cuba, population policies are an integral part of development policies. As was recommended by the World Population Conferences of Bucharest and Mexico City (Plan of Action), they are all part of the development policies. Government policies, after the Revolution of 1959, have in fact, even without a population policy, had a tremendous effect on rural to urban migration, urban to urban migration, the growth of urbanization and

the growth of cities such as Havana and Santiago de Cuba. Social and economic development policies such as full employment, full employment of women into the labour force, equal rights for women, control of urbanization and migration, health, education, eradicate malnutrition, do constitute population policies directly and indirectly. These policies have slowed internal migration and held down urbanization in spite of significant socio-economic development.

Landstreet (1977), Landstreet and Mundigo (1983), Mundigo and Landstreet (1980) make similar points to Hernandez-Castellon. The socialist government introduced far reaching changes into the Cuban society which also have many implications for policies on population. These developmental policies affect the principal patterns of population distribution by addressing land use, density and urbanization. Urban primacy is also affected. Government's agricultural development which looks at wages and more or less controls wages in rural and urban areas removes a major factor in rural to urban migration. Housing developments and placing of industry in areas outside of Havana, will slow the growth of Havana and develop new growth centres like Holquín, Camagüey, Cienfuegos, Nuevitas and Moa.

There are many other researchers and commentators who have examined how the socialist government had an impact on the demographic variables even without a population policy (United Nations, 1987; Erviti, 1989; Morejon-Seijas, 1988; Luzon, 1987; Baroni-Bassoni et al, 1988). Central planning in Cuba, as it was in China, does bring in demographic variables in their overall development planning. Central planning of the socialist government has slowed the rate of urbanization, reduced internal migration and slowed down the expansion of Havana. These effects were intended. The spatial distribution of the population was always of concern. Havana and Santiago de Cuba had the potential to increase their share of the population, but they were prevented by policies aimed at growth in other cities.

In 1953, 35 percent of the urban population lived in Havana (Morejon-Seijas, 1988). Havana was also the centre of most industrial and commercial activities. Internal migration, under the capitalist economy was concentrated on Havana, Santiago, Camagüey and Holquín. After the 1959 revolution, development was aimed at some medium sized towns, along with large scale agricultural production and gradual equalizing of wages between urban and rural areas. Urban population reached 68.2% in 1981, while Havana's share had declined in percentage from 20.8% in 1953 to 19.8% in 1981. President Fidel Castro's statement before the National Assembly of People's Power in 1983, that only Cuba was not having a problem in Latin America with the growth of the capital. Aldana-Martinez (1978) has slightly different figures from the above, but the census bears out the Morejon-

Seijas figures. Aldana-Martinez wrote that the growth rate of the urban population was growing by an average of 3.1% between 1953 and 1970 which was only slightly higher than the average growth of the total population at 2.1%. However, at this time most urban populations of Latin American and the Caribbean are just about doubling Cuba's urban growth. Havana grew by 2.2% during this period and by

1.3% between 1971-74. These are extremely low rates for Latin American and the Caribbean. However, the intermediate cities increased their percentage of the population from 10.6% in 1958 to 17.3% in 1970. The Isle of Pines (Isla de la Juventud) is a good example of how government influence can affect the growth of a population in an area, as well as its urban growth.

We have a slow down in urbanization relative to the total growth rate of the population. Slowed down of Havana and Santiago de Cuba, but growth in some intermediate cities. Cuba has succeeded where many countries in the region have failed.

The census of 1981 showed Havana with 19.8 percent of the total population. The urban population was accounting for 69 percent of the population. The 15 provincial capitals (including Havana) had 51.8 percent of the population. There were eight cities with populations of 50,000-100,000. The number of urban areas was listed as 589. Urban households accounted for 70.1% and 31.8% were in Havana. This census is now revealing the impact of the socialist government. The development policies are having a profound effect on the demographic situation. This kind of policy is enshrined in the Plan of Action from the Bucharest Population Conference of 1974 (Bueno-Sanchez, 1983; Hernandez-Castellon, 1988).

Gugler (1980) examined the situation in Cuba, ahead of the 1981 Census, and found that in the period 1943-53, the cities of 20,000 or more grew at 4.1 percent per year. Between 1953-1970 it dropped to 3 percent. The first period saw the capitalist economic system and the second saw a combination of both capitalism and socialism. Gugler, like others already mentioned, pointed out that the Revolutionary Government influenced outmigration (rural to urban). "Urbanizing" the rural areas meant new small towns which could easily be provided with services. Urban dwellers were involved in agriculture; and the living standards of the rural population should be raised to approach those of the urban dwellers. The Revolutionary Government slowed down the growth of Havana as well as reducing its dominance on industry and commerce. In a sense, the revolution was against Havana and its capitalist enclave for the rest of the Cuban society. By the 1981 census, it is clear that the government's policies are having an effect on internal migration, the role of urbanization, and on Havana (Erviti-Diaz, 1989;

Baroni-Bassoni et al 1988; Cuba, Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, 1985; Landstreet and Mundigo, 1983; Hernandez-Castellon, 1984).

The socialist government will continue to influence spatial distribution in Cuba; but the impact will be much less under the new move to introduce some capitalism in a socialist society. The Cuban government still control wages by paying the salaries of workers in the private sector. However, the new family enterprise and the professionals who are allowed to work outside of their disciplines may change the spatial distribution. New mines and the expansion of areas for tourism will have similar effect. Havana and Santiago are a part of the tourist expansion. They are attracting new industries and commercial establishments. They will increase their rate of growth.

3. Urbanization of Cuba

Cuba and Puerto Rico are the most highly urbanized among the Greater Antilles (Cuba, Puerto Rico, The Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti). Cuba and Puerto Rico are the farthest in the demographic transition process. However, one can imagine that Cuba's urbanization would be more like the southern cone countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay). At the time of the revolution of 1959, Cuba was similar to these countries in terms of the demographic processes. The policies of the government of Cuba slowed the process of rural to urban migration. Moreover, emigration from Cuba had an effect on the urbanization process. However, Cuba is still a highly urbanized society. The current policy of the government will accelerate the urbanization process. But there are other government policies with respect to housing and wages that will still have an effect on the spatial distribution of the population. By 2020, the degree of urbanization in Cuba should be around 88 percent of the total population.

In the previous section it is shown that up to the 1981 Census, the rate of urbanization had slowed after the Revolution of 1959. An examination of the degree of urbanization for the period 1950 to 2020 is undertaken. It should be noted that the current size of the population of Cuba in 1997 is about 11.1 million and the urban population is 74 percent of the total.

In 1950 the urban population was 49 percent in Cuba, in Chile it was 58 percent and in Puerto Rico it was 41 percent. Cuba's percent urban was 55 percent in 1960, Chile was 68 percent and Puerto Rico was 44 percent. Cuba experienced the 1959 revolution. In 1997, Cuba's percent urbanization was 74 percent, Chile 86 percent and Puerto Rico was 73 percent. Chile is 12 percent

ahead of Cuba; and Cuba and Puerto Rico are separated by one percent. All three countries experienced heavy emigration during this period, but Puerto Rico led the way in terms of proportion loss to emigration (Lattes, 1995; United Nation, 1992, 1996). Cuba rate of growth of the urban population is much less than Chile even though they share the same level in the demographic transition. Puerto Rico is now challenging Cuba at the top percentage urbanized. Cuba is different and it is posited that the socialist policies are very relevant.

The level of urbanization is Cuba was 60 percent in 1970, 68 percent in 1980, 72 percent in 1990. Taking into consideration, the United Nations projection, and the author's view of the emerging economic situation in Cuba, by the year 2000 it will be between 78 and 80 percent urban. Projecting to 2010, the level of urbanization should be around 84, and in the year 2020, in the order of 88 percent (United Nations, 1992). The emigration from Cuba is very low. It will change once the United States embargo has been lifted. The new and emerging economic order which allows foreign companies to pay higher wages (directly to the government, who in turn pays the salaries) and locate in urban areas, and the new individual occupations of professionals will change upward the rural to urban migration and increase the level of urbanization. It is also expected that there will be an acceleration of urban to urban migration in line with new economic opportunities that will occur in some places and not in others. The economic development under way will be uneven across the urban hierarchy.

The rate of growth of the urban population in Latin America in the early part of the demographic transition is generally twice the rate of the total population. By 1950 the rate of urban population growth is just about a percent above the growth in the total population (1950-1955, 2.93% vs 1.85%). In the period 1955-60 it is 2.72% vs 1.70%. These are pre-revolutionary figures. This suggests that Cuba is in the slow growth period in the demographic transition. In the period 1960-65 the urban growth is 3.05% and the total population growth is 2.09% The next period 1965-70, the urban growth rate is 2.79% and the total population is 1.88% (United Nations, 1996). During these two periods and into the period 1970-75 where respective figures are 3.06% vs 1.77%, the government is institutionalizing policies that will affect rural to urban migration and the rate of urbanization, housing policies, education policies, equalizing wages between the urban and rural areas and new urban centres to reduce the attraction of Havana. Even though other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have attempted similar policies, the Cuban central planning is more effective. Things work in Cuba, whilst elsewhere policies and plans are not always implemented.

The period of 1975-90 the population is growing at less than one percent due to lower fertility and some emigration. The urban population is growing at

about 1.75 percent. In this period, the demographic policies are an integral part of the socio-economic policies. Fertility is down and urbanization is down to low levels. The rate of urban growth between 1990 and 2025 should be around one percent. But it is possible that it will jump to above one percent if Cubans abroad start to return home and the new enterprises in cities will start to pay wages directly to the workers and at higher levels than the rural agriculture, fishing and service wages.

Cuba is now within the slow growth period of the demographic transition. The total population between 1990 and 2025 will increase by about one-half percent. The rural population has been declining since 1970 and by 1990 and up to 2025, it is expected to decline by one percent to 1.5 percent. This decline and immigration will increase the percentage of the population that is urban. However, the urban population growth will be much less in Cuba than in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti. These countries are behind Cuba in the demographic transition and they have large rates of urban population growth. Puerto Rico with direct migration access to the U.S.A. will be an unusual case but closer to Cuba.

4. Cities of Cuba

The urban population of Cuba generally live in towns and cities of 2000 or more. Currently, (1997) this urban population is 74 percent of the 11.1 million. The outstanding feature of the urban hierarchy is the country's capital, Havana (La Havana). Havana is a primate city. Currently, (1997) it has a population of close to 2.25 million. It has more than 20 percent of the total population.

Cuba, as is the case with most Caribbean and Latin American countries, has its capital with a large population relative to the other cities. Havana is about four times the size of the second largest city Santiago de Cuba, with it's population of about half a million. The next two largest cities are Camagüey and Holquín with about 300,000 and 250,0000 respectively. Havana is about 2.2 times larger that Santiago, Camagüey and Holquín. Havana would have been even larger without government intervention. That intervention promoted the growth of Camagüey and Holquín.

After 1960, government policies made each provincial capital service areas offering things that in the past were only available in Havana and Santiago de Cuba. They became government headquarters for education, including university, health, housing projects, industry, commerce, courts, and military installations.

In 1943, Havana was close to 900,000, by 1953 it was 1.2 million, in 1975 it was 1.8 million, in 1981 it was 1.9 million, and it crossed the 2 million mark in

1985 (2.01 million). Havana's population was 2.12 million in 1990 and 2.24 million in 1995, and it is expected to be over 2.5 million in 2010 (United Nations, 1992, 1996, Lattes, 1995; 1981 Census). However, because of changes underway in Cuba, we could expect the growth in Havana to be greater, and by 2020 it will be approaching 3 million. These changes in Cuba are related to socioeconomic changes in wages, new areas of economic activities, housing, and the importance of Havana in trade and commerce. Havana is also a part of the rapidly growing tourist industry.

To show what was happening to Havana since 1960 we can compare it to the Dominican Republic and Chile. The Chilean population in 1997 was about 14.6 million, the Dominican Republic was 8.2 million, and Cuba was 11.1 million. In 1960, Chile had a population of 7.6 million, Cuba had 5.9 million and the Dominican Republic had 2.4 million. There are differences in population size, but all three counties are rather small. In 1960, Santiago de Chile had a population of 2.03 million, Havana 1.4 million, and Santo Domingo had 0.45 million. In 1996 Santiago de Chile was 5 million, Havana was 2.2 million, and Santo Domingo was 3.3 million. The social, economic and demographic policies of the Cuban government retarded the growth of Havana by reducing internal migration. The internal migration was responding to wages, housing, education, health, as well as job opportunities (Hall, 1984; United Nations, 1995; Demographic Atlas, 1985). The provincial capitals and the new growth centres were diverting migrants away from Havana.

The Cuban government policies impacted on the other cities of Cuba. The decentralization of production activities and services had impacts on Havana as well as the other 13 agglomeration, all capital cities of the province, plus Manzanillo. Some of these cities had significant growth and others were restricted (Baroni-Bassoni, 1988). The intermediate cities of 20,000 or more in the 1981 Census also showed differential rates of increase since 1960. In Cuba, there were 138 towns, all over 5,000 in 1981. The 74 percent of the Cuban population who live in urban centres in 1996, live in towns and cities of substantial size. This is also government policy to promote the 12 provincial capitals, which became major sources of services, universities, health centres as well as production centres.

In 1981 there were 42 cities in Cuba, and Havana was by far the largest. The province of Havana had 6 cities between 20,000 and 50,000. Only two provinces had one each, Pinar del Rio and Cienfuegos. In 1981 there were 26 cities between 20,000 and 50,000 that had 8 percent of the total population. Above 50,000 to 100,000 there were 8 cities with 14.7 percent of the population. Havana at this time had 19.8 percent of the population. That is cities of 20,000 or more, we find 42 and they had 48 percent of the total population. Close to half of

the population lived in cities of 20,000 or more. These cities were given the type of infrastructure that existed in Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

After the revolution of 1959, there was a reduction of internal migration to Havana (1985 Demographic Atlas). Havana in 1981 had still grown to be 1.9 million. There was revitalization of the medium size cities. They became centres of political administration. There was revitalization of centres of industrial action for the provincial capital (e.g. Cienfuegos and Camagüey). Also some of the smaller cities began their growth due to industrialization (Mariel, Nueva Gerona, Nuevitas, Moa). Before the economic crisis brought about by the loss of economic aid and markets around 1993, once the Soviet Union fell apart, the population of Cubans in these cities were doing well and they were optimistic about their future even though the United States embargo was still hurting.

Looking at the four largest cities in Cuba, Havana's position has slipped since 1943. In 1943 Havana was 7 times larger than Santiago and it was the same in 1953. However, by 1970 Havana was 6.4 times larger, 5.6 times larger in 1981 and the same, 5.6 in 1985. The restrictions on internal migration to Havana have allowed Santiago to gain on Havana. In the case of Camagüey, in 1943 Havana was 10.0 times larger and about the same in 1953, but by 1970 it was 9, and in 1981 it was 8 and 7.7 in 1985. Holquín in 1943 was 24 times lower than Havana, it was 19 times less in 1953, 13.6 in 1970, 10.3 in 1981, and the same (10.3) in 1985. These positions have been maintained in the 1990s. Havana has been declining relative to the other three major cities. But with the window on capitalism we can expect Havana to reclaim some of its lost position.

The changes among the three cities (Santiago, Camagüey and Holguín) are not as spectacular as they were compared to Havana. Santiago and Camagüey kept the same relative position from 1943 to 1985. Santiago went from 3.3 times larger than Holguín in 1943 down to 1.8 times larger in 1985. Camagüey compared to Holguín went from 2.2 times larger in 1943 down to 1.3 in 1985. Santiago's relative position with Holguín, show Holguín as one of the growth centres; and this is true for Holguín relative to Camagüey. Holguín has expanded its urban population relative to the other three cities (Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, 1985).

Havana had an urban population that accounted for 19.6 percent of the total population in 1950. It rose to 20.3% in 1960 and in 1970 to 20.5%. By 1980 it was 19.7%, 20 percent in 1990, but it could recover its ground as we move into the new economic plan that is gradually emerging. As a percent of the urban population, Havana has lost even more ground. In 1950, Havana had close to 40 percent. In 1960 it had 37 percent of the urban population. By 1980, it was 29

percent, and 27 percent in 1990 (Lattes 1995). As we move into the next century, we believe that Havana with its dynamic nature and its location, will regain some of its last hierarchy in the urban structure.

5: Growth in the cities

The growth of Havana was relatively slow in comparison with other Latin American cities in 1950-1955. Havana had an average growth of 2.1%. Santo Domingo had 7.12 percent, Santiago, Chile was 4.23 percent. Havana's rate of increase remained at 2.1 percent between 1950 to 1970. Santo Domingo was 7.12 in 1950-1970 and 6.24% in 1965-1970. Santiago, Chile went from 4.23 percent down to 3.29 percent in the same time period. Between 1970 and 1980, Havana was under one percent. During the period 1980-1995 Havana was about one percent. Santo Domingo came down to 3.25 percent in 1980-85. Santiago, Chile went down 1.46 percent in 1980-85. The social, economic and demographic policies and plans have kept down the rate of growth of Havana (U.N. 1994, 1996). This is to the advantage of Havana. Latin American and Caribbean capital cities as well as other cities, have been expanding much too rapidly. Their rapid expansion makes it impossible to provide an adequate quality of life and protection of the physical environment. This is not to say it has been done in the case of Havana. Other forces are at work; but it would have been easier in Havana, all other things been equal.

Excluding Havana, the cities in Cuba grew by 3.3% in 1950-1960 and had a similar rate until 1980. Between 1980-1995 the rate of growth of the urban population was about 1.5 percent. This is fast relative to Havana, and this demonstrates the restriction on Havana. The Dominican Republic and Haiti grew much faster than these. The Dominican Republic rates were between 5.7 and 3.1 percent. Haiti was between 4.2 and 2.5 percent (Lattes, 1995). This reflects the different stages in the demographic transition but also the power of central planning in limiting the growth of cities.

6. Conclusions

Cuba's level of urbanization in 1996 (74%) is quite close to Canada (76%). It is higher than the countries of Central America. Among the Greater Antilles, it is just above Puerto Rico and quite ahead of the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti. But this level of urbanization has been restricted by government policies which retard rural to urban migration. The capital of Havana is a primate city. But its dominance in the urban hierarchy is being gradually diminished by policies aimed at having new growth centres. The growth of Havana has been slow relative to other capital cities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The capitals of provinces

have had varying rates of growth. Holguín and Camagüey have grown relative to Santiago de Cuba and Havana. Matanzas as a seaport town and close to some of the tourist developments has and will experience significant growth.

The level of urbanization will increase more rapidly than it did since 1960. The current window on capitalism will motivate urban expansion. There has been an increase in joint ventures between the Government of Cuba and foreign companies. There is now a new venture in which there is foreign investments in mining, agriculture, construction, hotels and commerce without Cuban involvement in the capital. Wages are still restricted to avoid the imbalance between rural and urban areas. However, the "have-dollars" and the "have-not dollars" is a very strong motivation for rural to urban and urban to urban migration. The scarcity of the very basic necessities of life is also a very important aspect of spatial distribution. Cuban individual enterprise and the private occupation of professionals will also affect the level of urbanisation and the residence in cities and towns.

Havana and Santiago de Cuba will once again exert their influence at the top of the urban hierarchy. As Cuba moves into the 21st century, urbanization will increase. By 2025, Cuba will be 85 percent urbanized. Havana will reach a population of 4 million and Santiago will have 1 million around 2025. The new resort areas for tourism will become cities. The potential for tourism in Cuba is enormous, and this will have an impact on cities and the urbanization process. Cuba is a highly urbanized society and it will become even more so.

The counties of Latin America and Caribbean have been concerned about the spatial distribution of their population, and in particular about the rapid growth in their capitals. They have tried policies and plans aimed at spatial distribution which have not worked. The Cuban government has integrated demographic considerations in the overall social and economic development policies; and things have worked by slowing down internal migration, the urbanization process and the growth of Havana. It would seem that Cuba has adopted the Plan of Action in which population concerns are an integral part of socio-economic planning. The urbanization process and the growth of the primate city of Havana are still of major concern to the Cuban society as they try to control urbanization and build a sustainable development with an improved quality of life.

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