

1996

# Does Anti-Regime Action under Communist Rule Affect Political Participation after the Fall? Results of a Panel Study in East Germany

Karl-Dieter Opp

Follow this and additional works at: [https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsperg\\_ppe](https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsperg_ppe)



Part of the [Economics Commons](#)

---

## Citation of this paper:

Opp, Karl-Dieter. "Does Anti-Regime Action under Communist Rule Affect Political Participation after the Fall? Results of a Panel Study in East Germany." Political Economy Research Group. Papers in Political Economy, 79. London, ON: Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario (1996).

POLITICAL  
ECONOMY  
RESEARCH  
GROUP

## PAPERS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY

**Paper No. 79**

**“Does Anti-Regime Action Under  
Communist Rule Affect Political  
Participation After the Fall? Results  
of a Panel Study in East Germany”**

**Karl-Dieter Opp**

#77

#78

#79

ECONOMICS REFERENCE CENTRE

JAN - 7 1997

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

The Political Economy Research Group was established in the faculty of Social Science at the University of Western Ontario in 1988. Its purpose is to foster scholarship, teaching and interdisciplinary research in political economy, with a focus on:

1. the application of economic models and methods to the study of political processes and institutions,
2. the economic impact of political processes and institutions,
3. the influence of economic factors on the formation of public policy and on institutional change,
4. the politics of economic policy making,
5. the political, social, and economic effects of public policy.

*Co-directors:*

Ronald Wintrobe (Economics)  
Robert Young (Political Science)

*Board of Directors:*

Peter Howitt (Economics)  
B.B. Kymlicka (Political Science)  
John N. McDougall (Political Science)  
Peter Neary (History)  
John Whalley (Economics)

*Staff:*

Jayne Dewar

*For further information:*

Political Economy Research Group,  
Department of Economics,  
Social Science Centre,  
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2  
phone: (519) 661-3877  
fax: (519) 661-3292

# **Does Anti-Regime Action under Communist Rule Affect Political Participation after the Fall? Results of a Panel Study in East Germany**

Karl-Dieter Opp  
University of Leipzig  
Institute of Sociology

*Abstract.* This paper addresses the effects of political participation at a certain time on the actors' participation at a later time. It is argued that if there is an effect it is an indirect one: political action is related to incentives to participate, and these incentives affect participation at a later time. Based on previous research, the paper proposes a model including the most important incentives to participate, and proposes hypotheses specifying the effects of participation on these incentives. These hypotheses are tested by panel data collected in Leipzig (East Germany) referring to the situation of 1989 and 1993. The most important results are that participation in anti-regime action in 1989 led to high political, social and economic satisfaction and increased perceived political influence in 1993. There were no effects of participation in 1989 on accepting norms to protest or justification of political violence (moral incentives) and on integration into protest promoting networks (social incentives) in 1993.

---

\* Support of the research reported in this paper by the German National Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) is gratefully acknowledged.

The literature on social movements and political protest almost exclusively addresses the question of why collective political action originates. The consequences of collective political action for the change of the participating individuals themselves are largely neglected.<sup>1</sup> The revolutions in Eastern Europe and East Germany provide a unique opportunity for studying the impact of participating in revolutionary action: A relatively large part of the population of these countries engaged in protests against the incumbent communist regimes, and the protests brought about enormous political and economic changes. If participation has any consequences for the participating actors at all, we will find them in the revolutionary situations in Eastern Europe.

Whereas there is a large number of studies explaining why collective action emerged or led to the fall of the communist regimes in 1989, there are neither empirical nor theoretical studies focusing on the extent to which participating in the revolutionary events of 1989 changed the individual actors themselves. Thus, the *external* effects of the protests, i.e. the effects on third parties, have been studied extensively, whereas the *internal* effects of the protests on the actors themselves have been neglected.

The present paper is concerned with these internal effects. The question I will address is to what extent participating and not participating in the East German protests in Leipzig in the fall of 1989 affects participating in political action after the fall in 1993. I will present hypotheses on these effects and test them by a panel study of Leipzig citizens that was conducted in 1990 - referring to the situation in 1989 when the communist regime was still in power. Not only the substantive question of how participation under a dictatorial regime affects participation after its transformation to a democracy is of interest for social movement theory; the data used in this research are also important to examine whether the theoretical hypotheses of social movement theory that are tested in stable democracies hold in a highly unstable situation where a former communist state was transformed to a democracy.

In order to better understand the context of this research it is useful to describe briefly some events of the East German revolution. The GDR was one of those communist states that seemed to be stable due to an extensive system of repression. The situation began to change in May 1989 when members of the opposition movement noticed that the published results of the communal elections were tempered with. This led to protests that increased over the year 1989. The largest demonstration after June 17, 1953, took place on October 9, 1989, in the centre of Leipzig. More than 70.000 citizens gathered although it was likely that this demonstration was cracked down. However, this demonstration was peaceful on the side of the demonstrators as well as of the police forces. After this event, protests in Leipzig - the well known Monday demonstrations - and at other places in the GDR increased and finally led to the collapse of the communist regime.

Apart from participating in demonstrations, that was by far the most frequent anti-regime action, working for opposition groups and attendance of the peace prayers that took place on Mondays, were forms of protests that were most common in 1989. Other forms of anti-regime action were the refusal to vote and the refusal to become a member of the SED (the communist party) or other similar associations. Participants in each form of protest ran a high risk of severe sanctions that could also extend to close relatives.<sup>2</sup> The present paper examines to what extent more or less participation in these kinds of action affects participating in the common forms of political protest in 1993 such as participating in demonstrations, collecting signatures, or working with citizen initiatives.

## **WHEN DOES POLITICAL ACTION INSTIGATE FURTHER PARTICIPATION?**

### **The Basic Model**

If political action at a certain time is related to participation at a later time it is plausible to assume that there is an *indirect* causal effect: political action at time 1 has changed or is related to conditions that bring about political action at a later time. For example, participation in a demon-

stration may have increased political discontent due to brutal police action, and this discontent affects later participation. It is hardly plausible that the fact that I demonstrate today is a cause for my demonstrating tomorrow. If this assumption is accepted, the question arises what these intervening conditions "between" political action at time 1 and time 2 are and what their impact is.

In answering this question I will draw on a set of factors that have been shown to be among the major determinants of individual participation in political protest action. This may be a problematic undertaking because these hypotheses have been developed and tested in rather stable democratic systems and may not hold in a situation of a radical system transformation. Although this possibility exists it is not clear how the alternative hypotheses may look like. As a preliminary working hypothesis that may be falsified by the data to be presented we assume that the factors that contribute to political action such as political discontent and perceived personal influence are the same in authoritarian as well as democratic systems. Yet, the values of these factors differ. For example, political discontent will be much higher in an authoritarian than in a democratic political system. Whatever assumptions seem plausible, this paper provides data to examine whether the hypotheses developed for stable democratic systems hold in the context of this research as well.

In contrast to the theory of collective action by M. Olson (1965) empirical research has shown that discontent, i.e. preferences for public goods, has a positive impact on political action, depending on the perceived individual influence that participation makes a difference. Empirical research further indicates that perceived political influence in large groups is in general not zero and varies among members of a group (see Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Gibson 1989; Moe 1980; Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1988, 1989).

Individual actors further contribute to the common cause because they feel obliged to do so (Marwell and Ames 1979; Muller 1979; Opp 1986, 1989), i.e. because of *moral incentives*. This term

refers to a perceived obligation to protest as well to the extent to which violence is regarded as justified.

It has become a commonplace in social movement research that integration in protest promoting groups or personal networks are important incentives to participate (see, e.g., McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp and Gern 1993, with further references). In those groups or networks rewards or punishments, i.e. *social incentives*, for participation are distributed.

We assume that these factors - public goods preferences (i.e. discontent), weighted by perceived personal political influence, moral and social incentives - are the major determinants of political action. Henceforth, we will refer to these factors as *incentives* (i.e. costs or benefits for participation). How can we use these incentives to explain the effects of anti-regime action in 1989 on political action after the fall in 1993 - for the following argument see Figure 1? Assume that we dispose of panel data referring to 1989 and to 1993 and that in each wave indicators for political protest and for the types of incentives mentioned before are ascertained. It seems plausible that the incentives that are in effect in 1993 explain political protest in 1993 (arrow 1 in Figure 1). For example, dissatisfaction in 1993 and not the discontent with the situation of the former GDR in 1989 is a condition for participation in 1993.

#### FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

If there are indirect effects of political action at a certain point in time on political action at a later time - via incentives -, it may be assumed: political action carried out in 1989 may have had a lasting impact on the incentives that existed in 1993 (arrow 2 in Figure 1). For example, the success of the protests in 1989 may have led the participants to believe that *in general* their participation makes a difference. Furthermore, "incentives 89" will in general be positively related to "incentives 93" (arrow 3 in Figure 1). This assumption of stability may be questionable in times of system change: discontented citizens in 1989 under communist rule may not be dissatisfied in 1993 after transition to a



democratic state. However, almost all panel studies indicate that lagged variables show some stability, and we will assume this too. The data will show to what extent this assumption is correct.

Because we assume that protest in 1989 affects protest in 1993 indirectly we expect that there will not be a direct effect of "protest 89" on "protest 93" (arrow 4). Another assumption is that there is no short term effect of protest on incentives (see arrow 5). In other words, it takes some time until protest changes incentives. Finally, because we assume that only the incentives effective in 1993 and not the incentives that operated in 1989 will influence protest in 1993, the relationship symbolized by arrow 6 is supposed not to exist.

We will focus in the first part of this paper on the relationships between "protest 89" and "incentives 93," including "incentives 89" as an independent control variable (arrows 2 and 3 in Figure 1). We justify this procedure in the Appendix where we shall provide a detailed discussion of the statistical analysis. We will then examine whether "protest 89" and "incentives 89" have the expected indirect effect on "protest 93" - via "incentives 93" (arrows 2, 3, and arrow 1), and whether "incentives 93" have a direct effect on "protest 93" (arrow 1).

### **How Dissatisfied Are the Revolutionaries of 1989 Today?**

The protesters of 1989 have invested to a high extent to bring about political change. Although the time used for the protests may not have been very costly, the protesters took a high risk. If the revolution had not been successful severe sanctions such as occupational degradation and prison sentences were likely to occur. For the participants in the Monday demonstrations up to October 9, 1989, it was also likely to be hurt by police action. The outcome of the investment was more political freedom, and the centrally planned economy was replaced by a market economy.

If individuals receive some outcome - even if it differs from what they expected -, those individuals will be more satisfied with this outcome who have invested a relatively large amount of their

resources. There is a need to match the amount of effort expended and the outcome. If the effort is relatively large individuals will be relatively satisfied with the outcome. In short, "people love what they suffer for" (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 556).

This proposition - the *matching proposition* - is part of the effort justification hypothesis saying that "the expenditure of effort increases the value placed upon the end sought, as well as resistance to learning a new response" (Milburn and Christie 1990:239). The first part of this hypothesis - the matching proposition in the present paper - is empirically well confirmed (Milburn and Christie 1990:240; see also Eagly and Chaiken 1993:555-556).

This proposition follows from the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957): Dissonance will originate if there is a discrepancy between the value placed upon the investment and the outcome. "In short, effort justification is one strategy for reducing cognitive dissonance; that is, if one has expended a great deal of energy toward an outcome, then one must value that outcome. ... If I have expended effort, I assume that it is for a worthwhile cause. Otherwise, I have behaved stupidly or exercised poor judgment" (Milburn and Christie 1990: 238). Regarding the GDR protesters, those who have participated to a large extent "need" a better result than those who have invested to a lower extent. The prediction thus is:

*Matching proposition:* The more individuals have engaged in anti-regime action in 1989, the more they are satisfied with the situation in 1993.

Although this proposition has been confirmed by empirical research, it is implausible if the discrepancy between the end sought and the actual outcome is relatively large and valued negatively. Assume, for example, a student worked hard for a vacation, and wants to travel to an island with quiet beaches and blue sea. Yet when he arrives he finds polluted water and dirty and crowded beaches. He will probably not like the outcome. Only if the discrepancy between the desired and actual outcome is relatively small one will like the outcome. There may thus be a threshold effect: only if the result of

an effort deviates to a certain extent from the goal, the matching proposition will hold true. If this is correct we presume that the matching proposition will not hold for those GDR citizens who had a relatively strong anti-capitalist attitude before the fall of the communist regime.

This alternative proposition would imply that the matching proposition does not hold for former members of opposition groups. Documents about their goals before the collapse of the GDR indicate that they strongly favored a more democratic form of socialism (see, e.g., Findeis, Pollack, and Schilling 1994). But German unification brought the political and economic system of West Germany, i.e. a representative democracy with a capitalist market economy, and most of the former dissidents lost any political significance in the new order. Thus, it seems that the discrepancy of the ends sought and the outcome of the protests of former members of opposition groups was relatively large. Therefore, we expect that those dissidents whose political participation was relatively extensive before unification are relatively *discontented* after unification.

This proposition gains further plausibility from the perspective of research about protest and social movements. Discontent is one of the conditions for the decision to protest. The implicit assumption seems to be that discontent will persist until the goals of the protesters are fulfilled. We will thus not predict, as dissonance theory would imply, that unsuccessful protesters will tend to love the status quo.

### **Do the Revolutionaries Generalize the Success of the Revolution?**

Previous research indicates that political participation leads to a feeling of being politically important or efficacious (see, e.g., Finkel 1987; Oliver 1989; Opp 1989:ch. 8; Sherkat and Blocker 1992). Accordingly, we would expect a *generalization effect* stipulating that participation in the Leipzig protests in 1989 is generalized to the situation in the united Germany. However, it seems also plausible to expect a *discrimination effect*: citizens may think that in the specific situation in 1989 joint

action and each individual's participation have been decisive for the fall of Communism, but that the success of the demonstrations in 1989 was just a historical episode that cannot be generalized.

Cognitive dissonance theory suggests the following prediction. The data of the first wave of this research indicates that perceived personal influence, together with a high extent of political discontent, was a major incentive for participating in the protests (Opp and Gern 1993). Furthermore, the protests were successful in bringing about a democratic system. Now assume you have participated in the protests in 1989 to a high extent. It would be highly dissonant to believe that in a democratic system your participation in protest is less efficacious than under the former communist regime. This dissonance will be particularly high if you have participated to a high extent and thus have experienced the success of your participation. We thus predict:

*Generalization proposition:* The more an individual engaged in anti-regime action in 1989, the more influential she or he regards herself or himself in 1993.

### **Does Revolutionary Action Create Moral Incentives?**

During the spontaneous mobilization processes in the fall of 1989, a large-scale moral socialization could have taken place: those individuals with strongly internalized protest norms could have communicated moral demands that participation in the protests is a duty. This could have occurred during participation in the protests in the fall of 1989: there was ample opportunity to meet many people one did not know before. These demands could have led to a general increase in the internalization of protest norms.

The communication of moral demands to participate in the anti-regime protests in 1989 presupposes that norms of protesting could develop in a communist regime. Although the GDR was not a democratic state citizens learned that it was a duty to participate in politics - but, of course, in support of the regime. This included participation in elections and other kinds of political action such

as participating in demonstrations for a good cause - "good" from the perspective of the regime. We therefore assume that protest norms existed in 1989. The data of the first wave of the panel confirm this proposition (for details see Opp and Gern 1993; Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995). Therefore, it is to be expected that those norms were communicated during encounters in the process of mobilization in 1989.

However, socialization effects do only take place when interactions extend over a much longer time span than a few weeks or even a few months. The assumption is that internalized norms are rather stable individual dispositions that do not change during a short episode of political turmoil. Our prediction thus is:

*Failed moral socialization proposition:* Anti-regime action in 1989 does not have any effect on moral incentives in 1993.

The term "moral incentives" also refers to justifications of political violence. The data of the first wave of this panel indicate that justifications of political violence were not accepted in the population. We therefore assume that participation in the protests did not bring about an increase in accepting those justifications.

### **Is Revolutionary Action an Opportunity for the Formation of Social Networks?**

When the large-scale protests in the GDR began in May 1989, many new opposition groups were founded and membership of existing groups increased (see, e.g., Müller-Enbergs, Schulz, and Wielgohs 1991). Furthermore, the meetings of these groups, the Monday prayers and the Monday demonstrations were social occasions for the formation of new protest encouraging personal networks. Is it plausible to expect that those networks persisted after the fall of the communist regime?

To sustain a social relationship is a decision that depends on the costs and benefits of the relationship. First, relationships are rewarding if the partners are similar, particularly in regard to

interests, values and resources (see, e.g., Argyle 1988:229). This is confirmed by the data of the first wave of this research as well where 61% of the 115 members of opposition groups said they joined because "the association of people who have the same political views as myself is important to me." Second, sustaining a relationship is unlikely if the opportunity costs (i.e. the utility forgone in upholding a relationship) are relatively high. It is our contention that after the fall of the communist regime decreasing homogeneity of the former GDR citizens - especially in regard to interests, values, and resources - and increasing opportunity costs led to the weakening of networks that emerged during the protests in 1989 and the beginning of 1990.

Although there is still economic and political discontent in East Germany, it is relatively low and decreasing. It seems that there is no longer a common goal for which it is worthwhile to sustain a social relationship. Homogeneity is also decreasing in regard to resources. For example, the range of incomes - leaving apart the party elite - was relatively small before the unification: it ranged from about 800 to 2500 Marks. This situation changed drastically after the fall of the communist regime. Political attitudes differentiated too: there was a common opposition against the former Socialist party, but nowadays preferences for the new political parties differ.

The fall of the communist regime and the adoption of a market economy meant for most GDR citizens that they had to adapt to a new situation. Citizens needed time to learn the new skills to survive in a competitive market economy. The opportunity costs of engaging in some kind of time consuming relationship such as working in a protest group were high. We therefore assume:

*Weakening network proposition:* Participation in anti-regime action in 1989 has no effect on membership in protest promoting networks in 1993.

This proposition does not imply that no new networks emerged after unification. In the same way as social networks originated in the former GDR for coping with the everyday situation of scarcity (see, e.g., Völker 1995), new networks may have originated after unification in order to cope with the

uncertainties and new discontents of everyday life. The weakening network proposition only maintains that participation in the protests of 1989 has no effect on protest promoting networks in 1989.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN, MEASUREMENT, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

### **Data**

We tested these propositions by a panel of the population of Leipzig (East Germany). The first wave was a random sample of 1300 citizens of Leipzig. The interviews were administered by a survey institute in the fall of 1990. The questions referred almost exclusively to the situation in the fall of 1989 (for details see Opp and Gern 1993; Opp 1994; Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995).<sup>3</sup> In the summer of 1993 a total of 513 respondents of the original sample could be re-interviewed. Such a relatively low rate of respondents in panel studies is not uncommon in East Germany.<sup>4</sup>

In order to examine the extent to which the second wave was a representative sample of the first wave we compared various characteristics of respondents of the first wave who have and who have not participated in the second wave. As one would expect, among the participants in the panel are more persons being married or living with a partner, fewer persons with low schooling and low occupational education. Although these differences are statistically significant, they are relatively small. There are no statistically significant relationship between participation in the panel on the one hand and gender, religious affiliation (yes/no) and income on the other. These analyses lead us to conclude that the differences between the participants and non-participants of the second wave do not involve any problems for testing our hypotheses.

### **Measurement**

A general measurement problem in this research concerns the selection of items for a theoretical (i.e. latent) variable such as discontent that was measured in 1989 as well as 1993. The

usual procedure in panel studies is to select identical items at two points in time. This is certainly sound in most situations where there is little social change. But in a situation where the data of the first wave refer to the situation of a communist state and the data of the second wave to a democracy this procedure is not always meaningful for at least two reasons. First, some items could not be measured at both points in time. For example, dissatisfaction with the possibilities to travel to Western countries (which was usually not possible in the former GDR) and with the extent to which the ruling Communist party (SED) exercised control could only be measured in 1989. Thus, the changing situation limits the possibilities of using identical items in each wave.

A second reason why it is not useful always to attach the same items to the same latent variables at two points in time is that the referents of identical items may be different. For example, we asked in both waves whether respondents refused to vote. In the GDR, there were no secret elections and everybody was expected to vote for the candidates of the SED or their satellite parties. Refusal to vote was a way of protesting against the regime and it was likely that this had negative consequences for the respective citizen. Nowadays, not voting is not or at least need not be an act of open protest and does not evoke any kind of official repression. Thus, the same item may refer to different phenomena in the two waves of the panel.

We solved the problem of item selection in the following way. A latent variable denotes certain general characteristics of respondents such as frequency of participating in protest events. The specific phenomena the latent variables refer to may differ in different social contexts. For example, let the latent variable "political discontent" denotes the extent to which an individual dislikes political decisions of the incumbent regime. The *kinds* of political decisions that people are discontented with may vary. They are, e.g., different in the GDR in 1989 and in the united Germany in 1993. In order to measure given latent variables in different situations, it is useful to use those indicators that best



represent the meaning of the latent variables in the specific situation. This meaning is not necessarily captured by identical items.

In order to ascertain the meaning of the latent variables in each wave, each single latent variable was constructed for each wave separately. For each wave, we selected the indicators that were best suited to measure the construct at that time. A consequence of this procedure is that the latent variables, measured at two points in time, overlap with regard to the items: they are in part identical, in part similar and in part different. Table 1 summarizes the items for each latent variable. The names of the latent variables are printed in bold. After testing the dimensionality of the items for each latent variable by confirmatory factor analysis - see the Appendix - we constructed additive scales by summing for each respondent the values of the items and dividing them by the number of items.<sup>5</sup>

#### TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

## RESULTS

### The Effects of Revolutionary Action

The key hypotheses this paper concentrates on are the effects of participation in the protests of 1989 on incentives 1993, i.e. on discontent (matching proposition), perceived influence (generalization proposition), moral incentives (failed moral socialization proposition), and social incentives (weakening network proposition). In order to test these proposition we have to examine the effects “political protest 1989” on the incentives 1993 (discontent etc. - see arrow 2 of Figure 1), controlling for the lagged incentive variables (see arrow 3 of Figure 1). For example, in testing the effects of participating in anti-regime action in 1989 on discontent in 1993, discontent 1989 was included as the lagged independent variable. This is necessary in order to avoid spurious correlations. For example, a correlation of “protest 89” and “discontent 93” may hold because “discontent 89” affects “protest 89”

as well as “political discontent 1993.” If “discontent 89” is included in the analysis we can be safer to ascertain a causal effect of protest 89 on discontent 1993. The effects of “protest 89” and the lagged incentives 89 on the respective incentives 93 were examined by multiple regression analysis.<sup>6</sup> Figure 2 shows the results.

*The matching proposition.* “Discontent” was measured by presenting the respondents with statements referring to various possible problems such as the condition of the environment and the possibilities of free speech (see Table 1). To each of these statements the respondents could express their content or discontent (five categories, ranging from very discontented to very contented). We distinguish the following kinds of discontent (for details see Table 1). *Political discontent* refers to specific political issues of the GDR in 1989 and of German politics in 1993. In 1989, salient issues were, e.g., the state of the environment, the activities of the secret police (“Stasi”) and possibilities to travel to West Germany or other Western countries. In 1993, the environment has become irrelevant. Major issues are the unification process, discrimination of foreigners (asylum seekers in particular) and the work of the “Treuhand” which is the agency whose main objective is to privatize former GDR property. *Social discontent* denotes dissatisfaction with the welfare system and with equality. *Economic discontent* captures the extent to which respondents are dissatisfied with various aspects of the economic situation.

Whereas these types of discontent refer to rather specific issues *alienation* is defined as a general evaluation of aspects of the political system. *Political alienation* denotes the discontent with the fairness of the legal system or the protection of basic rights. *Ideological alienation* means the extent to which a socialist political system is preferred to the democratic capitalist market society that was adopted after the unification. These two types of alienation were only measured in 1993.

We summarized the specific discontent measures of each wave by constructing two additive scales: “discontent 89” and “discontent 93” (see Table 1). Figure 2A shows that “protest 89” has the

expected effect on “discontent 93”: participation in the protests in 1989 *decreased* discontent in 1993. These results also hold if we perform the same analyses for each type of discontent.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in general the matching proposition is confirmed.

#### FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

*The generalization proposition.* “Perceived influence” was measured for 1989 as well as for 1993 by items referring to the extent to which respondents judge the probability (four categories, from “very unlikely” to “very likely”) to change the political and economic situation by three protest actions that the latent protest variable comprises (see Table 1). Figure 2B presents the results of our analyses. As expected, those who have participated in the protests in 1989 regard themselves as more influential after the fall of the communist regime than those who have not participated.

These results have the following implications. Participation in anti-regime action in 1989 *decreases* discontent in 1993 and low discontent in 1993 decreases political action in 1993 (see the section “Incentives and Protest 93” later in this paper). In other words: *anti-regime action in 1989 reduces political protest in 1993 - via discontent*. However, there is a counter-effect: Protest in 1989 increases perceived influence that in turn raises protest in 1993. Thus, *anti-regime action in 1989 increases political protest in 1993 - via perceived influence*.

*Failed moral socialization proposition.* We use two measures for moral incentives: *Protest norms* ascertain the extent to which the respondent agrees (five categories, from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”) that she or he has to participate in protests under a relatively large number of conditions. For example, if a respondent agrees to a high extent that one should protest if discontent is high - even if this has personal disadvantages -, protest norms exist to a high extent. *Justifications for political violence* - the second type of moral incentives - refer to two statements that violence against persons or property is more or less justified. Figures 2C and 2D show that there is neither a statistically

significant effect of protest 89 on protest norms 93 nor on justifications for political violence in 93.

The failed moral socialization proposition is thus confirmed.

*Weakening network proposition.* We distinguish four kinds of social incentives for 1989 as well as 1993, that we used as measures of the latent variables "social incentives 89" and "social incentives 93." *Membership in protest promoting groups* refers to the number of groups the respondent is a member of and that encourage protest, according to the perception of the respondent. *Expectations of reference persons* is defined as the extent to which individuals who are important to a respondent value the respondents' protest positively if she or he engages in protest - again in the perception of the respondent. *Critical friends* is an additive scale referring (1) to the number of friends the respondent reports to be critical of the regime (1989) or the new states (1993), and (2) to the number of friends who have participated in protests. *Critical colleagues* is also an additive scale consisting of items about the number of colleagues critical of the situation in the GDR (1989) or the new states (1993) and who have protested already. This scale was multiplied by an item referring to the extent to which the respondent has close relationships to her or his colleagues. "Social incentives 89/93" is a composite additive scale consisting of the foregoing measures. As Figure 2E indicates, the weakening network proposition is confirmed.

*Stabilities.* Figures 2A to 2E also include the stabilities of the incentive variables, i.e. the standardized regression coefficients of the dependent incentive variable of 1993 and the respective lagged variable. The results are striking for two reasons. First of all, the stability coefficients are relatively small, compared to results from Western countries. For example, Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb (1991) report the stability of measures referring to attitudes in 1930 and 1960. The stabilities exceeded 0.60. On the one hand, it is not surprising that in a situation where almost everything changed attitudes before and after those changes are also extremely unstable. On the other hand, one might surmise that there are some basic attitudes or feelings that are rooted in personality structures and

are learned early in the socialization process. Furthermore, social relations often need a long time to emerge. It could be expected that those relationships are relatively stable even in times of rapid social change. In regard to our research, it is certainly not surprising that discontent 1989 and 1993 differ to a large extent because discontent refers to the social situation which changed. However, one would expect that at least protest norms and perhaps social incentives are relatively stable. But none of the standardized regression coefficients we found comes near to .60.

It is further striking that the stability coefficient for the discontent measure is negative. That is to say, the higher the discontent in 1989, the lower it is in 1993. The explanation is that in general those GDR citizens that were content before the fall of the communist regime were positively attached to the regime to a high extent. A large part of these individuals such as employees of the secret police or active party functionaries are the losers of the unification and are relatively dissatisfied today. If this explanation is correct we would expect that former members of the SED - the socialist party of the former GDR - are relatively dissatisfied in 1993. We tested this hypothesis by first constructing additive scales for each of the latent discontent variables. For example, the scale "political discontent 93" was constructed by adding the items mentioned in Table I and dividing them by the number of items. All correlations of these scales with SED membership (no/yes) were negative. That is to say, SED members are in regard to all discontent measures more dissatisfied than nonmembers. We constructed the discontent scales for 89 in the same way. The correlation indicate that in 1989 SED members were more satisfied than nonmembers.

### **Controlling for Other Variables**

Although the results of the previous analyses confirm our propositions the results may be different when other variables are included in the analyses. As was noted before, the matching

proposition seems most implausible for members of former opposition groups. Our sample includes 41 members and 471 nonmembers - there was one missing value - of former opposition groups.

We estimated each model of Figure 2 separately for nonmembers (N=471) and members (N=41) of opposition groups. For example, we estimated the model of Figure 2A first for members, and then for non-members. The matching proposition holds for nonmembers as well as for members of opposition groups: the standardized regression coefficients have a negative sign and the differences between the coefficients for members and nonmembers are not very pronounced. For example, for nonmembers the standardized regression coefficient for the effect of "protest 89" on "discontent 93" was -.18, for members -.16. Thus, for members as well as for nonmembers of opposition groups, political action in 1989 decreases political, social, economic discontent and alienation.

Dissonance theory would lead us to expect that even if the former goals of opposition groups are not reached they will like the results of their efforts. A plausible explanation is that former dissidents do no longer subscribe to the goals before the fall of the GDR. A recent study of Findeis, Pollack, and Schilling (1994) found that former dissidents have largely changed their former "utopian social idealism" and recognized that there is no third way between capitalism and socialism and that forms of direct democracy are difficult to realize. They further discovered the new opportunities to influence politics (see, e.g., Findeis et al.:13, 292-306).

Although we did not propose any special prediction for members and nonmembers of opposition groups in regard to our other hypotheses it is of interest to see whether our previous results hold when we test *all* models of Figure 2 for members and nonmembers. The generalization hypothesis is also confirmed. Participation in protests in 1989 has even a stronger effect on perceived influence for members than for nonmembers of opposition groups. Our analyses also indicate that for members and nonmembers of opposition groups alike participation in 1989 has no statistically significant effects on norms and on social networks.

In order to see how stable our results are we examined for each model of Figure 2 whether demographic variables change the coefficients. We re-estimated each model by inserting the following demographic variables: present income (in 1993), age, years of schooling (in 1993), occupation (consisting of five dummy variables) and gender. The results remain, but the coefficients are somewhat reduced.

It might be argued that the effects of anti-regime action in 1989 on the incentives to protest in 1993 heavily depend on what happened in the meantime, especially on whether one has benefitted from the unification. Our best measure for this is a question whether respondents regard themselves as losers (N=78) or winners (N=153) of the unification.<sup>8</sup> I carried out the regression analyses of Figure 2 for each of these groups separately (the results are not presented). Our hypotheses were confirmed for each of these groups. Thus, the effects of protest in 1989 on incentives in 1993 do not seem to depend on the perception of economic well-being after unification.

### **Incentives and Protest 1993**

Our model (see Figure 1) assumes (1) that only those incentives that immediately precede political action are conditions for engaging in such action (arrow 1 of Figure 1), and (2) that there is no direct effect of “protest 89” on “protest 93” (arrow 4 of Figure 1). To examine assumption 1 we first test a cross-sectional model only for the panel data of 1989. The respective model (column 1 of Table 2) includes an interaction term that was formed by multiplying the discontent measure of 89 with the influence scale of 89. The model further comprises “moral incentives 89”, in this case protest norms because the scale refers to perceived obligation to participate in the kind of action common in 1989 and 1993 and not to violent political participation (such as justifications for political violence) , and “social incentives 89”. Each variable is significant and the explained variance is .29. It is worth noting that “social incentives” has the strongest effect, followed by the public goods term.

## TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Next we perform the same analyses for the 1993 panel. The dependent variable is "protest 93" - a scale that comprises items referring to the kinds of protest that are common in western democracies such as participating in demonstrations or signing petitions. The regression analysis (column 2 of Table 2) yields only statistically significant standardized regression coefficients as well, with an explained variance of .32. As for the 1989 study, "social incentives" and the public goods term have the strongest effects. The results for the 1989 and 1993 cross-sectional analyses are thus very similar.

The results presented in column 3 confirm the prediction that incentives of 1989 have only a relatively small effect on protest in 1993: the explained variance is only .03 and the effects are relatively weak. The public goods term is even negative. This is due its intercorrelations with the other two independent variables. The bivariate correlation of the public goods term with protest 93 is -.01.

These coefficients further decrease when we include in the model of column 3 the incentives measured in 1993. The explained variance of this model is equal to the explained variance of the model that includes only the incentives (column 2).

The analysis of the model in column 4 does not yet include the lagged protest variable 1989. Column 5 shows the full model, including the incentives measured 1989 as well as 1993 and the lagged protest variable "protest 89". The explained variance increases by .03, compared with the model without "protest 89" (column 4). If we compare the results of the regression analyses with and without the lagged protest variable (columns 4 and 5), we find that the coefficients of the 1993 incentives are almost identical in both models. The coefficients for the 1989 incentives differ to a larger extent. This is to be expected because "protest 89" has stronger correlations with the incentives of 89 than of 93. The negative effect of "discontent 89 \* influence 89" on protest 93 is odd. An explanation may be that discontent 89 and discontent 93 correlate negatively (see Figure 2), and discontent 93 correlates



positively with protest 93. Thus, there is an indirect negative effect of discontent 89 on protest 93 - via discontent 93. The models exhibited in columns 4 and 5 confirm our assumption that the incentives that immediately precede protest are the decisive causal factors and not the lagged incentives.

The positive, statistically significant regression coefficient of "protest 89" on "protest 93" ( $\beta = .19$ , column 5 of Table 2) is not in line with our prediction that "protest 89" has only an indirect effect on "protest 93". How can this direct effect be explained? It is difficult to imagine that an individual's protest in 1989 is a direct causal factor for her or his protest in 1993. It is more plausible to assume that a behavior can only affect another behavior indirectly by changing the causes of that other behavior. If this assumption is correct the effect we found is to be expected if the explanatory incentive variables of 1993 are not complete. If our model has omitted incentive variables that are affected by "protest 89" and in turn have an effect on "protest 93" we will find a direct effect of "protest 89" on "protest 93". Because the incentives of 1993 explain only 32% of the variance of "protest 93" (see Table 2, column 5) the errors may include relevant incentive variables. Whether this interpretation is correct and what these variables might be is a question for further research.

## DISCUSSION

The results of this research may be surprising. Wouldn't one expect that participating in a unique, emotion provoking and highly consequential event such as the East German revolution in 1989 had long lasting effects for political participation at a later time? As this research shows, there were effects, but they were rather weak. In this regard, it is particularly striking that participation in the revolutionary events had in general no effects on the formation of protest sustaining social networks - a factor that is regarded as the major mobilizing context for participating in political protests. In other words, participating in the East German revolution had tremendous external effects - a whole economic

and political system was replaced -, but only small internal effects on the "hearts and minds" of the people and on their social relationships.

However, it may be argued that the results of this research are not surprising at all. The unique events in 1989 were followed by social changes that were so extensive that it would be astounding when participation in the revolution had any long lasting effect. These quite diverse theoretical expectation indicate that we do not dispose of a theory that enables us to explain under what conditions participation in political action has what effects. To what extent is a unique, emotion-provoking and highly consequential situation where protest takes place relevant for its effects? What exactly are those effects? What conditions that occur after those events change the effects of protest in what ways? These are questions that future research should concentrate on.

As far as the results of this research are concerned, we conclude that a general claim of the kind that participating in protests brings about politically enlightened and active citizens is not justified. However, it seems that extant research indicates that protest participation has some biographical effect (see, e.g., McAdam 1989; Sherkat and Blocker 1992). What the studies show is that participants in political action like the student movement or the freedom summer are different from non-participants. But this does not imply that the differences are due to participation. Instead of a *socialization effect* there may be a *recruitment effect*: individuals who join a movement or participate in an event like the freedom summer may already be different when they join. In the research that is reported in this paper the initial level of incentives is controlled for. This ensures that a relationship between protest at time 1 and incentives to protest at time 2 is not due to the fact that individuals were already faced with different incentives at time 1. In this case, a relationship between protest at time 1 and incentives to protest at time 2 would not say anything about an effect of former protests. Controlling for incentives allows us to determine the effects of protest at time 1 and, thus, a socialization effect for the period between time 1 and time 2.

We noted above that the matching proposition may not be plausible if the result of an effort is valued very negatively before the outcome occurs. Our prediction that it did not hold for members of the opposition groups was based on the assumption that their original goals were not changed after the fall of the GDR. There is evidence that the attitudes toward the capitalist system changed because of misinformation in communist times. Thus, the former members of opposition groups were not a good case to test the matching proposition. It would be important for social movement research to test the matching proposition for cases where goals of protesters and outcomes of protests clash in different degrees.

Regarding the relationships between political action in 1989 and incentives in 1993 that we have found, two questions are have not been answered. (1) "Protest 89" refers to actions that were carried out before October 89, the reference time for the interview, whereas the incentives were for October 1989. It is possible that political action that occurred before October 1989 has affected those incentives. Whether this is the case cannot be tested with our data. Therefore, the paper concentrates on the effects of protest performed in 1989 on the incentives measured in 1993. (2) What is the time that elapses between the performance of political action and the change of incentives? Neither existing theory nor empirical research has tackled this question by now. We assume that effects of engaging in the protests in 1989 occurred at least before the first free elections in the GDR on March 18, 1990. This was the time when the large-scale protests were definitely over.

After this date, and especially after the unification of the GDR and the former Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990, a far-reaching transformation process in East Germany began. The authoritarian communist regime was replaced by a democratic order, the central planning system was abolished and replaced by the West German "social market economy." Unemployment rose considerably, many unproductive enterprises were closed down, private property in real estate was returned to the former owners from West Germany, and many East German citizens found new jobs

where they had to acquire new knowledge and technical know-how. This transformation process set in motion mobilization processes that led to new protests. However, the number of participants remained much lower than in the fall of 1989. It seems that a “critical mass” that could instigate an evolutionary process of collective political action did not emerge.<sup>9</sup>

To what extent are those phenomena relevant for the explanatory problems this research focuses on? Our explanatory model exhibited in Figure 1 is a micro-level theory. The transformation process, mobilization efforts of groups or threshold effects are macro-level phenomena. These macro-phenomena can be linked with our micro-model in the following way. We assume that the macro-phenomena mentioned *may have changed the incentives that we have measured in 1993*. For example, citizens who became unemployed after unification may have blamed the political order for their situation and became politically more dissatisfied and alienated. Furthermore, the new democratic order may in general have increased perceived personal influence.

It is not possible and also not necessary for this research to specify the effects of various macro-changes after unification on the incentive variables in more detail. These effects had taken place at the time when the data of the second wave were collected. Thus, the transformation process and other macro-phenomena may have strengthened or attenuated the relationships between protest 1989 and the incentives measured in 1993. Our research thus ascertains the effects of the protests in 1989 that survived the transformation process and other macro-changes up to the time when the second wave of our interviews was administered. It would be interesting to see whether the effects we have found will survive longer than from 1989 to 1993.

## NOTES

1. Notable exceptions are Sherkat and Blocker 1992, 1994; McAdam 1989 - with further references.

2. For a detailed description of the situation in the GDR in 1989, the kinds of protests and an explanation of the emergence of the protests and the collapse of the regime see particularly Opp, Voss and Gern 1995.

3. These references show, among other things, that the data of the first wave matched the Leipzig population in regard to age and gender very well. The obvious problem that the responses of the 1990 wave may contain biases is extensively discussed in Opp and Gern 1993, and in Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995.

4. From those 1300 respondents interviewed in 1990, 1147 (89%) expressed their willingness to be re-interviewed. In 1993, 965 addresses could be located (i.e. 74% of the original 1300 respondents). From those 452 respondents who were not interviewed, only 35% declined the request to be re-interviewed, 60% were unavailable: respondents were not at home (30%) or did not live at the address noted during the first interview (18%), or access to the person to be interviewed was denied (14%).

5. It goes without saying that each item that is included in the additive scales is brought to the same value range if this was necessary.

6. This decision is discussed in detail in the Appendix.

7. As a lagged variable for ideological and political alienation in 1993 we included "political discontent 89".

8. Among the 513 respondents of the panel 281 said they are in part losers and in part winners.

9. It seems that tipping phenomena played a role in the East German revolution and in other East European revolutions as well. See, e.g., Lohmann 1993; Karklins and Peterson 1993; Opp, Voss and Gern 1995.

## **APPENDIX: PROBLEMS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

### **The Choice of the Statistical Technique**

It is common practice by now to test hypotheses with panel data by using structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation. Accordingly, we began the statistical analyses by testing the models of Figure 2 with exactly the same indicators and latent variables by applying this statistical technique. We switched to regression analysis for the following reason. Testing our models for members as well as nonmembers of opposition groups resulted in the following problem. Because our sample includes only 41 members (and 471 nonmembers) of former opposition groups, as was

noted before, the Lisrel program was not able to estimate all models for each of the groups, probably due to the skewed distribution of the items in the opposition group sample. Using regression analysis seemed only meaningful if the tests of the models of Figure 2 yielded very similar results with each statistical technique. In order to test this we formed an additive scale from the items of each latent variable - after having transformed the items to the same value range, if necessary, in a *first step*. For example, "social discontent 89" consists of three indicators (see Table 1). For each respondent, the average of each item was computed. This procedure yielded an additive scale for each latent variable. In a *second step* each of the previous models was tested by a regression analysis with the additive scales. In a *third step* we compared the results of the regression analyses and of the Lisrel analyses. The advantage of using structural equation modeling is that measurement errors are explicitly taken account of, whereas in regression analyses measurement errors are ignored. More precisely, it is assumed in a regression analysis that the relation between a latent variable and an item has a weight of 1. Despite this bold assumption it is held that regression analyses are a relatively robust statistical technique. A comparison of the results of the regression and Lisrel analyses thus might show very similar results. Only if this is the case it seems justified to perform the statistical analyses for members and nonmembers of opposition groups by using regression analysis.

A comparison of the standardized regression coefficients of Figure 2 and the Lisrel coefficients that are not presented shows high similarity. In general, the coefficients of the regression analyses are somewhat lower than the Lisrel estimates. This is to be expected because Lisrel eliminates attenuation due to measurement errors. It is of particular importance that if there are clear-cut effects in Lisrel analyses we have also clear-cut effects in the regression analyses. Although the coefficients of the Lisrel analyses are most of the time higher, they are mostly statistically not significant. This is due to multicollinearity of the independent variables. For example, the standardized coefficient between "protest 89" and "social incentives 93" is -0.15 due to Lisrel and not significant. The bivariate correlation

between the independent variables is 0.74. The bivariate correlation of the respective additive scales “protest 89” and “social incentives 93” is only 0.24. These similar results of the Lisrel and regression analyses justify the decision to test our propositions by using regression analysis.

### **Testing the Full Model of Political Protest**

It could be argued that the full model of Figure 1 has to be tested. This means, among other things, that “protest 93” has to be included in the analyses and that the feedback relationship (arrows 1 and 5) has to be estimated. However, the full model is mathematically not identifiable and thus cannot be tested. The first option to make the model identifiable is to eliminate arrow 2 (and also not test whether the relationship of arrow 6 is absent). But this is the relationship that is at issue in this paper. The second option is to introduce instrumental variables. This is problematic too because we do not dispose of a theory about factors that change incentives. Introducing ad hoc instrumental variables (such as demographic factors) may also misspecify the model. Thus, testing the full model in Figure 1 is not possible.

A substantive argument for omitting “protest 93” from the analyses is the common assumption that incentives affect action, and there are numerous empirical studies on political action that make and confirm this assumption. If feedback effects are discussed it is usually assumed that they are long-term effects and relatively weak.

Another possibility is to include in the analyses of Figure 2 “protest 93” as an additional independent variable. This is only meaningful for adherents of the extreme propositions that incentives are an outcome of the behavior and that they are a sort of justification for the behavior.

But simply omitting “protest 93” may also misspecify the model *if* we assume a causal effect of “protest 93” on “incentives 93.” The reason is that correlations between the three independent variables for the dependent variable “incentives 93” (i.e. “protest 89”, “incentives 89” and “protest

93") may affect the coefficient of arrow 2 which is important for testing our hypotheses. However, including "protest 93" as an additional control variable in the models of Figure 2 may misspecify the model 2 too, as was noted above.

Although this is true it may be better to include "protest 93" as an additional control variable than refraining from any statistical analysis altogether. We tested each of the models of Figure 2 by including "protest 93" as a third variable. The results of the analyses that are not presented are strikingly similar to those exhibited in Figure 2.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Argyle, Michael. 1988. Social Relationships. Pp. 222-245 in Introduction to Social Psychology, edited by M. Hewstone, W. Stroebe, J.-P. Codol, and G.M. Stephenson. New York: Basil Blackwell

Eagly, Alice H.; Chaiken, Shelly. 1993. The Psychology of Attitudes. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Janovich College Publishers..

Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Findeis, Hagen; Pollack, Detlef; Schilling, Manuel. 1994. Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Was ist aus den politisch alternativen Gruppen der DDR geworden? Interviews mit ehemals führenden Vertretern. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt.

Finkel, Steven E. 1987. "The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel." The Journal of Politics 49:443-464.

Finkel, Steven E. 1995. Causal Analysis with Panel Data. Thousand Oaks: Sage

Finkel, Steven E., Muller, Edward N.; Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1989. "Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action." American Political Science Review 83:885 -903.

Gibson, Martha Liebler. 1991. "Public Goods, Alienation, and Political Protest: The Sanctuary Movement as a Test of the Public Goods Model of Collective Rebellious Behavior." Political Psychology 12:623-651.

Karklins, Rasma and Roger Petersen. 1993. "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989." Journal of Politics 55:588-614.

Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action." American Political Science Review 87:319-333.



- Marwell, Gerald, Ames, Ruth E. 1979. "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Groups Size, and the Free-Rider Problem." American Journal of Sociology 84:1335-1360.
- McAdam, Doug. 1989. "The Biographical Consequences of Activism." American Sociological Review 54: 744-760.
- McAdam, Doug; Paulsen, Ronnelle. 1993. "Social Ties and Activism: Towards a Specification of the Relationship." American Journal of Sociology 99: 640-667.
- Milburn, Thomas W.; Christie, Daniel J. 1990. "Effort Justification as a Motive for Continuing War: The Vietnam Case." Pp. 236-251 in: Betty Glad, ed. Psychological Dimensions of War. Newbury Park: Sage
- Moe, Terry M. 1980. The Organization of Interests. Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
- Müller-Enbergs, Helmut; Schulz, Marianne; Wielgoths, Jan. 1991. Von der Illegalität ins Parlament. Werdegang und Konzept der neuen Bürgerbewegungen. Berlin: LinksDruck Verlag.
- Muller, Edward N. 1979. Aggressive Political Participation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Muller, Edward N., Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action." American Political Science Review 80:471-489.
- Oliver, Pamela E. 1989. "Bringing the Crowd Back in: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements." Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 11:1-30.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1986. "Soft Incentives and Collective Action. Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement." British Journal of Political Science 16:87-112.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1988. "Grievances and Participation in Social Movements." American Sociological Review 53:853-864.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter, in collaboration with Peter and Petra Hartmann. 1989. The Rationality of Political Protest. A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1994. "Repression and Revolutionary Action. East Germany in 1989." Rationality and Society 6:101-138.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter, Gern, Christiane. 1993. "Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation: The East German Revolution of 1989." American Sociological Review 58:659-680.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter, Voss, Peter; Gern, Christiane. 1995. The Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution. East Germany 1989. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Riker, William H., Ordeshook, Peter C. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." American Political Science Review 65:25-42.

Riker, William H., Ordeshook, Peter C. 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.


Sherkat, Darren E., Blocker, T. Jean. 1992. "Protest and Alternation: Sixties Activists in Adulthood." Paper Presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Sherkat, Darren E., Blocker, T. Jean. 1994. "The Political Development of Sixties' Activists: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and Socialization on Protest Participation." Social Forces 72:821-842.

Völker, Beate. 1995. "Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot ...?" Institutions of Communism, the Transition to Capitalism and Personal Networks: The Case of East Germany. Amsterdam: Thesis Publisher.


**Figure 1. Explaining Political Protest over Time**

---



**Note: Solid arrows symbolize hypothesized relationships, dashed arrows denote relationships that are assumed to be absent.**

Figure 2: The Effects of Protest 1989 on Incentives 1993



Note: The coefficients are standardized regression coefficients; coefficients under the dependent variables are adjusted explained variances. \* significant at the .05 level; \*\* significant at the .01 level.

Table 1. The Scales and Their Measurement, 1989 and 1993

**Political protest 1989:** Working for an opposition group, participating in peace prayers and other church activities, refusal to vote, refusal to become member in the SED or a similar organization (four answer categories for each item: had not taken the action into account (code 1), had thought about performing the action but had not performed it (code 2), had engaged in that action once (code 3) or several times (code 4)). Frequency of participation in the Monday demonstrations before October 9, 1989.

**Political protest 1993:** Working with or founding a citizen initiative, organizing or participating in demonstrations, collecting signatures or sign petitions, writing letters to newspapers or members of parliaments. Answer categories as for "political protest 1989."

**Political discontent 1989:** Discontent (five categories, "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied") with: environment, existence of two German states, possibility for free speech, demands of the socialist party SED, surveillance by the secret police (Stasi), possibilities of a fair political trial, possibilities of traveling to Western countries.

**Political discontent 1993:** Discontent with: unification of GDR and former FRG, possibility of free speech, policy of the federal government regarding asylum seekers, violence against foreigners by Rightist radicals, work of the "Treuhand" (privatization agency), adopting the laws of the former FRG for the new Germany after unification.

**Social discontent 1989:** Discontent with: possibilities of child care (in kindergartens etc.); equal rights for women and men, possibilities for further education.

**Social discontent 1993:** Same items as for "Social discontent 1989."

**Economic discontent 1989:** Discontent with: the standard of living, the supply of goods in the shops, the purchasing power of the GDR currency in other countries.

**Economic discontent 1993:** Discontent with: the standard of living, rents for apartments, prices in the new states (former GDR), unemployment in the new states, speed of the economic reconstruction of the new states, differentiation of incomes in the new states.

**Political alienation 1989:** Not measured.

**Political alienation 1993:** Agreement to statements that: German courts do not guarantee fair trial, basic rights of citizens are not protected, I have a negative attitude towards our democracy, politicians do not advance interests of the people. "Political discontent 1989" was taken as the lagged variable for political alienation 1993.

**Ideological alienation 1989:** Not measured.

**Ideological alienation 1993:** Agreement to statements that: socialism was a good idea that was carried out badly, I had preferred that the GDR had remained a socialist state with more democracy and with elements of a market economy. "Political discontent 1989" was taken as the lagged variable for ideological alienation 1993.

**Discontent 1989:** Composite additive scale: for each respondent, the values of the previously mentioned scales of political, social, and economic discontent were added and divided by 3.

**Discontent 1993:** Composite additive scale: for each respondent, the values of the previously mentioned scales of political, social, economic discontent and, in addition, political and ideological alienation were added and divided by 5.

**Perceived personal influence 1989:** Respondent was asked to what extent it was likely that s/he could have changed the situation in the former GDR by working for an opposition group, participating in peace prayers, refusal to vote.

**Perceived personal influence 1993:** The same items as "perceived influence 1989."

**Moral incentives 1989: protest norms 1989:** Agreement to the following items (five categories, from "fully disagree" to "fully agree"): Protest is a duty in case of high discontent, in case of expected success one should participate even if one runs a risk, in case of high discontent participation is a duty even in case of personal disadvantages.

**Moral incentives 1989: protest norms 1993:** Same items as for "Protest norms 1989."

TABLE 1 CONTINUED

**Moral incentives 1993: justifications of political violence 1989:** Violence against persons can be justified; violence against property can be justified; violence against the state is justified if the state suppresses basic rights.

**Moral incentives 1993: justifications of political violence 1993:** Same items as for "Justifications of violence 1989", and in addition: it may sometimes be necessary to break the law.

**Social incentives 1989:** Membership in protest encouraging groups, expectations of reference persons to protest; critical friends, critical colleagues (for details see text of the paper).

**Social Incentives 1993:** Same items as for "Social incentives 1989."

---

Note: The expressions printed in bold are the names of the scales variables.

Table 2. The Effects of Incentives 89 and Incentives 93 on Legal Protest 89 and 93 (Standardized Regression Coefficients, N=513)

	Dependent: Protest 89		Dependent: Protest 93		
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 89</b>					
Discontent 89*Influence 89	.26**		-.09*	-.04	-.10*
Moral incentives 89	.14**		.08	-.001	-.03
Social incentives 89	.31**		.16**	.12**	.06
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 93</b>					
Discontent 93*Influence 93		.25**		.27**	.28**
Moral incentives 93		.18**		.18**	.17**
Social incentives 93		.32**		.27**	.27**
<b>PROTEST 89</b>					.19**
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.32	.03	.32	.35

\* significant at the .05 level; \*\* significant at the .01 level.