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Redefining Security

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Redefining Security

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Introduction

What is "security"? Does the word "security" possess a precise and commonly accepted meaning? The concept of security is often referred to in no uncertain terms: politicians refer elusively to measures which need to be taken in order to increase national security and individuals frequently use the term to describe a particular feeling of well-being or to denote a state of financial health. In fact, security has come to mean so many different things to different people that it may have no precise meaning at all. In a seminal conceptual piece on security, Arnold Wolfers characterizes security as an "ambiguous symbol" and draws attention to the potential mischief which the ambiguity of the symbol can cause. He argues that "while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, ... (the concept of security) may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name." [1] If Wolfers is correct, and security is potentially a deceptive symbol, then our options are either to avoid using the concept entirely or to begin chipping away at the analytical problems underlying the way the concept of security has been conceived of. This paper seeks to understand the way the concept of security has been treated in the past and to offer some concrete suggestions as to some methods or strategies which could be used to enhance security in the future.

Levels of Security?

Besides experiencing difficulties with putting forward precise definitions of security, analysts have found it especially difficult to compare one "level" of security with another. For instance, what is seen to be a threat to security at the individual level might not be significant at the national level of analysis, or threats to security which occur at various levels, both state and individual, may be responded to at multiple levels of analysis. [2] Furthermore, there is not necessarily any connection between measures taken to enhance security at one level and increments in security at another level - that is, an increase in the aggregate of "security" among individual citizens does not always translate into greater security for the state or for the leaders of a state. [3] Nevertheless, making a distinction for analytical purposes between levels of security can help in thinking more clearly about different aspects of security: in particular,

a distinction between the "individual," "national" and "systemic" levels of analysis is made here because these typologies seem to offer considerable exploratory power.[4] The paper, therefore, is divided into three sections and in each section the "traditional" approach to the concept of security at that level is considered; some of the more recent contributions to the concept of security at that level are overviewed; and then some suggestions regarding methods of enhancing either individual, national or systemic security are made.

The Individual Level of Analysis

Philosophers have long grappled with the concept of security, the roots of insecurity and the conditions which contribute to security. Hobbes puts forward, perhaps, the most pessimistic exposition of mankind's condition of insecurity. For Hobbes, men must live without security, except for what their own strength and inventiveness can supply them with, whenever men live in a condition of anarchy or "Warre". According to Hobbes:

During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre and such a Warre, as is of every man, against every man ... Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is ... continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.[5]

Further complications are created by the fact that, according to Rousseau, most methods for self-protection which are undertaken in order to increase the individual's own sense of security simultaneously menace others. For Rousseau:

It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. But so long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to himself, so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the

assailant's own possessions than a device for seizing those of others.[6]

Both Hobbes and Rousseau are preoccupied by the condition of physical insecurity in which man finds himself - for Hobbes threats to man's physical security, indeed man's survival, are derived from man's fearful nature and the lack of an overarching authority, while for Rousseau continual physical insecurity is dictated by uncertainty about the motives of others. But are threats to man's physical security the only kinds of threat relevant to individual security? There is no real doubt that humans have a basic right to physical security: a right not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, or assault.[7] Yet even in societies where physical security is relatively assured, individuals feel insecure. They may feel insecure because of a low sense of self-worth, because of perceptions of threat to their family or because of concerns arising out of larger issues including fears about population growth, world hunger, or threats to the environment. Although these sorts of fears may not, in the short-term, threaten the physical security of the individual and may, indeed, be a product of the individual's exaggerated fears, they can nevertheless exert a deleterious effect.

Consequently, more contemporary analyses of security have attempted to incorporate the notion of subjectively-perceived security into the definition of security. For instance, Wolfers ultimately defines security in "an objective sense as the absence of threats to acquired values," and "in a subjective sense, as the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." [8] Christian Bay distinguishes further between two types of subjective security: "subjective external security" refers to the degree of consistent reassurance the individual senses in that he or she, or the loved ones, are objectively secure; and "internal subjective security" refers to the security deriving from self-acceptance and self-insight. [9]

Clearly, new concepts of security are beginning to incorporate subjectively-rooted assessments of security. Whereas security formerly referred primarily to an objective measure of physical security, any assessment of individual security must now include an assessment of the individual's own sense of security. [10] But are subjective and objective aspects of security separable in any meaningful way? Any objective assessment of security will be itself the product of the analyst's own subjectively-derived ideas about the conditions, probabilities and nature of security. Therefore, in order to understand more fully the components of contemporary notions about individual security, it seems most pertinent to explore more fully some facets of subjective security.

There are a number of problematic aspects to subjective security which militate against its conceptual usefulness. First,

there remain some doubts about whether absolute subjective security is indeed desirable. For instance, Christian Bay points out that it may be the case that "modest amounts of anxiety may be necessary to keep humans alert and agile, intellectually and emotionally." [11] Secondly, we are not certain whether humans require some basic level of subjective security in order to function nor do we know what effect inadequate amounts of security can have on an individual. For example, Abraham Maslow argues that every human being has two forces within him. One set of forces clings to security or safety; the other set of forces seeks to grow and gratify higher needs involved with intellectual and emotional "being." What this means, according to Maslow, is that in the choice between giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out: "safety needs are prepotent over growth needs." [12]

However, despite Maslow's research, it is still not known to what extent the individual's subjective security needs must be satisfied before the individual can become a fully functioning human being. A third problem with assessing subjective security stems from the profound differences among individuals in terms of security requirements. Robert Jervis' research on the cognitive and motivational processes of human psychology argues that individuals differ in their subjective security requirements. According to Jervis, there are two aspects to assessing subjective security requirements: first, individuals differ about their perceptions of threats to their security; and second, people differ, about how much they value increments of security. Thus, a person facing relatively the same threatening conditions as another may experience a relatively higher sense of insecurity, or some individuals may be more willing to pay a higher price to gain increments of security than others. [13]

If Jervis is correct, and each individual's subjective security needs differ, then this would seem to imply that strategies and methods which seek to enhance individual security will need to be tailored to each individual. This is a daunting task, and one which suggests that enhancing security at the individual level is, if not impossible, at least practically unattainable. However, it must also be remembered that what is practically important is not to somehow attain high levels or absolute subjective security for each individual, but to devise methods and strategies which to some degree enhance the individual's security. In order to do so we need first to understand that subjective security is in practical terms immeasurable, except insofar as subjective security denotes the absence of subjectively-felt insecurity.

Secondly, it is important to assess the different degrees and kinds of individual insecurity. By devising policies and strategies which alleviate or eliminate individual insecurities,

the individual's subjective security can be enhanced in a round-about way. In this context, therefore, strategies which enhance subjective security are any actions or policies which ameliorate, remove, or reduce the individual's perceptions of insecurity.

Finally, any attempt to ameliorate insecurity will necessitate that we try to understand the physical, psychological and social realities of those who are experiencing insecurity, and then try to eliminate the causes of their particular insecurities. At first glance such an endeavour might also seem overwhelming, but because many kinds of personal insecurity will have common causes (i.e. poverty, foreboding of nuclear war, worker alienation), the elimination or amelioration of some of the root causes of commonly-felt insecurities can promise quick results in terms of higher levels of personal security for all individuals. Therefore, whereas the research thus far on individual security seems to have been overly preoccupied with the task of somehow defining and attaining subjective security, arguably an alternative approach which seeks merely to alleviate or eliminate subjectively-perceived insecurities may bear more fruit in the form of higher levels of individual security all around.

The National Level of Analysis

The "traditional" approach to security at the national level is embodied in what is referred to as the "realist" paradigm.[14] For the realists it is basically a Hobbesian world with no escape from eternal conflict. The realist vision of national security is based on lessons from history which teach that security is best obtained through preponderant military strength, through the ability to threaten attack by superior forces and through the demonstration of resolve rather than conciliatoriness in the face of the enemy.[15]

Realists can trace through history incidents which demonstrate the parabellum doctrine that "if you want peace, prepare for war." [16] In a similar sense, realist orthodoxy seems to assume that if a nation wants security in an anarchical world, obtaining superiority of power in the form of weapons is the most preferred strategy. Nations are advised, for instance, by the "classical" realist thinker Hans Morgenthau to seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances because "all nations must always be afraid that their own miscalculations and the power increases of nations might add up to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs avoid." [17]

The realist preoccupation with obtaining security through superior strength in a largely anarchic world order is seen in definitions of national security which emphasize a nation's ability

to deter or sustain an attack. For example, Walter Lipmann writes that:

A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. This definition implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it.[18]

The realist preoccupation with security through military strength is also manifested in many national security policies, of which the best illustration is the national security policy of the Reagan administration. The origins of the Reagan administration's national security policy can be found in the founding statement of the Committee on the Present Danger. In the statement, the Soviet Union is perceived to be the principal threat to national security: "The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup." [19] Consequently for the Reagan administration, every aspect of U.S. national security policy was judged on its capability to protect the United States military from the perceived Soviet threat.

Why do politicians and self-professed "realists" define national security in such excessively military terms, and why do they resort to such rhetoric about the enemy whenever they talk about security? It may be because politicians have found it easier to focus the domestic public's attention on military threats to security, real or imagined, rather than on non-military ones. Certainly it may be easier to build a consensus on military solutions to national security problems than to get agreement on the other means of influence that a country can bring to bear on problems that it faces.

Another explanation, however, attributes the militaristic rhetoric surrounding national security to deep psychological images of the enemy. Patrick Blackett has written that "once a nation bases its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atomic bomb, it becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy." [20] However, it could also be argued that it is first psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy before a nation can base its security on atomic weapons or weapons of mass destruction - that is, a nation's citizens would not tolerate such kinds of defence unless they held stark, menacing images of the enemy. The psychological roots of enemy imagery have received scant attention in the literature [21] but findings in the field of attribution theory regarding "mirror imaging" indicate that enemy images are the product of human tendencies to believe only the

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worst about our enemies (and the best about ourselves) and to deny information about the enemy which conflicts with strongly-held images.[22]

If we reject the realist assumption that military strength must be the primary characteristic of any national security policy, what are some other emerging visions of national security? Chief among the various alternative approaches to national security is the idea that disarmament would most contribute to national security. Disarmers or abolitionists argue that military capability remains associated with national security in the minds of most people because of images that are carry-overs from a time in which they once had some relationship to international relations, however, in reality, "the burgeoning growth of military capabilities has been the chief source of insecurity." [23]

For disarmers the very process of arming increases tensions and exacerbates hostilities. Indeed, the dynamics of such a process are described by John Herz and Herbert Butterfield as a "security dilemma." Reduced to its essentials, the theory of the security dilemma states that attempts by the state or the individual to gain security through power accumulation tend to provoke the insecurity of others, stimulating them to enhance their security, which in turn threatens the security of the other side. Thus, the security dilemma describes the measures and countermeasures each side takes which can incite a vicious spiral of increasing insecurity.[24] The most obvious manifestation of the security dilemma is the arms race: one nation's attempt to enhance its security through stockpiling weapons may stimulate the nation's adversary to obtain more weapons, with the final result that there is less security for both sides.[25]

The idea underlying the security dilemma - that one nation's attempt to enhance its security through power accumulation may threaten the security of others - seems to have engendered an entire school of thought which proposes obtaining national security by decreasing or eliminating a nation's preponderant power - that is, through unilateral or bilateral disarmament. Essentially, the argument is that disarmament can enhance national security by reducing each side's fears about preemption, accidental war and miscalculated attack, thus contributing to greater security overall.[26] Also significant is the notion that disarmament can free resources conducive to development, which can in turn enhance national security. Thus, in the Final Document of the 1987 United Nations Conference on the Relationship between disarmament and development it states that:

Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments

could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security.[27]

The recognition seems to be dawning that security for nations no longer means simply devising defence against invasion or nuclear destruction. On the contrary, strategies based on disarmament seem to hold the promise of higher levels of security overall.

It was mentioned previously that other concepts of national security are being developed in addition to the realist and the disarmament perspectives. Another recently emerging approach to national security is the concept of "alternative security." Alternative security describes a plethora of defence measures including neutralism, non-alignment, nuclear-weapons free zones, civilian defence, non-nuclear neutral zones and non-provocative conventional defence measures.[28] According to a prominent exponent of alternative security methods, Ulrick Albrecht, there is no consensus as to the exact conceptual meaning of "alternative security," or "alternative defence" as it is sometimes referred to, "but this lack of conceptual clarity, like that of democracy or socialism and other political bywords, does not impair [its] political appeal." [29]

Despite its ambiguous nature, the main underlying purpose of proposals for alternative security seems to be to gradually wean nations and leaders away from their dependence on force for security, not by the direct process of abolishing weapons and the military but by the more indirect strategy of substitution. Less threatening "non-provocative" weapons, "civilian-based" defence systems, "transarmament" plans and a shift toward "disengagement" are all alternative security measures which are meant to act as interim substitutes for present-day defence systems, which are by and large based on nuclear weapons.[30]

However, one criticism must be made about the entire concept of alternative security. The various proposals for alternative security are principally intended to enhance the security of small states.[31] But it seems that the advocates of alternative security systems are mainly seeking changes in the national security policies of small states so that if a war should come, and if a war is fought on one's own territory, the preservation of the society and environment will be possible because comparatively less harmful types of weapons will be relied upon for defence and conflict escalation levels will likely remain relatively low (i.e. below the nuclear threshold).[32] Apparently, the advocates of alternative security policies are also preoccupied with the notion that national security policies must somehow cope with military threats. But, perhaps, the analysis of national security must

broaden its focus from thinking only about military threats and defences.

Strategies to enhance or maintain national security must also emphasize economic, social, environmental and political threats.[33] For example, a nation's security today depends just as much on its economic health and on its ability to cope with unexpected domestic problems as on its military preparedness. Therefore, national security policy must also include emergency plans to cope with such threats as interruptions in the flow of critically needed resources; a drastic deterioration in environmental quality or the dwindling of the global supply of resources; unprecedented national disasters (i.e. earthquakes); violence in Third World countries; urban conflict, (exacerbated, perhaps, by the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants and unemployed workers); and terrorist attacks. All these types of threats endanger the quality of life of a nation and need to be considered and prepared for the formulation of every national security policy.

Another healthy corrective to the current preoccupation with defining national security in terms of weapons stockpiles would be to define national security policy in terms of the fears which one's adversaries may have - that is, to try to recreate the fears which a state's enemies may have and then attempt to alleviate those fears or insecurities.[34] In this regard the old Jewish saying "Fear the man who fears you" is of special relevance: one must try to understand the fears felt by other states in order to increase one's own national security. Security policies which attempt to alleviate the insecurity of adversaries and which attempt to prepare for unexpected natural, economic and social disasters may, in the end, prove to be more efficacious national security policies than either the realist, disarmament-oriented or alternative security proposals being circulated today.

The Systemic Level of Analysis

During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, diplomats and politicians came to realize that a nation's security could be more effectively enhanced by allying with other nations. For instance, during the 1900s coalitions of nations formed which were variously referred to as "balances of power," "concerts" or "alliances." All the coalitions however, sought to expand the power and security of each member nation-state by uniting its military force with other like-minded states.[35] The modern twentieth century versions of these kinds of coalitions are referred to as "regional security systems" with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS) being the most prominent examples of such kinds of regional security systems.[36]

Underlying all these types of coalitions there remains the conviction that national security is best preserved and enhanced through alliances which can boast of, or demonstrate, preponderant military strength. In a sense, security is seen as a "zero-sum" game where increases in the military security of one alliance or bloc make the other side less secure. However, newer approaches to enhancing security at the global level emphasize that the pursuit of security can no longer be conceived of as a zero-sum game. New systemic-level thinking stresses that nations, and opposing blocs of nations, share interests; interests which, if threatened or destroyed, would be detrimental to the security of both sides. Therefore strategies which increase the security of one side, and in doing so also add to the security of the other side, are actively sought - it is, so to speak, a global security game which need not add up to zero.

What are some emerging concepts of global security which emphasize the existence of common interests? The primary shared interest of nations must be to avoid nuclear war, and in this regard there have been many proposals which seek to establish a type of "common security" based on nuclear-weapon free zones and negotiated conventional balances. The report of the Palme Commission on Common Security, for instance, proposes as a medium-term measure the creation in Europe of a battlefield nuclear-weapons free zone and a 150 kilometres wide disengagement zone on both sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact demarcation line.[37]

But there have also been other proposals for security which are based on more general, shared interests. For example, Karl Deutsch has developed the concept of "security communities": groups of states which develop reliable expectations of peaceful relations between them and which do not expect or fear the use of force (i.e. Canada and the U.S.).[38] And Barry Buzan has considered the emergence of "security complexes," in which the security interests of a group of states are linked together so closely (i.e. Western Europe) that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another, with the result that they seem to lie in an "oasis" of relative security compared to the rest of the "fractious" international system.[39]

But one problem with the proposals for common security, security communities and security complexes is that they all require close physical proximity and/or a degree of cultural commonality between the members; one would not speak of a security community between Pakistan and Paraguay for instance. In this respect, the proposals seem to incline more toward a regionally-based rather than a systemic-level conception of security. Are there any proposals to enhance systemic-wide security which are not necessarily based on territorial proximity for their success? Recently the term "security regime" has been coined to describe the existence of tacit or explicit rules, principals and decision

making procedures which exist in order to preserve or enhance shared security interests among any and all nations and among international organizations. A security regime exists when nations or organizations coordinate their behaviour according to shared principles, procedures and rules.

For instance, Nation A and Nation B may seek to control the arms competition between them by making up rules and setting up interdependent decision-making bodies which constrain each nation's pursuit of a larger stockpile of weapons. Besides acting as a constraint on each nation's behaviour, continued adherence to the regime's rules and principles encourages each nation to gradually develop more stable expectations about the other's behaviour. Thus, by specifying what constitutes their shared interests and then by seeking to coordinate their action so as to ensure outcomes based on their shared interests, security regimes can serve to strengthen the security of their members, which may number anywhere from two to hundreds of member nations and organizations. Some examples of successful security regimes are the various arms control agreements between the superpowers.[40]

A resounding strength of security regimes is that their creation and maintenance does not rely on "altruistic" or "conciliatory" behaviour. Systemic-level thinkers have been criticized in the past for their utopian illusions about international behaviour and their unwarranted faith in the selfless qualities of human nature.[41] But the kind of global thinking which advocates the creation of security regimes relies on a nation's self-interest or "selfishness" in order for regimes to come into being. Security regimes are based on the shared self-interest of nations in averting war and preserving peace.

Unfortunately, however, security regimes are not necessarily stable or durable institutions; one nation may violate the rules of the regime if it is in its self-interest to do so. Therefore, it is argued that the members of a security regime must remain on guard against powers arising from within the regime which threaten to violate its rules and procedures and they must also be prepared to defend themselves against other nations outside the regime which may issue military threats or resort to the use of nuclear weapons.[42] What kinds of security policies do systemic-level thinkers advocate which can combat these kinds of threatening scenarios? Arguably, the first priority of a global security perspective must be to guarantee that the life, health and survival of humanity is assured.[43] But holding to such a principle may mean that a nation must demonstrate conciliatoriness (appeasement) in the face of a threat from another nation or bloc to attack using weapons of massive destruction.

Therefore, taking a systemic-level perspective on security might require taking the viewpoint that in the face of a suffi-

ciently dangerous and potent threat, the sovereignty and independence of a nation-state may have to be sacrificed for the sake of human survival.[44] In the long run, however, by working to establish security communities, security complexes and security regimes we can hope to transform each nation's fixation with national security into a preoccupation with first ensuring world survival, universal well-being and systemic-wide security. Indeed, the evolution toward a systemic-level perspective on security may result in a state of affairs where the issuance of a nuclear threat or even the contemplation of an attack using weapons of mass destruction would be unheard of.

To effect such changes in the concept of national security is a tall order. However, there have been cases in history where government policy has been changed to reflect systemic rather than national interests because of an enlightened public's concern about issues important to global survival (examples are the conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the INF Treaty in 1987). Therefore, one force which could effect a change toward a systemic security perspective is an informed and determined public. To pin our hopes for change on the prospect of a tidal change in world public opinion is not entirely utopian because mounting evidence indicates that a deep sea-change in world opinion is actually taking place. The evidence that leaders are replying to - indeed, are being carried along on a world-wide wave of desire for security through peace - is seen in the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall; the changes in Eastern Europe; the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan; the elections in Nicaragua, Namibia and Eastern Europe; the release of Nelson Mandela; the superpowers' agreement to eliminate chemical weapons as well as the growing movement to negotiate large-scale cuts in carbon monoxide emissions. But if there is not, ultimately, an even greater shift toward more globally-oriented security concerns in the future, including a move to create more security regimes, security communities, security complexes and associations based on common security, then the game of international relations runs the risk of becoming a "negative-sum" game in which all nations and all individual citizens feel less and less secure.

Conclusion

In order to reach a better understanding of the concept of security and so as to suggest some strategies which could more effectively enhance security, the differences between individual, national and systemic-level approaches to security have been considered. It was argued that the focus at the individual level of analysis on individual physical security and on objectively and subjectively-defined concepts of security could be broadened by attention to individual insecurities and the methods and strategies

Notes

1. Arnold Wolfers Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), p.147.
2. For a more elaborate explanation of the problems surrounding the analysis of security at different levels see Robert Linden, "The Security Bind in East Europe," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.26 No.2, June 1982, p.158-159.
3. Thomas Schelling in Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York, 1978) succinctly describes the problem of translating the needs of individuals (i.e. for security) into national needs and behaviour. Schelling shows that there is not necessarily any relationship between what he calls "micromotives" and "macrobehavior."
4. In a chapter entitled "Conceptions of Security: Individual, National and Global" in Political Discourse, Bhikhu Parekh and Thomas Pantham (eds.) (London, 1987), Christian Bay also makes use of this kind of typology for analyzing the concept of security, except that he refers to global rather than systemic security.
5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson (ed.) (London, 1968) p.185-186.
6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe, Translated by E.E. Vaughan (London, 1917), p.78-79.
7. Henry Shue Basic Rights (Princeton, 1980), p.20. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Kingston & Montreal, 1988).
8. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, op cit, p.150.
9. Christian Bay, "Conceptions of Security: Individual, National and Global", op cit, p.131.
10. On the other hand, one might argue that the insecurity that both Hobbes and Rousseau are describing is due to a pervasive sense of personal insecurity rather than to mere physical insecurity. Furthermore, the situation of Hobbesian fear may in fact be a product of subjectively-felt fears and not a reflection of the "objective" situation. Therefore, the distinction I make between the former preoccupation with physical security, and the more contemporary focus on subjectively-felt security, may be a false one. Nevertheless, the confusion simply proves my next point, which is that it is

difficult in any case to make a distinction between subjective and objective security.

11. Quoted in Christian Bay, "Conceptions of Security...", op. cit., p.132. Bay is referring in this context to the work of Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, (Princeton, 1957), (originally published in 1844) p.142.
12. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, (Princeton, 1968) (originally published in 1962) p.47.
13. Robert Jervis "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics Vol.30 No.2, January 1978, p.174-175 and Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976).
14. The term "realist" was originally coined to describe those who "describe what is" while the term "idealist" denotes those who describe "what ought to be." John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago 1951).
15. Of course, the debate about the various tenets of realism, "neorealism" and "structuralism" as well as the continuing discussion about whether realism is a paradigm or tradition in international relations, reaching back to Thucydides, St. Augustine, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Reinhold Niebuhr still continues unabated. For some illuminating discussions about the nature of realist thought see Kenneth Thompson & Robert J. Myers, eds., Truth and Tragedy (New Brunswick 1977); James Der Derian & Michael J. Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations (Lexington, Mass., 1989); R.B.J. walker "Realism, Change and International Relations Theory" International Studies Quarterly Vol. 31, 1987; and David Campbell "Recent Changes in Social Theory: Questions for International Relations" in Richard Higgott, Ed.1, New Directions in International Relations? Australian Perspectives (Canberra, 1988).
16. For instance, Thucydides is often referred to as the first "realist" and his account of the Peloponnesian War is cited by realists for its lessons about the causes of war. However, a close reading of his account tells us that for Thucydides the cause of the Peloponnesian War was due mainly to Sparta's fear of the preponderant growth in power of Athens: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by Rex Warner (New York, 1980) p.49. Thus, one could argue that the Athenians drive to obtain superiority of power may have actually caused war, contrary to realist doctrine.

17. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (London, England, 1978 edition), p.228.
18. Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943), p.51. Quoted in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Department of International Studies: University of Warwick, 1983), p.216.
19. The founding statement of the Committee of the Present Danger and an analysis of its profound effect on the formulation of the Reagan administration's national security policy is found in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels (New York, 1982), p.36-52.
20. Patrick Blacknett quoted in Mark Sommer, Beyond the Bomb (New York, 1985) p.159-160.
21. For some information on this subject see Robert Jervis The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, 1970); and the work of psychologist John Gleisner reviewed by John P. Holdren in "The Enemy Within", New Internationalist, March, 1983.
22. Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1961, p.45-50; Thomas Homer Dixon, "They and We: An Empirical and Philosophical Study of a Theory of Social Conflict", Unpublished thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1989.
23. Anatol Rapoport "Whose Security Does Defence Defend?" in Defending Europe: Options for Security, D. Paul (ed.) (London, 1985) p.272.
24. John Herz, Idealism and Realism, op. cit., p.158.
25. For a more elaborate analysis of the cause of the arms race and the roots of the security dilemma see Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London, 1951), pp.21-22.
26. See, for example, Admiral Eugene Carrol, Jr. "A New Concept for Security in the Nuclear Age" in End the Arms Race: Fund Human Needs, Proceedings of the Vancouver Centennial Peace and Disarmament Symposium: (Vancouver, 1986); Anatol Rapoport "Whose Security Does Defence Defend?", op. cit.; Charles Osgood "Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 1959, p.295 and the disarmament proposals aired at the United Nations Disarmament and Development Conferences, particularly in 1978.

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27. United Nations Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 24 August-September, 1987 (United Nations: New York, 1987), p.3.
 28. For more information on these measures see S. Lodgaard, "Nuclear Disengagement in Europe," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 17, No. 3-4 1986; Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces", International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, p.48; and Bent Sorenson "Security Implications of Alternative Defence Options for Western Europe," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1985, p.197.
 29. Ulrich Albrecht, "Alternative Designs of European Security, the Palme Commission Report and the Conventionalization of Forces," in Derek Paul (ed.), Defending Europe: Options for Security (London, 1985), p.144.
 30. For more information on non-provocative defence systems and civilian based defence systems see Dietrich Fischer, "Invulnerability without threat: The Swiss Concept," Journal of Peace Research, Vol XIX, No. 3, 1982; for information on transarmament see Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives (Nottingham, 1984); and for a review of the concepts underlying nuclear disengagement and nuclear-weapons free zones see Carolyn Stephenson "Alternative Methods for International Security: A Review of the Literature," Peace and Change, Fall, 1981.
 31. Christian Bay argues that as the world's leading superpower, the United States is "the only great power that is really free to pursue alternative security policy options." Christian Bay, op. cit., p.136. Theoretically such is the case, however, I would argue that in practical terms any leader in an arms race of such magnitude is left with little leeway to initiate policy changes because of the dynamics of the arms race itself (i.e. the dynamics of the military-industrial complex) and the leader's perceived stake in preserving the present international system. It is therefore incumbent upon the smaller or middle powers to take responsibility for experimenting with alternative security policies in the hope that they may eventually be adopted by the superpowers. The fact that most of the alternative security proposals aired today originate in Western Europe and are intended for use in defending Europe indicates that the smaller nations are beginning to shoulder this responsibility.
 32. Johan Galtung, There are Alternatives, op cit. p.162.
 33. The idea that national security policies must cope with more than military threats is not entirely my own but is the

- product of a conversation with Dietrich Fischer in February 1988.
34. Some analysis of alternative strategies of conflict management (i.e. reassurance rather than deterrence) are proposed in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Maryland, 1989).
 35. For a comprehensive description of all these types of alliance systems see Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York, 1962).
 36. The term "regional security systems" is referred to by Richard J. Barnet in "Regional Security Systems" Richard B. Grey (ed.), International Security Systems (Ithasia, Illinois, 1969).
 37. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London, 1982)
 38. Karl Deutsch Political Community at the International Level (Random House, Inc: New York) 1954.
 39. Barry Buzan, op cit, p.115.
 40. I.e. the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT I & II]), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the agreements to control the spread of nuclear weapons (i.e. the Non-Proliferation Treaty) and the measures to decrease the likelihood of accidental nuclear or conventional war (i.e. the Hotline Agreement and the Stockholm Accord. For more information on security regimes see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes" International Organization Vol. 36 No. 2 Spring 1982 P.357; Arthur A. Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 Spring 1982, p.299; Janice Stein "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," International Journal, Vol. XL, No. 4 Autumn, 1985, p.599.
 41. For instance see Arnold Wolfers' caustic criticism of the globalists (he calls them moralists) in Discord and Collaboration, op. cit., p.164 and see Hans Morgenthau's critique of the utopians in Politics Among Nations, op. cit., p.3, 43.
 42. Arthur Stein "Coordination and Collaboration . . . , op. cit.
 43. Christian Bay, op. cit., p.145-146.

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44. It is on this point that I fundamentally disagree with Jonathan Schell in his interesting book The Abolition (New York, 1984). In Part II Schell argues that all nations must abolish their nuclear weapons but must retain the knowledge to rebuild them so as to be able to credibly threaten retaliation if one nation rebels and threatens to blackmail all the others with the threat of nuclear war. Although there may be little that is inherently wrong with threatening nuclear retaliation, I do not believe that a systemic perspective on security could conceive of any grounds, or any human value, which warrants the initiation of nuclear war. Furthermore, given the unknown effects of a few megatons on the sensitive ozone layers, I would argue, against Schell, that there is no value which is worth risking the use of a few nuclear bombs, even for the purpose of nuclear retaliation.